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Gina Paola Rico Mendez

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Governing the rurals: Food security and governance in the 21st century

By

Gina Paola Rico Mendez

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of
Mississippi State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Public Policy and Administration
in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Mississippi State, Mississippi

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Governing the rurals: Food security and governance in the 21st century

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This dissertation develops a theory about the consolidation of state legitimacy given transformations in food security. Food security has moved from a national food maximization effort to the provision of food to households and individuals, regardless of the production source. This definitional change was triggered by urbanization, industrialization of agriculture and liberalization of trade. These dynamics altered the formula for balance and control of a country's territory; as agricultural output moved into a global context, urban centers became less reliant on its periphery for sustenance and thus governments have fewer incentives to provide governance of any quality to rural areas. Hence, the expansion of industrialized production has led to an increasing volume of international food exchanges and reliance on transnational networks for food provision. This, I argue, produced a decoupling of rural and urban areas, yielding a new form of governance in the periphery, which relies on negative legitimacy and the expansion of large-scale agriculture under public-private partnerships. This dissertation challenges conventional approaches to modern state consolidation in the sense that the monopoly of violence in the territory is no longer the core of state legitimacy. Rather, alternatives now exist that make possible the consolidation of state political power.

Methodologically, this dissertation follows the critical case study approach. While it may sacrifice some external validity in terms of generalizability, it maximizes internal validity through careful process tracing. By tracing the trajectory of rural areas for state formation, agricultural policies, the concept of rural citizen and the interaction between rural and urban areas, this dissertation expresses in-depth knowledge of policy outcomes due to the change in food security. Utilizing findings from Colombia, before and after the 1990's, this dissertation illustrates the impacts of a change in the concept of food security and its effects on the administrative capacity in rural areas. Findings indicate that large scale agricultural policies and violence concentrated rural land ownership into export productive commodities and altered the structure of rural governance. While food security initiatives and policies has been a boon to world health, this dissertation illustrates how it has also brought about changes in state consolidation.

DEDICATION

Quiero dedicar este esfuerzo a mi familia en Colombia. A mis padres Roberto y María Inés, quienes con su amor y dedicación me enseñaron el valor de la educación y el la dedicación al trabajo. Nada me hizo más feliz que decirle a mi familia que ya tenían una doctora en la familia. Ellos saben del esfuerzo y la dedicación que me llevaron a concluir este proyecto. A mis hermanos Camilo, Diego y Daniel porque siempre han estado ahí, preocupándose por mí. Camilo, gracias por hacerme reír y sacarme de casillas todo el tiempo. Gracias Diego por hacerme pensar y pensar que algún día usted pasará por estas. Mi Dani, gracias por existir y hacerme ver que las cosas más especiales en la vida son más bien sencillas.

While Colombia is my home and inspiration to write, Mississippi became my second home and greatly affected my views of life and society. The people, the music and the stories in this place helped me growing personally, hopefully today I am a better academic than I was four years ago when I came here as the city girl. Among those Mississippians, Bryan Farrell became my best friend and partner, your love and dedication greatly help me to conclude this project; your passion and intellect challenge my views and pushes me to think broader and see different perspectives. I am looking forward to sharing a life full of adventures with you. To my dear friend and colleague Heather Hanna, she took care of me and adopted me as her little sister. Your love, compassion and tenacity make you an amazing woman, professional, mother, partner,

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To the community of Hispanics and particularly Colombians in Starkville, especially to my dear friend Sandra, thanks for all your help and support. Keep dreaming and working hard, and I am sure one day you will inspire your students to be even better than you.

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To the millions of individuals in Colombia that have suffered the consequences of the largest civil conflict in the modern world. I do what I do because I think a better world is possible.

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I would like to thank to the institutional support that I have received at Mississippi State University. I want to thank to the staff and faculty from the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, especially Ms. Quintara Miller, she is a fantastic asset for students and faculty, the department runs because of you. Thanks to Dr. P. Edward French, for his support in the recruitment process. To the staff at the College of Arts and Sciences, the International Institute, particularly Ms. Karin Lee as she convinced me to come to Mississippi State, and the Library, its staff dedicates an enormous amount of effort to review this manuscript. Special thanks to the support I have received from the staff and faculty at the Social Science Research Center, particularly Dr, Arthur Cosby and Ms. Jodie Shappley, they are like my family.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation builds off the observations of contemporary scholarship in the study of food security to develop a theory about the consolidation of state legitimacy in the modern world and its implications for how we think about public administration in developing countries. The rapid growth of world population and the subsequent increase of urbanization around the mid-twentieth century greatly increased food demands. This demographic shift required more efficient agricultural production and increased exchanges of food. Accordingly, urbanization, industrialization of agriculture, and increasing international trade of food production transformed the nature of national food security. Until the mid-90s, food security “was used by some to mean self-sufficiency” with a focus on maximizing supply (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009). Historically, food insecurity was felt to derive from the many variables, from climate and disease to war and technological capacity, which made local food production and distribution precarious. Unsurprisingly, this approach indicated that national governments bore responsibility for creating the conditions favorable to the development of food systems in order to stabilize population food needs. In the immediate aftermath of WWII, and broadly consistent with the historically dominant conceptualization of food security, the attendant focus was upon improved technologies (associated most powerfully with the ‘Green Revolution’), development of rural infrastructure, and intimately linking a state’s

agricultural productivity to the very health of the national project. This definition is consistent with the conventional narrative about the foundation of the modern state: an urban area dependent upon a peripheral space for supplying food needs to an urban core that, owing to economic specialization, could not produce its own food sources. Today the concept of food security is different; states no longer need to primarily rely on domestic production of primary products to feed their population. Instead, the expansion of industrialized food production has led to an increasing volume of international food exchanges and a reliance on transnational networks of food provision.

In this dissertation I suggest that this definitional change, while wholly consistent with the expectations of improved efficiency garnered from technological improvements as well as gains from trade obtained from freer and more open markets, has generated significant negative externalities that impair the ability of modern nation-states to effectively govern themselves. Ultimately, I develop a theory that suggests that globally, but most especially in post-colonial states, there is a developing asymmetry in the public administrative capacities of states to cultivate and maintain broad-based legitimacy, ensure the effective production of public goods to all citizens, and to possess incentives to exert authority across the whole of their juridically recognized territory. There are many possible reasons for this growth in asymmetric public administrative capacity (Englebert and Tul 2008; Herbst, 2000; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Migdal, 1988; Scott, 2009), but I will argue that changes in the nature of global food production and provision are a significant, and heretofore, underanalyzed variable that helps to explain this change.

This dissertation will be guided by the three core ideas: (1) the concept of national food security has changed in the past sixty years as a result of urbanization,

industrialization of food production, and liberalization of agricultural trade; (2) the shift in the concept of national food security has altered the role of public administration in rural areas such that rural public goods are too expensive and serve such a diffuse population that they are increasingly viewed as unnecessary; and (3) the shift in the concept of national food security has altered, or is beginning to alter, the nature of political authority in the modern nation-state system. Significantly, I argue that food security is a highly important variable that can help explain uneven internal state strength in an increasingly globalized world. Analytical models portraying the consolidation of modern states imply that the physical elements of the state coexist in a symbiotic manner where politically dominant urban areas rely upon peripheral rural areas to obtain food (Jones, 1981; Wittfogel, 1957). This model of autonomous political units has changed; today global networks formed by national and multinational corporations' (MNCs) actively participate in the consolidation of state in rural areas promoting a different model of governance. Put simply, most modern societies do not 'need' their rural populations as the percentage of people involved in agriculture has declined and food security can be ensured through global networks of agricultural trade based less on family farms and more on corporate models of food production. Consequently, modern governance is less oriented towards legitimizing state control over the whole of a state's territory and population, but rather aims to 'maximize' public goods by focusing public expenditures on populations that are either necessary to sustain revenue streams (in practice urban economic activity centered around services and manufacturing) or who may represent an existential threat to the regime by virtue of their capacity to quickly overthrow regimes owing to the collective action advantages afforded through high population density

(again, in practice, urban populations). The result of this is that rural populations largely are less a population to be cultivated and relied upon for their contributions to the national project and more of a costly burden to be managed. Low level and non-existentially threatening insurgencies are tolerated to the extent that they do not impair what few viable economic activities are conducted in outlying areas (in practice, extractive industries like mining and forestry and corporate agriculture). Indeed, the key policy-relevant conclusion of this dissertation is that, in the face of rational incentives produced by changes in food security and low population density in peripheral areas, low-level insurgency management will be the principal public administrative role of the state in the future.

This dissertation is organized into six chapters and a conclusion. The introduction exhibits the theoretical debates in the contemporary scholarship in the study of food security and its policy implications. Chapter II explores the triggers that promoted the substantial shift in food security (urbanization, industrialization of agriculture and trade liberalization). Chapter III, builds on the different perspectives on state-building to develop the theoretical foundations of a new model of rural governance. Chapter IV displays the method used in this dissertation; that is, the critical case study of Colombia using process tracing and case study tools as research strategies. The methods section includes a segment that displays the allegedly shift in food security in Colombia that occurred in the 1990's to further present the results in two empirical chapters (V and VI) that display the situation before and after the shift in food security. Chapter VII includes the conclusions of the dissertation.

Shifts in the concept of food security: Theoretical debates and policy implications

Given technological developments in agriculture, transportation, and food storage it is reasonable to think that, if properly distributed, annual global food production would be sufficient to satisfy global demand. Indeed, as a simple measure of food security the annual growth rate of food production since the end of WWII indicates that humans produce more than enough food to satisfy the nutritional demands of every person on earth by a wide margin (Tweeten, 1999). Nevertheless, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) data suggests that between 2012 and 2014 805 million people were likely to be chronically undernourished (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 2014b)

Why is this the case? Agricultural economists suggest that the key dynamics driving undernourishment and food insecurity tend to be lack of income and lack of access. Put another way, while there exists an ample supply of food at the global level, local variables conspire to limit food availability to populations most in need. The nature of food security is complex given the combination of human physiological needs, individual preferences, and collective institutions; three elements that frame contemporary discussions about the proper conceptualization of food security. In this section I will explore the concept of food security and how it has shifted from a nation-centered perspective to a globally-shared responsibility to satisfy nutritional needs.

Simon Maxwell (1996) argues that three paradigm shifts occurred around the concept of food security in the aftermath of the World Food Conference (WFC) in 1974: (i) “from the global and the national to the household and the individual” (p. 156); (ii) “from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective” (p. 157); and (iii) “from

objective indicators to subjective perception” (p. 158). While all three propositions are important and merit discussion, this dissertation will emphasize in the first paradigm shift. I argue that the movement from nation-centered food security to household and individual food security is ideal only since global policies tend to promote a different shift: from nation-centered food security towards consolidation of global networks to secure the provision of food. Therefore, in this section I will inquire why food security no longer means maximizing domestic food production in order to satisfy national demands.

To this respect, Pinstrup-Andersen (2009) claims,

“Originally, the term “food security” was used to describe whether a country had access to enough food to meet dietary energy requirements. National food security was used to mean self-sufficiency” (p. 5).

Considering food security as national food security is relevant for the discussion here because it promotes a set of policies that delimited the course of action for nations regarding not only the satisfaction of population feeding needs, but the preservation of national security and internal legitimacy as well (see Jackson and Rosberg 1982 for a discussion on the distinctions between juridical and empirical legitimacy). Taking into account Maxwell’s work (1996) on the post-modern perspective of food security, I argue that the concept of national food security is more appropriately framed by modernism and its political ideology of the sovereign nation-state. In the aftermath of WWII the nature of the sovereign state system changed. Where historically states were compelled to both defend their borders from invasion through the creation of armies that could repel invaders as well as cultivate the internal social contracts among citizens to more reliably raise revenues to pay for such armies (Tilly, 1992), the new international order worked to reduce or eliminate the threat of international war through the reification of juridical

sovereignty (Desch, 1996). New states emerging from the colonial period, safe from the perpetual threat of invasion, simply had to develop internal sovereignty from their myriad tribes and communal groups through the expansion of the ideology of the “nation” (Barzun, 2000; Hobsbawm, 1990). In this context, reliable food production was central to maintaining stability and achieving legitimacy. Therefore, the modernist model of state promotes the need for public investment for the development of food systems as they are essential to accomplish the goals of public governance.

Problematically, and as will be discussed more fully in later chapters of this dissertation, the mechanisms that compelled states to defend their borders in the preceding decades were also intimately connected to the absence of norms necessary for the cultivation of internal sovereignty. This dilemma directly implicated both the legitimacy of the new nation-state as well as made new countries especially prone to destabilization when the definition of food security changed. This last point is the central thesis of this dissertation. As food security became more closely attached to global trade and the feeding of growing urban populations with tastes for internationally produced goods grew, rural populations in new states were seen as either unnecessary to the development of the nation or as a burden to be tolerated or managed, not as citizens whose participation in the state was existentially needed.

Significantly, this change in the definition of food security, as well as its implications for uniform public administrative capacities, did not change in the immediate aftermath of decolonization. In a review of historic conceptualizations of food security, Smith et al. (1992) found that, until roughly the mid-1970s, the term was associated with maximizing national food stocks and engaging in production oriented

towards satisfying domestic demands. During the 1980's the term shifted to favor food security conceptualizations that stressed individual and household access. These two approaches are most cogently outlined by the Food Availability Decline approach (FAD) (Famine Inquiry Commission, India, 1945) and the Entitlement approach (Sen, 1981). The national food security concept is framed by FAD, with its attendant focus on attaching food production to the nation's survival, whereas the household and individual conception of food security is consistent with Sen's entitlement approach.

According to Maxwell (1996), the food security definition from the 1974 WFC confirms the prevalence of the national production model:

“[...] availability at all times of adequate world supplies of basic food-stuffs... to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption... and to offset fluctuations in production and prices” (United Nations, 1975 cited by Maxwell, 1996, p. 156).

For Maxwell this definition of food security places emphasis “on supply, to concern with national self-sufficiency and to proposals for world food stocks or import stabilization schemes” (1996, p. 156). Maximizing supply drove both changes in agricultural technology as well as the establishment of national bureaucracies oriented towards reinforcing the farming sector, with varying results (Bates & Rogerson, 1980), in many countries. Because famines were believed to be caused by a decrease in the availability of food, this approach promoted increases in food production as the primary focus of food security policies, and therefore mechanisms to reduce starvation and famines. The so-called ‘food availability decline’ (FAD) approach, can be traced to the classic works of Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus regarding the role of price mechanisms in the creation of social welfare (Smith, 1776) and the catastrophic potential of population growth as the cause for an imbalance of food availability (Malthus, 1798).

However, the national food security approach seems to put the demand side of the food security equation in a secondary place. According to Pinstrup-Andersen “availability does not assure access, and enough calories do not assure a healthy and nutritional life” (2009, p. 5). During the late 1970’s and early 1980’s Amartya Sen advanced the most cogent critique of the FAD approach, suggesting that starvation is not a supply issue only, or even principally, but rather a failure of food acquisition. The ‘entitlement approach’ suggested in his work “Poverty and famines. An essay on entitlement and deprivation” (1981) addresses the issue of starvation from the standpoint of the people’s relationship to commodities. He contrasts food supply statements to starvation statements, arguing that latter “are about the relationship of persons to the commodity [...] starvation statements translate readily into statements of ownership of food by persons” (Sen, 1981, p. 1). In this regard, “[o]wnership relations are one kind of entitlement relations” (p. 1), therefore “[a]n entitlement relation applied to ownership connects one set of ownerships to another through certain rules of legitimacy” (p. 1). In addition to the terms “entitlements” and “ownership”, Sen introduces the concept of exchange entitlement mapping which establishes the exchange relation between the set of alternative bundles of commodities that a person can acquire and what that person actually owns. In this regard Sen states,

“A person will be exposed to starvation if, for the ownership that he actually has, the exchange entitlement set does not contain any feasible bundle including enough food.” (Sen, 1981, p. 3)

Under FAD approaches, food shortages will lead to famines. However, for Sen this explanation seems to fall short. Concerned with the 1974 Bangladesh famine he states:

“The food availability approach offers very little in the way of explanation of the Bangladesh famine on 1974. The total output, as well as availability figures for Bangladesh as a whole, point precisely in the opposite direction. [...] Whatever the Bangladesh famines of 1974 might have been, it wasn't a FAD famine” (Sen, 1981, p. 141)

Sen suggests four general observations regarding the entitlement approach: It “provides a general framework for analyzing famines rather than one particular hypothesis about their causation”; [...] “famines can arise in over-all boom conditions (as in Bengal 1943) as well as in slump conditions (as in Ethiopia in 1974)” (p. 164); decline of food availability is concerned with the whole amount of food available in the economy, whereas “direct entitlement to food deals with each food-grower's output of food which he is entitled to consume directly”; finally, it emphasizes legal rights (p. 164-166).

In the context of the theoretical debates, food policies derived from the WFC suggest the need to emphasize food production. Seemingly, the likelihood of famines and food price increases influenced the direction of global food security policies (Maxwell, 1996). Three large famines occurred during the 1970's. The 1968-1972 Sahel drought that resulted in the death of one million people; The 1972 -1974 Ethiopian drought led to another famine causing between 50,000 and 200,000 deaths; and the 1974 Bangladesh famine that left an official mortality estimate of 26,000 and non-official estimates suggesting that deaths may have reached between 80,000 to 100,000 (Sen, 1981). These critical famines are utilized by Sen as empirical evidence to support the hypothesis underlying the entitlement approach. As mentioned, conventional FAD suggested that these famines were caused by a food decline, however using national level aggregate data Sen shows that the Bangladesh and Ethiopia (Wollo) famines were not the result of a

collapse in aggregate food supply. Instead other factors intervened in the entitlement failure. For instance, in Bangladesh Sen does not observe a food decline but actually quite the opposite--the 1974 rice harvest was the highest of the entire famine period, suggesting that farmers could produce food stocks. Table 1 summarizes the evidence presented by Sen in “Poverty and Famines”.

Table 1 Comparative Analysis of Four Famines – Poverty and Famines (Sen, 1981)

<i>Which famine?</i>	<i>Was there a food availability collapse?</i>	<i>Which occupation group provided the largest number of famine victims?</i>	<i>Did that group suffer substantial endowment loss?</i>	<i>Did that group suffer exchange entitlement shifts?</i>	<i>Did that group suffer direct entitlement failure?</i>	<i>Did that group suffer trade entitlement shifts?</i>	<i>What was the general economist climate?</i>
Bengal famine 1943	No	Rural labour	No	Yes	No	Yes	Boom
Ethiopian famine (Wollo) 1973	No	Farmer	A little, yes	Yes	Yes	No	Slump
Ethiopian famine (Harerghe) 1974	Yes	Pastoralist	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Slump
Bangladesh famine 1974	No	Rural labour	Earlier, yes	Yes	No	Yes	Mixed

Source: Sen, 1981, p. 163

Likewise, the 1974 WFC was preceded by an important increase in food prices (figure 1). A review of historical events of the era suggests that harvest failures in the former Soviet Union contributed significantly to upward pressures on global food prices as the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to a significant wheat trade deal that disrupted extant trade arrangements. According to Luttrell (1973) an amount of 400 million bushels of (subsidized) wheat at a price of \$700 million dollars were imported by

the USSR from the United States. It caused an important shock in the American food supply. Time magazine dedicated its April 9, 1973 issue cover to the food price increase. According to Time “consumer prices for food rose 2.3% in January and 2.4% in February-the fastest rate of gain since the Korean War” (“Changing farm policy,” 1973). Analyzing the politics underlying the wheat deal is not the purpose of this work, but it is important to acknowledge the effects of geopolitics on food security in an interdependent world. Indeed, other factors affected prices during the 1970s. John Schnittker (1973) suggests that price increases of agricultural commodities in the U.S. and worldwide was due to: (1) an imbalance in the supply and demand of grains and protein meals; (2) an income increase in developing countries that triggered the demand for animal protein; (3) limited soybean production due to a lack of incentives of U.S agricultural policies; (4) administrative barriers to agricultural production; and (5) dollar devaluation that promoted a demand increase in non-dollarized economies (Schnittker, 1973).




Figure 1 FAO Food Price Index in Nominal and Real terms

(*) The real price index is the nominal price index deflated by the World Bank Manufactures Unit Value Index (MUV)

Source: FAO, January 2016. <http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/>

Altogether, famines and shocks in food prices pushed for an increase in food production. In spite of the empirical findings presented by Sen to support the thesis of the entitlement approach and conceptual debates, the reality is that governments and international donors retained incentives to focus on supply and less on demand. In order to do so, policies aimed to strengthen agricultural production such as farm subsidies, public investment in irrigation systems, regulations on crop size and production, and price management (Anderson, Rausser, & Swinnen, 2013). To be sure, these strategies vary across countries (Thies & Schuyler Porche, 2007) and agricultural sectors (Winders, 2009) and these policy debates have occurred in the context of a globalized economy, a decline of traditional national ideologies that 'bind' countries together, and in the face of a new postcolonial world (Beck, 1997). Thus, while there was recognition of the complexity of food security as a concept, there were few ways that policy makers could incorporate new dimensions of the ways we think about food supply and demand into extant policy tools. While the WFC acknowledged that food security is a multidimensional problem, the most important alternative to manage the problem remained an increase food production.

As mentioned, Sen suggests that the entitlement approach is a framework for the analysis of famines and FAD is one among several potential reasons for famines, but not the only and/or the most important. Interestingly, the case of famines without declines in food availability are important milestones to understand the emergence of a food security narrative with complex policy implications at two scales: at the level of governance of rural areas dedicated to agricultural production, and at the level of urban areas dedicated to the maintenance of stability and legitimacy of the modern state. In addition, the debate

between FAD and the entitlement approach suggests that the historically dominant frame of seeing food-systems-as-public-goods has also changed. As the foundation of food security has shifted, policy actions have adapted to the new narrative. The structure of agricultural production at the national level no longer aims to satisfy internal feeding needs only but also, and perhaps more importantly, global demands for primary agricultural commodities. Showing results for the regional aggregate level, table 2 presents the percentage of food imports per region indicating that low-income countries are comparatively importing more food, although at an absolute level their import rates are declining relative to higher income states. This has important implications for food security because such regions should be more vulnerable to price shocks.

Table 2 Structure of food imports by income level and geographic region

Region	Food Imports (*) % of total	
	2000	2014
World	7.1	8.1
Low income	14.8	13.4
Middle income	7.1	7.3
Lower middle income	10.7	9.5
Upper middle income	6.0	6.8
Low & middle income	7.2	7.3
East Asia & Pacific	4.9	6.4
Europe & Central Asia	6.8	8.2
Latin America & Caribbean	7.2	7.3
Middle East & North Africa	17.7	..
South Asia	7.3	6.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	12.2	11.5
High income	7.0	8.3
Euro area	7.9	9.8

Source: World Development Indicators 2015, THE WORLD BANK. Last updated date 12/16/2015

(*) % of merchandise imports

Long definition: Food comprises the commodities in SITC sections 0 (food and live animals), 1 (beverages and tobacco), and 4 (animal and vegetable oils and fats) and SITC division 22 (oil seeds, oil nuts, and oil kernels).

Are these trends compatible with the definition of food security released by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in the World Food Summit of 1996? According to FAO, food security is achieved “when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life” (FAO, 1996). It is built on three pillars: availability of food, access to food, and food use. However, industrial agriculture and trade liberalization are affecting the likelihood of small rural communities achieving food security, given the unfavorable conditions for small and subsistence farming, despite of the fact that small farming units are responsible

for the largest share of world food production (Horrigan, Lawrence, & Walker, 2002). Generally speaking, nowadays peasants in non-developed countries face two options: stay in rural areas as part of the labor force or migrate to larger urban areas and searching for a *better* life style. Impoverished rural areas are more willing to return while agricultural labor is the most important employment sector in developing countries (FAO, 2014; Maass Wolfenson, 2013). Put another way, despite the historic reliance on agriculture as an employment sector developments in the area of food security mean that it is possible to grow more food with fewer people who receive, on balance, less income for their work. Not surprisingly, this development has manifested in counter-movements to reclaim the primacy of an ‘idealized’ rural society that is linked to the national imaginary through the concept of ‘food sovereignty,’ as best expressed by the 2007

Declaration of Nyéléni:

“The right of peoples, communities, and countries to define their own agricultural, labour, fishing, food and land policies which are ecologically, socially, economically and culturally appropriate to their unique circumstances. It includes the true right to food and to produce food, which means that all people have the right to safe, nutritious and culturally appropriate food and to food-producing resources and the ability to sustain themselves and their societies. Food sovereignty means the primacy of people’s and community’s rights to food and food production, over trade concerns” (Zerbe, 2012).

Nevertheless the narrative about the need to increase food production succeeded under the framework of globalized public-private networks leading agricultural production. As mentioned earlier, this dissertation will emphasize in the changes of the nation-centered definition food security policy. However the review of the literature suggests that academics have tended to emphasize a shift towards household and individual food security whereas global policies tend to promote food security through

the consolidation of global networks to secure enhanced supply. Important decisions were made during the WFC in 1974 that indicate the direction of this change. The participants in the conference agreed to increase food aid to developing nations, as well as to create an international fund for agricultural development. Even though developed nations were reluctant, WFC participants reached an agreement to subscribe the “International Undertaking for World Food Security Project” or “Boerma Plan” aiming to have an international emergency stock of 500,000 tons of cereals (Commission of European Communities, 1974, p. 3). Likewise developing countries joined under the aegis of the “Group of 77” submitted a failed proposal to compel developed countries to remove agricultural support measures and “the acceptance of the principle of repayment to the developing countries of the levies and other taxes collected on imports of products from those countries” (Commission of European Communities, 1974, p. 4). More importantly participants agreed to the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition which stipulated that:

“It is a fundamental responsibility of Governments to work together for higher food production and a more equitable and efficient distribution of food between countries and within countries” (World Food Conference, 1974).

A call to increase food production became the leading narrative of food security (FAO, 2009; Godfray et al., 2010). And, even after mid-1950s, it is acknowledged that despite the complexities and dynamics of food security global policies today focus primarily on producing more food:

“A threefold challenge now faces the world: Match the rapidly changing demand for food from a larger and more affluent population to its supply; do so in ways that are environmentally and socially sustainable; and ensure that the world’s poorest people are no longer hungry” (Godfray et al., 2010, p. 812).

Among the externalities produced by this approach, the supply-side policy model induced “a rush for land” (Keene, Walsh-Dilley, Wolford, & Geisler, 2015). This had effects on policy formation at the national level, that are only recently being realized, particularly for rural areas that traditionally do not fall under the category of “modern”. Nevertheless, the current state of food security policy focuses on the need to increase food production regardless of the updated conceptual developments that consider aspects such as household and individual food security. In the name of food security a model of large-scale land deals in developing countries is promoting intensification of production at expense of food security of local communities. This critical issue will be explored later in this section.

At the outset of this proposal I inquired why food security no longer means national security? After reviewing the evolution of the food security concept, the theoretical debates surrounding it, and policy consequences I argue that food security no longer means national security because it is no longer a matter of self-sufficiency, but rather has become an umbrella term for a policy whose primary publics are multinational firms and advocates for corporate agriculture. To be clear, this corporate agriculture model and the policy advocacy associated with it are largely responsible for a remarkable revolution in the availability of food resources and innovations that have made crops robust against disease and drought, markets for food transparent, and technologies for transport and storage effective. Despite these advances, however, this model has had the unintended consequence of detaching rural citizens from their historically existential significance for the countries in which they live. In any case, the call for increasing food production in a globalized world requires public and private efforts; national,

multinational and corporate initiatives, and overall a widespread call to increase food production for an increasing and widely urbanized population. In the next section, I aim to explain how this shift happened.

CHAPTER II

TRIGGERS OF CHANGE IN FOOD SECURITY

Urbanization

Since the middle of the 19th century, the human species has experienced two significant demographic changes: an exponential growth in overall population and widespread urbanization. These shifts have challenged the traditional forms of agricultural production that fueled the advancement of human civilization and have compelled rapid technological advances in agriculture in order to accommodate not merely the growth in demand for food but also the relative changes in agricultural producers versus consumers. The history of human conglomerates dates back to approximately 4,000 B.C. when ancient Asian and middle eastern civilizations succeed in the development of agricultural systems by meeting two requirements--favorable environmental conditions and institutions capable of implementing and sustaining technological change in agriculture (i.e. irrigation and plow systems) (Davis, 1955; Jones, 1981; Wittfogel, 1957). Davis (1955) asserts that “the result was a sufficiently productive economy to make possible the sine qua non of urban existence, the concentration in one place of people who do not growth their own food” (p. 430). The development of food systems under the model of an urban-rural divide transformed radically the political foundations of human interaction. Sedentary societies were capable of developing complex organizational structures for taxation via coercion (Graeber, 2011) as well as the

creation of public goods that enhanced the possibilities for gains from trade (Bates, 2010). The basic condition for development of this model was the symbiotic interaction between an urban conglomerate and a rural periphery for the satisfaction of food needs due to the presence of relatively dense rural areas (comparing to the modern urban-rural ratio) located close enough to centers of authority capable of providing both public goods and higher prices for agricultural goods.

However remarkable the creation of social orders based on the growth of urban areas, few ancient or early modern cities could rival the success (both in terms of overall size and population density) of modern cities. Davis (1955) justifies this limitation due to deficiencies of communication technology and the lack of transportation which increased the costs of maintaining urban dwellers who did not produce their own food, low levels of centralization of political power in cities and a strong bureaucratic rule over the peasantry preventing free trade, poor developments in medicine that limited population growth even under “healthy” conditions, peasant attachment to land which limited urban-rural migration, lack of large-scale manufacturing,; and strong social traditionalism (Davis, 1955, p. 432). But overall the main reason that prevented the expansion of urban societies was that “agriculture was so cumbersome, static, and labor-intensive that it took many cultivators to support one man in the city” (p. 431). Indeed, in the wake of the collapse of the Roman Empire the emergent societies of Europe were compelled to scale back urbanization in order to satisfy local food demands through manorialist and feudal structures.

Feudalism produced a decline in the evolution of urbanization. Relative isolation and self-sufficient localities were the norm with the castle and close surroundings serving

as centers for agricultural exchange at a small scale. The consolidation of political power under the aegis of monarchy in the late middle ages triggered the expansion of cities as forms of political organization but under the same basic structure of an urban area surrounded by a rural periphery whose agricultural output was essential for survival. This process accompanied the emergence of a new form of political organization: the modern state. Once national states consolidated, a second stage in the modernization era transformed the urban-rural dynamic: the industrial revolution and mechanization precipitated drastic changes in the way society arranged its way of living and including important transformations in the way food was produced, stored, transported, and consumed. Since 1800s the true urban evolution took place worldwide and redefined the social, political, economic, and cultural structures of modern society. Among those important changes, urbanization and population growth transformed the dynamic of food systems increasing the need to expand productivity to feed a growing population.

Indeed, world population has dramatically changed in the past 200 years. Population increased exponentially after the Industrial Revolution reaching one billion around 1800 and doubling to two billion in 1927. Since 1960, when the world population reached 3 billion, the world has grown by about a billion inhabitants every 13 years. This dramatic growth was accompanied with a similarly important change in the urban-rural population ratio. Urban areas have grown significantly faster than rural areas in the 20th Century and today around half of the world population lives in cities (UN-Population Division, 1999). Figure 2 shows that urban areas have accounted for the majority of total population in North America, Latin America and Europe since 1960 with rural-to-urban migration being most pronounced in Latin America. Similarly, aggregate data at national

level shows that high income countries are heavily urban and low income countries are heavily rural (figure 3). Indeed, in low-income countries an important portion of the labor force is in agriculture with relatively low wages. In addition, the need to increase productivity in agriculture has promoted models that are less human-labor intensive leading rural populations to migrate to cities, thereby increasing poverty levels in urban areas of non-wealthy countries. As industrialization expanded and secondary and tertiary sectors became the major source of economic wealth, rural areas faced two alternatives: to implement technological developments in agriculture to increase output and wealth (highly concentrated) or to remain poor.




Figure 2 Percentage of urban population by region 1960 – 2014 (*)

(*) “Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects.” (World Bank, 2015)

Source: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>




Figure 3 Percentage of urban population by income level and 1960 – 2014 (*)

Source: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

The relatively recent wave of urbanization, particularly in western countries forced significant changes in the pattern of social life that affected not only urban areas but the rural “hinterland” as well (Davis, 1955). The movement of populations to cities, combined with the exponential increases in per-unit agricultural labor output, has effectively changed the overall role of rural areas in the strategic calculus of modern countries. The hinterland is no longer used as the place to collect food for local consumption by a state’s urban and peri-urban areas. Rather, we observe the development of a corporate model of agriculture that is increasingly intended for either export or as inputs for processed food items (palm oil, soybeans, corn).

Concurrently, population growth and urbanization revived fears of the Malthusian catastrophe of exponential population growth accompanied by linear growth of food

which would lead to the rapid decline in the available resources. Population trends importantly affected food and agricultural policies. The Food Availability Decline (FAD) approach seemed the most adequate explanation to the Malthusian catastrophe predicted in the 1960s (Ehrlich, 1968). Therefore increasing food stocks became the center of national and global policies. A rapid expansion of utilization of technology in agriculture and liberalization of trade became the norm in the narrative of food security and undergirded rapid advancements associated with the Green Revolution.

Industrialization of agriculture: the role of government assuring food security

Considering the evolution of human societies around agricultural systems, one needs to consider environmental conditions as a central factor in the development of successful food systems. However, scholarship has insisted that successful agricultural systems combine adequate natural conditions for agriculture and institutions that promote technological change to stabilize production. An adequate combination of natural resources (i.e. water, soil, and environmental conditions), institutions (i.e. social, political, and economic), and availability of labor, lead to the consolidation of political entities that succeed in the governance of sedentary societies organized under a specific forms of urban-rural divides with a clear division of functions among them (Herbst, 2000; Herdt, 2012; Jones, 1981; Wittfogel, 1957). Conversely, as population grew and specialization of labor increased the amount of people not producing their own food grew as well, meeting food requirements became more challenging given that agriculture was labor-intensive and per-unit productivity was allegedly low. Davis (1955) asserts that “agriculture was so cumbersome, static, and labor-intensive that it took many cultivators to support one man in the city” (p. 431). Regardless of the favorability of natural

conditions, demographic shifts pushed the need to produce more with fewer workers. This challenge coincided with the industrial revolution and simultaneous dynamics such as urbanization, industrialization, and technological developments forced an unprecedented revolution in agricultural production.

Development and implementation of new technologies in agriculture was necessary to reduce the yield gap (difference between observed yields and those attainable in a given region) and increase product per worker. One of the important technological advances of ancient civilizations was irrigation systems for the growing of crops. The industrial revolution greatly contributed to output by developing ways to acquire water from unexploited sources, for example through the utilization of engines to pump underground water. Mechanization also contributed greatly to increases in agricultural productivity due to the ability to replace animals with mechanical track for ploughing and harvesting (Federico, 2010). Similarly, in the early 1900s the industrial synthesis of ammonia and hydrogen led to the development of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides that revolutionized agricultural production by increasing crop yield while simultaneously reducing vulnerabilities to disease (Smil, 2004). While technological advancements have been critical to ensuring greater production of food, there are externalities associated with developments in agriculture, including losses of water to commercial agriculture, contamination of aquifers, soil degradation, and destruction of natural (Cohen, 1995).

The need to increase food production came also from the likelihood of famines. As explored in the previous section, famines in developing countries spurred global discussions on finding alternatives to enhance efficiency in food production. The Green

Revolution, “a technical change in agricultural sector” (Griffin, 1974), was the strategy developed in industrialized countries to increase agricultural production in developing countries through research and technology transfer. An assessment of the Green Revolution indicates growth in crop productivity and more efficient land usage, an outcome that allegedly reduced the likelihood of famines (Pingali, 2012) but did not fully achieve the goal of food security: “adequate availability of, and reasonable prices for, food at all times” (World Food Conference, 1974). Under this framework, government-financed technological development in agriculture was seen as the premise to reduce food insecurity between 1940s and early 1980s.

International organizations and private donors led the development of technical change in agricultural sectors of developing nations. Pingali (2012) suggests that advances in research are public goods and as such governments and private investors did not have the incentives to invest, due to either limited resources (governments) or low-profitability (private investors). Herdt (2012) traces the history of international agricultural research lead by the Rockefeller and Ford foundations in Asia and Latin America. It started in 1940s as national programs and by the 1960s it moved towards international agricultural research centers organized around the Consultative Group for International Agriculture Research (CGIAR) (Table 3). The main purpose of this conglomerate of institutions in the early stages was to concentrate scientific research efforts for the enhancement of agricultural yielding varieties of staple foods (e.g. corn, rice, wheat). In that way, their main purpose was to improve the well-being of poor populations. In addition to the development of scientific research, another policy instrument that was reinforced at global forums such as the World Food Conference of

1974 was the availability of international credit for low-income nations to guarantee the financial flow to support food imports in moments of scarcity. One example of this was the Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), created in 1963 and eliminated in 2009 as a mechanism to support member countries to manage “export shortfalls or excess costs of cereal imports that were temporary and resulted from events that were largely beyond the members’ control” (International Monetary Fund, IMF, n.a., 2004).

Table 3 CGIAR Consortium Research Centers

Center	Acronym	Location
Africa Rice Center	Africa Rice Previously the West Africa Rice Development Association, WARDA	Bouaké (Côte d'Ivoire) Cotonou (Benin)
Bioversity International	Bioversity	Maccarese, Rome (Italy)
International Center for Tropical Agriculture	Known by its Spanish acronym CIAT for Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical	Cali (Colombia)
Center for International Forestry Research	CIFOR	Bogor (Indonesia)
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center	Known by its Spanish acronym CIMMYT for Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo	El Batán, Mexico State (Mexico)
International Potato Center	Known by its Spanish acronym CIP for Centro Internacional de la Papa	Lima (Peru)
International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas	ICARDA	Aleppo (Syria)
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics	ICRISAT	Hyderabad, Patancheru (India)
International Food Policy Research Institute	IFPRI	Washington, D.C. (United States)
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture	IITA	Ibadan (Nigeria)
International Livestock Research Institute	ILRI	Nairobi (Kenya)
International Rice Research Institute	IRRI	Los Baños, Laguna (Philippines)
International Water Management Institute	IWMI	Battaramulla (Sri Lanka)
World Agroforestry Centre	Previously known as the International Centre for Research in Agroforestry, ICRAF	Nairobi (Kenya)
WorldFish	Previously known as International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management, ICLARM	Penang (Malaysia)

Source: Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centers (CGIAR), (n.d)

International institutionalization of technological development had important impacts on national agricultural policies and on nutrition outcomes. Pingali (2012) indicates that the premise of Green Revolution was the ability of technological change to produce a positive spillover effect on food security as long as institutional mechanisms and adequate environmental conditions were present. Once the international research efforts produced advancements in yielding for staple crops, national governments initiated public investment for “technology adaptation, dissemination and delivery” (Pingali, 2012, p. 12302). According to the author, the Green Revolution reported increasing efficiency in agricultural production with low-intensive land use: “Between 1960 and 2000, yields for all developing countries rose 208% for wheat, 109% for rice, 157% for maize, 78% for potatoes, and 36% for cassava” (FAO, 2004. The State of Food and Agriculture 2003–2004, cited by Pingali, 2012, p. 12303). Another important outcome of the Green Revolution was a significant increase of calorie availability for undernourished people. Regarding the role of technology in reducing food insecurity, Turrall, Svendsen and Faures (2010) indicate that public-financed irrigation contributed greatly to food security by “providing approximately 40% of the world’s food from less than 20% of its area” (FAO, 2003. World Agriculture Towards 2015/2030. Cited by (Turrall, Svendsen, & Faures, 2010, p. 551).

As technology was available to farmers in developing nations, marketed agricultural production increased whereas subsistence crops have decreased, an aspect that has potentially affected food security of small-local communities in the context of large-scale agricultural production where prices are set in international commodity markets. Therefore, another important aspect regarding the role of technology in

agricultural production is the role played by governments in the definition of agricultural policies. The critical issue here is how the government (supported by global institutions) spreads the benefits of technological advancements among stakeholders. Issues such as investment in technological development and implementation, land tenure types, subsidies, price interventions, and tariffs are critical in the definition of agricultural policies at the national level. Market perspectives, in particular literature on the political economy of agricultural protection, suggests that governments have imposed costly transaction costs to agriculture introducing distortions that have affected food security. One aspect that is relevant to this discussion is that scholarship agrees that the agricultural sector is a case of special-interest politics that potentially affects food security (Bates, 1981; Olper, 2007; Thies and Schuyler Porche, 2007; Winders, 2009).

In this regard, and despite of these recent findings, it is worth considering an empirical study authored by Keith Griffin in 1974. Based on evidence from rural Asia and a couple of countries in Latin America (Colombia and Mexico), the study suggests that genetically improved varieties of rice and wheat in these regions did not increase production or decreased malnutrition. Instead, he suggests that “the benefits of the green revolution have largely accrued to the prosperous regions and the more prosperous landowners” (Griffin, 1974). Whether his findings can be easily disputed today (regarding production increase and decrease in undernourishment), Griffin (1974) makes an important suggestion for the analysis of agricultural policies founded on technical change:

“Conflict can be found at many different levels, and we have divided the various groups of society in several different ways to reflect this fact. At one level there is a conflict between nations. [...]. It did arise, however, in connection with the

tendency of several countries to use the new varieties as an excuse or opportunity to import substitute foodgrains at the expense of traditional rice. There are other contexts, of course, in which international conflicts of interest can be present, e.g., a conflict between countries which wish to export agricultural machinery and agro-chemicals and those that wish to safeguard domestic employment” (pp. 248-249).

It is not my aim to neglect the role of technological development in food security, instead it is to promote an informed and critical discussion about the aspects that potentially affect it. The main lesson from this perspective is that conflict of interest is potentially a central component of the analysis of food security policies, but also the existence of institutional factors affecting the production, distribution and utilization of food. As discussed earlier, the entitlement approach indicates that the framework to analyze famines and undernourishment should go beyond food availability decline and include additional factors that should be considered as explanations of individuals' lack of entitlements. Well-known are the famines in Africa associated not only to droughts but also to political instability and economic frailty. For the case of low investment in maintenance of rural infrastructure, Ostrom, Schoeder and Wynne (1993) suggest that the issue is how hierarchical governance creates wrong incentives to individuals participating in social arrangements in rural areas of developing countries, reducing possibilities for economic and political development. Olper (2007) finds empirical evidence to indicate that agricultural protection and political ideology are related, given that agricultural policy is one of those that concerns special interests. What all these works have in common is that they point out the role of political and economic factors as central components in a comprehensive analysis of food security, one that includes nutrition and agricultural variables, and strategies for rural development.

Increasing of free trade

This section will present an analysis of the role of free trade and market perspectives in food security. The first part will present the evolution and main features of market-based solutions to collective action problems, the second will consider market-failures in international trade and national policies for agricultural sector and its impacts on food security.

An approach to market-based solutions for collective action problems

In the transition from Feudalism to Modernism, the expansion of economic power of centralized states was conceived as an outcome of monetary accumulation (precious metals) owing to international trade. Mercantilism was criticized by classic liberals such as Smith who was convinced that the division of labor in a market economy (guided by the principle *laissez faire laissez passer*) would lead to the wealth of nations and by Ricardo who argued that economic growth would come from specialization and free trade among countries. Changes in the economic approach reflected the political and economic sentiment of the moment, the spread of ideas of free markets seemed appealing to the need of expansion of state power.

Regarding the market as mechanism to manage collective action, it is necessary to consider the different movements in the history of economic thought. (1) Classics Liberal Economics suggests that exchange under market conditions and scarcity are important notions in the provision of public goods, where concepts such as invisible hand, *Laissez faire et laissez passer* (Adam Smith), the labor theory of value, iron law of wages (David Ricardo), and ideas about population growth and scarcity of resources (Thomas R. Malthus) became central in understanding the emergence of modern economic

institutions. (2) Neo-classic Economics, that adds mathematics to the economic analysis based on the work of the classics. The works of Jevons, Walras, Pareto, Hayek, and Samuelson, are central understanding the movement. The basic concepts under this movement are that individuals are rational and they are concerned with the maximization of their utility functions, exchanges occur with complete information, that prices contain all relevant information, and in welfare economics the assumption that market equilibrium are Pareto efficient. (3) Public Choice and Neo-Institutionalism, consider that the neoclassic assumption that prices contain all information in market transactions to be inadequate, instead suggesting that institutions play an important role in the reduction of transaction costs regarding incomplete information (D.C. North, 1990) because they reduce uncertainty and create credible commitments among participants (Milgrom, North, & Weingast, 1990; Myerson, 2008; Olson, 1993) . Under this perspective, collective action is the aggregation of individual preferences (Buchanan & Tullock, 1999). A classic definition regarding the market mechanism is that institutions are focal points or mutually agreed rules and norms that produce multiple equilibria. (Schelling, 1960)

Under market-based mechanisms exchange underlies social order. Supporters argue that economic relationships are part of human nature, exchanges are “good” forms to incentivize innovation and that markets are the most appropriate forms of solving collective action problems. The relevance of the market-based mechanisms to convey policy preferences and the introduction of rational-decision approaches in government action is based upon the notion of government failures (Johnson & Kwak, 2012; Kettl, 2003; Lowi, 1979; Ostrom, 1971). Several schools of thought have developed strong

criticisms to the hierarchical mechanism to convey policy preferences. Lowi (1979) criticized interest group liberalism, or the tendency of groups to coopt the power of the state: corporatism, and the predominance of administration and the generalized acceptance of Statism. From the rational choice perspective, several arguments underpin the criticism towards centralization of power in the state. Hayek (1944) is concerned with the arbitrary power of the state and argues that centralized planning is a false road to freedom therefore, collectivism creates false common goals not founded in individual preferences (Hayek, 1944). Public choice scholars pointed out the inefficiency in resource allocation, regarding costly effects of government interventions in markets, such as high concentration of benefits and spread costs (Buchanan & Tullock, 1999). This has been also pointed out by Bates (1981). He suggests that the lack of appropriate institutional incentives (particularly in agriculture) has led to increasing corruption in African countries (Bates, 1981). Free rider problem in the allocation of pure public goods (Hardin, 1968), and the impossibility of collective action among large groups or external coercion because of rational self-interested individuals (Olson, 1965) are also important sources of criticisms among rational choice scholars towards governmental action. From behavioral economics and an evolutionary theory standpoint, Ostrom focuses her criticism on how external coercion reduces cooperation (Ostrom, 2000). Considering these criticisms the agricultural sector appears to be the exceptional case to make evident government failures.

Centralized government defenders suggest that public intervention is required to minimize the impacts of market failures (Keynes, 1936). However, Kleiman and Teles (2006) indicate the problems with that assumption inquiring what really justifies

government action? Indeed, they suggest that excessive public interventions have produced a series of government failures as well. Those can be categorized (according to the authors) in this manner: Inadequate penetration within societal needs and capacities; legitimacy and efficiency; low levels of voluntary cooperation; bureaucratic discretion and red tape; voter attention and inattention; path dependence of political decision-making; competition for technical expertise; and weak administrative culture (Kleiman & Teles, 2006). For scholars criticizing hierarchical forms of government, these categories seem to be symptoms of a greater problem, the inability of the governed to choose among a variety of alternatives, as they would supposedly do under ideal markets. Accordingly, centralized government action has produced a series of policy distortions that negatively affect collective welfare. As centralized governments tend to spread costs and concentrate benefits, they reduce the ability of exchange to produce collective welfare effectively.

The basic assumption of markets-based theorist is that participants have the opportunity to choose among different alternatives under exchange conditions. Exchange participants will make rational choices among available options because the purpose is to maximize one's utility function. Because the state is the exclusive mechanism to solve collective action problems, rational individuals cannot maximize their utility function properly because they do not have a variety of alternatives and choose among the available options that maximizes their utility (Ostrom, 1971). Instead, market-based scholars suggest that a competitive market provides the individual with different options to choose from, and would allow participants to enter in the exchange voluntarily and not be forced by the coercive authority of the state. Under this perspective a constitution is defined as the aggregation of individual preferences and not as a social contract between

a Leviathan and scared individuals (Buchanan & Tullock, 1999). Hayek (1944) argues that the market mechanism is the best form of coordinating human efforts: competition is the principle of social organization because of its superior method of coordinating individual efforts. These paradigms acknowledge that even though markets are imperfect institutions they are better at the provision of public goods than government (Buchanan & Tullock, 1999; Olson, 1965). In an interaction of rational self-interested individuals, they would be better-off under market exchanges with an adequate institutional framework, low transaction costs, and better information (North, 1990).

Under the market-mechanism, economic and political institutions are not external and hierarchically implemented. On the contrary, norms and shared understandings lead to institutional arrangements that reduce uncertainty and transaction costs. As political order is “spontaneous” and not imposed (Hayek, 1944), exchange without external coercion is the most efficient way to solve collective action problems. However, this perspective ignores the reality of negative externalities created by free market exchange. As opposed to the Pigouvian tax (to correct negative externalities), Coase (1960) argues that negative externalities can be managed by establishing property rights. If property is well defined, divisible, and defensible, and transaction costs are low, simply by assigning the right externalities can be overcome (Coase, 1960). Regarding the distribution of political power at various levels of government, Ostrom asserts that quasi-market exchanges are necessary regarding the provision of public goods (Ostrom, 1971; Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961)

Despite of the professed benefits of market mechanisms to solve collective action problems, modern rational choice scholars acknowledge the existence of market failures.

These can be summarized as information asymmetries (Akerlof, 1970; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Coase, 1937), non-competitive markets (Bates, 1981), transaction costs (Coase, 1960; North, 1990; North & Weingast, 1989), principal–agent problems (Myerson, 2008), and externalities or public goods (Coase, 1960). External criticisms are relevant as well, and the main concern regards social justice problems: beyond rational individuals competing for scarce resources, are all publics equally competent to compete in market exchanges? Is the market capable to solve inequality problems (Rawls, 2001)? And from the political philosophy perspective, are the principles of liberalism and democracy concurrent? Or, is it an inherent paradox in the classic liberalism assumptions about the political and economic organization of society? (Mouffe, 2000).

Market or government failures? The role of agricultural policies in the narrative of global and national food security

As presented, theoretical underpinnings of markets-based solutions to collective problems such as food security are relevant to address the discussion on trade liberalization of agriculture. The problem of non-competitive markets is probably the most significant market/government failure regarding the agricultural sector; this is a central issue to understand liberalization trends in agriculture sectors since the early 1980s. As mentioned earlier, Lowi (1979) criticized corporatism in America, but that phenomenon seems to be the norm in the agricultural sector of developed and developing countries. Winders (2009) analyses shifts in agricultural coalitions in the United States during the twentieth century by describing interest division within agricultural sectors and their impacts of food availability. Bates (1981) analyzes the ways in which political power has been used to manipulate the major commodity markets in Africa. Agricultural

policies in African countries concentrate benefits towards organized groupings (elites) and spread costs over the unorganized masses (peasants). According to Bates African governments tend to sustain non-competitive markets leading to a concentration of benefits through pricing-based policies (i.e. rising of prices of goods from urban areas, and reducing prices that farmers receive for their products), subsidies for wealthy farmers, or using coercion to control peasant resistance and fragmenting opposition.

In general, agricultural protection is neglected by market-based defenders who argue that government distortions affect market outcomes in national and global agricultural sectors. Thies and Porche (2007) argue that agricultural protection in developed countries is an intriguing issue for economists, who conventionally focus on the economic exchange aspect only. This has been addressed by political science considering the role of political institutions in the formation of agricultural policies. They rely on Sanderson and Mehra's (1990, cited by Thies & Porche, 2007) five approaches that explain the persistence of agricultural protection in developed countries. The first is Olson's collective action theory which for the case of agricultural protection suggests that small groups with particular interests organize more easily and make decisions more effectively. Therefore there is a common interest among agricultural producers (despite of the variety in size and interest) and they are all interested in larger protection measures regardless of consumers' interests. A second group suggests that agricultural producers are more vulnerable to market fluctuations than in other sectors such as industry. A third explanation proposes that the large amount of actors participating in the decision making process produces lags in institutionalized support to agricultural protection. The next approach indicates that shocks in the international markets and fiscal rules drive changes

in producer support. The last explanation points out that agricultural protection adjusts depending on the different stages of economic development--early stages promote higher taxation for agricultural sectors in order to promote progress; late stages aim to maintain low food prices to feed urban population, but as income increases prices become less elastic leading agricultural producers to demand protection as production and income lag increase.

Anderson, Rausser, and Swinnen (2013) argue that government distortions in agriculture have diminished economic wellbeing nationally and globally. Among the policy instruments that constitute distortions are subsidies, controls on land use, production and marketing quotas, target prices, price supports, and border measures that directly tax, subsidize, or quantitatively restrict international trade (Anderson et al., 2013, p. 439). They observed a tendency towards pro-agricultural bias in developed countries and anti-agricultural bias in developing countries. Indeed, public investment in agricultural research has benefited big farmers under free trade agreements. Free trade has been part of the global economic agenda since the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, reformed in the Uruguay Round leading to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. Recently, the Doha Development Agenda is under negotiation aiming to reduce trade barriers to promote international trade with agriculture being the most critical issue. Anderson And Martin (2006) analyze the impacts of distortions in agriculture, and as a result they suggest that moving towards liberalization of trade (i.e. reduce tariffs and adjust subsidies and price-based policies) would lead to positive economic outcomes for developing countries,

mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, where rural populations are larger and tend to have lower income.

Regardless of the free spirit of global trade, the truth is that there are no real conditions for a fair competition among developed and developing countries. Global institutions promoting free trade are not given the power of reducing transactions cost by managing information asymmetries, principal-agent dilemmas, and non-competitive markets. In the case of agriculture we shall see that high-income countries have access to technology at far greater rates than low-income countries, agricultural lobbies are very powerful, and corporatism is expanding beyond national borders. Current international trade agreements (multi and bilateral) succeed by using the narrative of free trade but are negotiated under un-equal conditions incurring in market-failures as well¹. One is the ideal scenario under which market-based solutions can produce better welfare outcomes, but empirically we observe that conflict of interest and power differentials across actors determine policy formation, mainly in a special-interest sector such as agriculture. The reality is that beyond market and/or government failures, conflict of interests are an important variable to understand the trends in agricultural protection and its effects on global and national food security. Instead of the existence of an “ideal type” regarding agricultural policy, the point is that there are encountered several types that shape agricultural policies. Anderson et al. (2013) indicate that:

“[...] political and economic forces influence the strategic interactions among various interest in any public policy-making process. Various schools of thought in political economy have provided insights into the conflicts between the public

¹ Cases of multilateral trade agreements are: North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), European Union (EU), Pacific Alliance, South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP).

interest and special interest that naturally emerge in the design and implementation of public policies, including those that affect agricultural and food markets” (Anderson et al., 2013, p. 447-448).

On the other hand, variations across agricultural policy narratives suggest that policy strategies are determined by conflicted interests and group-shared encountered visions. For the case of Uganda and Ghana’s agricultural policies Mockshell and Birner (2015) suggest that developing countries are moving from taxing to subsidizing the agricultural sector and this explanation suggests that contrasting policy beliefs (i.e. domestic policy makers and international donors) are important to comprehend this shift:

“The dominant story-line of the domestic discourse coalition can be summarized as follows: ‘Productivity is low due to limited access of smallholders to inputs and lack of guaranteed prices. The proposed policy instruments (block farming, fertilizer and tractor subsidies, and price stabilization through buffer stocks) are essential to address these problems, and hence productivity will be increased. Agriculture will become more attractive to the youth and serve as an engine of growth.’” The response of the donor coalition, as is obvious from the above analysis, mainly present what in narrative policy analysis is called a “non-story” (Roe, 1994): The narrative of the donor discourse coalition mainly focuses on explaining why this strategy is difficult (governance problems, political capture), and why it will not be successful” (Mockshell & Birner, 2015, p. 10).

Regarding this conflict of interests, recent attempts to liberalize agricultural trade as a mechanism to increase food production has led to an increasing trend of large-scale land acquisitions. These land large-scale deals are occurring in rural areas of developing countries, those areas have been traditionally considered un-exploited or wasted lands and now can potentially be used for the expansion of agricultural land that would lead increasing economic development through public-private alliances dedicated to large-scale agriculture (Grajales, 2013; Keene et al., 2015). These alliances are able to produce and distribute public goods in remote rural areas and capable of producing a low-intensity

level of political and economic conflict reducing the likelihood of rebellion from rural areas. Rural areas now have lower population densities, more economic investment, and are destined to secure food globally, sometimes at expense of local food security.

Indeed, because of international trade networks many states have concentrated on producing for export, rather for local consumption, which also has increased the need for food imports (table 2). The debate between government intervention and market-based solutions to the problem of food security remains: there is an implied risk of relying on markets to meet population feeding needs versus the high costs of maintaining self-sufficiency instead of concentrating on developing comparative advantages and having monetary resources available to import food (Minot & Peljor, 2010). These dynamics have changed how national governments understand food security and formulate food policies; the symbiotic relationship between a highly dense center and rural areas to secure food has changed. And that has transformed the nature of state governance in rural areas. The market approach suggests that markets will determine prices but the exchanges are not happening locally, instead globalized food markets determine commodity prices making small-size communities vulnerable to market shocks. At the same time, government intervention in agricultural policies has produced negative consequences due to concentration of benefits. In this context, global trade has become the new rule to secure food, replacing the center-periphery model that modern state imposed. In this context, rural areas of the state do not meet the same function as the traditional periphery in the old modern states. States do not rely on their periphery to supply population food needs, instead the periphery serves to expand the agricultural frontier to unexplored areas through large investments. Technology and protection of agricultural sectors is no longer

a public good, instead is a new mechanism to legitimize the existence of the state in rural areas, though public-private alliances.

This trend leads to understand food security as a political problem that requires a comprehensive theoretical framework that has transformed the functional duality met by rural-urban areas in the state. This framework should include political and economic institutions, a physical scenario and people. First, I will define “political” as conflict of interests among actors with power differentials attempting to achieve or impose consensus. In the realm of political regimes, individuals or groups attempting to convey their preferences into political action can recur to policy solutions either through violence or representation, which produces different types of political institutions. Second, an attempt to conceptualize food security requires considering factors such as land and population size as means to establish the connection between population feeding needs and agricultural production. Third, food security conveys an economic and technological problem in and of itself, therefore economic institutions and technology development to enhance production need to be considered as well. Summarizing, I will argue that the factors affecting food security are political institutions, physical conditions of the land, demographic composition, economic institutions, and technology development and access.

As mentioned earlier, in this dissertation I suggest that this definitional change, while wholly consistent with the expectations of improved efficiency and alleged gains from free trade, has generated significant negative externalities that impair the ability of modern nation-states to effectively govern their rural areas, or at least to govern them in the modern sense of hierarchical governance. Ultimately, the proposed theoretical

approach indicates that globally, but most especially in medium and low-income states, there is a developing asymmetry in the public administrative capacities of states to cultivate and maintain broad-based legitimacy in rural areas, ensure the effective production of public goods to all citizens, and to possess incentives to exert authority across the whole of their juridically recognized territory. The next section will focus on the problem of rural governance in the state.

CHAPTER III
THE RURAL GOVERNANCE PROBLEM: A FAILED ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE
LEGITIMACY IN NON-URBANIZED AREAS?

The urban–rural divide is a fundamental, yet understudied, factor explaining modern state formation and public administrative capacity. This is perhaps surprising given the existential need of central governments to consolidate authority over the whole of their respective territories and population, but as the earlier discussion of food security and demographic changes suggests, it may well be the case that public administration scholars and political scientists should reassess extant theories about the motivations of governments to uniformly provide policy goods. In this section, I expand on how the combination of changes in food security and the seeming privileging of urban economies over rural economies has conspired to fundamentally alter the ways that governments in the developing world think about political legitimacy and effective public administration. In this dissertation I argue that this difficult task has been rendered all the more onerous owing to the decline in rural populations relative to urban populations, the precipitous collapse in the relative per-unit value of rural work and labor relative to the per-unit economic output of urban areas, and technological changes that have effectively made agricultural workers operating in traditional forms obsolete. Put simply, it does not make sense from the perspective of rational public administrative theories, to invest in public goods for rural areas. Consequently, rural population in most countries, but most

especially in states aspiring for ‘modernity,’ become peripheral to the overarching economic and political project of the modern state. Problematically, however, international law dictates that these semi-citizens are still attached to the juridical nation-state. The dilemma is what to do with them. These are some of the issues explored in this section.

The symbiotic relationship between an urban consolidated area and a rural periphery has produced an entangled set of rules and institutions leading to the consolidation of state legitimacy. Modernist theories begin with the assumption that the ideal state is a political entity with uniform legitimacy across territory and population (Deutsch, 1961; Huntington, 1968). That said, this dissertation will argue that the strict duality of functions among urban and rural areas in the post-WWII era has led to different paths of institutional formation in different parts of a country. While the tenets of modernism focus on the rule of law over royal prerogative, the rule of reason over tradition, and the establishment of a bureaucratic state buttressed by both a social contract and an imagined national identity, contemporary scholarship of the developing world make clear that this process has neither been homogenous nor thorough (Herbst, 2000; Migdal, 1988; North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009; Scott, 2009; Slater, 2013). Indeed, Scott (2009) and Migdal (1988) both characterize efforts by post-colonial states to extend dominance over outlying territories as persistently hamstrung by conflicts between the tenets of modernism and the persistence of traditional networks of authority, the supremacy of ‘authentic’ kin connections as opposed to national imaginaries, and order over social contractarian notions of freedom among the rural populations of many different societies.

Regardless of these differences, most theories of public administration and political economic accounts of state formation say that central governments must modernize all the territory that is juridically recognized as belonging to a state and aim to preserve its role as the central and exclusive authority in the territory. Attempts of modernization in the rural periphery blend a large set of strategies that include bureaucratization, the expansion of the myth of the nation, the extension of infrastructure to link outlying and central areas, and most importantly for this dissertation, the mechanization of agriculture. I argue that these attempts have failed under the normative assumptions of modern state building and instead these strategies have instituted a form of negative legitimacy in rural areas in place of the desired stabilization of political power of the state across its legal territory.

Nowadays, given the shift in the notion of food security, public-private networks of government agents and large-scale agricultural firms have succeeded in the stabilization of the governing function in rural areas through the implementation of large-scale agricultural projects. Significantly, and central to the thesis of this dissertation, while this emergent partnership between public and private agents has done much to reduce the specter of food insecurity globally it has produced negative externalities for rural/local communities who find themselves being 'third wheels' in the long-term governing calculus of national governments who value the legitimacy of urban populations and international firms more than rural dwellers. Put another way, national governments in many parts of the developing world have recognized that efforts to firmly establish the authority of the bureaucratic state in peripheral regions is difficult, expensive, and dangerous. To the extent that multinational agriculture firms can help pay

for part of the cost of sustaining social order in outlying areas governments are increasingly willing to ‘hand off’ part of the responsibility of rural governance to such companies. Moreover, to the extent that the demand for land is not evenly distributed across a country, we should see that a state’s reach is asymmetric across its territory. Governments will only work to establish stable governance in areas where the marginal returns from such efforts are positive. This means that, all else being equal, an international food security regime built on satisfying global (and increasingly urban) food demand through free trade and the proliferation of large-scale agriculture firms should be associated with highly asymmetric rural public administration in post-colonial states. Where firms have little interest in cultivation, rural social orders should be characterized by lower levels of public trust in state institutions, a general absence of attitudes legitimating the state, and possibly higher levels of corruption and the persistence of low-level insurgency. In the next section I will explore the notions of state building, a discussion that will lead to a fuller explanation of the changes in the nature of governing rural areas of modern states.

Theories of the state

Charles Tilly (1992) argues that “states make war, war makes states”. This statement encloses the main idea underlying the process of modern state consolidation. However, post-colonial states have not followed the same development path that this narrative implies, nor have they necessarily achieved agreement about the ‘appropriate’ structure of their societies through consensus or conflict. Even if post-colonial states exist as de jure organizations they suffer from continuous internal instability that prevent them from fully attaining political legitimacy across all the territory, what Jackson and Rosberg

(1982) term 'empirical' sovereignty. Similarly, in the context of international relations, states are allegedly equal but integrated in a system featured by the de facto power distributed among its constituent states. Theoretical approaches to state consolidation in the Western hemisphere have addressed ways that sovereigns sought to control territory owing to a need to internally exist as well as to prevent invasion from foreign powers (Levi 1988; Tilly, 1992). Considering the history of the state, control of rural areas through systems like feudalism and vassalage (Barkey, 1994) as well as through modern processes of nationalization (Caramani, 2004) was seen as a critical, if not the critical, function of emergent political institutions. It was not sufficient to control a town or urban area since these places, while important centers of economic and political activity, were dependent upon local sources of agricultural goods. Moreover, since towns were rarely very large (no megacities) and most people dwelt in rural areas there was significant security risk associated with leaving the periphery unmonitored.

Using the state as a unit of analysis to explain variation of functional governing institutions lies upon two assumptions: (i) the state is the most common (preferred or not) form of political organization in the post-colonial world, and the international system is structured by de jure units called "states". This leads to the second assumption, (ii) regardless of formal equality among states in the international system, state is not an objective construct, but a normative type of institutional design that emerged in a specific time and place, and its features do not necessarily fit to all contexts and physical conditions (Barkey, 1994; Englebert & Tull, 2008; Herbst, 2000). Although the features of the modern state, a king and its castle surrounded by a local market and extended through some arable land, an army, and the people, theoretically described by Weber

(1919) as monopoly of violence in a territory and population control can be understood as an ideal-typical form that created a path for the development of states. The notion of path development has been spread and formalized in the post-colonial world (modernization theory), and has re-structured the international power from colonialism to a system of formally equal states with power differential. However it does not account for why this path development has not achieved the expected outcomes as it did in developed nations.

Considering the state as unit of analysis to explain variation across functional governing institutions I will suggest a framework to analyze and compare theories of the state and how they would explain variation of governing institutions. According to Moselle and Polak (2001), theories of the state traditionally address three issues: (1) explain the existence of the state; (2) provide a normative account of the state; and (3) consequences of the state. Here I will suggest a framework for the analysis of theories of the state that address the normative problem, or who should be the ruler or where the sovereignty of the state lies upon? This question is central because it defines the form of the political regime, the problem of the underpinnings of political order or existence of the state, and it defines if the government of the state is a legitimate source of authority. The third issue concerns the political power problem, or how political power is divided among actors and territorial units. Finally, the consequences of the state can be observed in terms of political and economic outcomes, and the policy making process regarding the provision of public goods. I will use these elements to compare different approaches to state building. As a result of the review of the literature on theories of the state, scholarship suggests that these can be grouped into four perspectives or types of explanations regarding their conceptions about the normative, underpinnings, power, and

consequences of the state. These can be named as (I) contractarian, (ii) predatory state, (iii) political economy, and (iv) modernization theories. The next sub-section aims to analyze and compare these explanations by presenting their arguments regarding the mentioned issues.

Comparing explanations: four approaches to understand state formation and consolidation

Contractarian Approach

Normative assumptions

The contractarian explanation about state formation and consolidation find its basis in the classic political philosophy of liberalism from the seventeenth century. Two main elements emerged from it: centralized authority of the state and popular sovereignty. “The Leviathan” by Hobbes (1651) is the fundamental narrative about the foundation of the state as a social contract between frightened individuals and a colossal beast that is more powerful than the sum of all individual powers. The image of the Leviathan reveals the transition from the state of nature to the state of civilization in which free human individuals transfer their power to a big central power to obtain protection. The foundation of fear lies upon political and economic reasons: the divinity of the authority (Hobbes, 1651) and the need to protect individual property rights (Locke, 1698). In Hobbes’ work, the Leviathan assumed the form of an absolute monarch who receives the sovereign power from a divine source. As a result of liberal revolutions, the People became that divine source of power (Montesquieu, 1748; Rousseau, 1762). In this regard, the purpose of the social contract is to protect individual liberties and

property rights. Like the contract between God and his sons in the creation narrative, the social contract becomes the essence of the religion of the state.

Underpinnings of political order

Derived from the ideology of social contract, the hierarchical structure of power became a central component of modern state. The fact that individuals concede their powers to one central authority presumes a voluntary agreement under which the centralized authority promises protection in exchange for subjection. Here, I refer to an exchange of taxation for protection, because of fear of other humans. However, I would argue that the real matter is how this model creates the conditions for the symbiotic interaction between the castle, the market, and the surrounding land. Under these conditions, the rationale to participate in the contract lays upon the need to preserve property rights to secure agricultural production and market exchanges. A physical existential need that sustains the narrative of modern state.

In addition to hierarchy, democratic governance is required to secure state legitimacy. Democratic governance emerged as a result of the transition from traditional (stateless) to charismatic authority (absolute monarchies) and afterwards to a rational form of authority, the bureaucracy (Moselle & Polak, 2001; Weber, 1946). A strong state apparatus commanded by the state and supported on democratic legitimacy, aimed to control individual powers, monopolize violence in the territory, punish those who do not comply with the social contract, enforce property rights, and stabilize food systems. Both, the ideology of social contract and the democratic governance form the underpinnings of social order under contractarian approaches.

Political power

Social contracts and democratic governance establish the normative and underpinnings of the state. Consistently, the distribution of power within the system assumes that the people are the sovereign source of authority and therefore should be represented in the decision making process. In this regard, republicanism or parliamentarism were adopted as preferred forms of representation (Locke, 1698), and division of power was adopted as a form to avoid the corruption of power by concentration (Madison, 1788b; Montesquieu, 1748; Tocqueville, 1835). At local levels, the formulas vary between centralism and federalism as a means to balance centralized power of the state and localized powers but the aim is still the same. This structure of power aims to ensure the state's physical existence by creating equilibrium of forces between the central power (urban) and localized powers (rural) stabilizing the symbiotic interaction among the two.

Consequences

One of the outcomes of the social contract is the assumption about the function of the state: the classic liberalism version suggests that the main and unique function of the state is the provision of security for the protection of property rights. Nozick (1974) adapted this liberal principle to argue the need for a minimum state for individuals to progress. However, as the state emerged simultaneously with capitalism in its origins citizenship compels ownership. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the people are not equal to the sum of all individuals in a society, instead the people as social category resembles industrial or land owners who require from the state order and regulation to promote economic advancement. The main societal consequence under the contractarian

approach is that political development is built on the assumption of an unequal society. On this subject a contemporary development of the contractarian approach suggest the co-existence of both inequality and democratization. Ansell and Samuels assert that,

“[...] regime change is not a function of autocratic elites’ fear that the poor and middle classes would expropriate their assets under democracy. It is instead a function of politically disenfranchised yet rising economic groups’ struggles to obtain credible commitments against expropriation of their income and assets by the autocratic governing elite. This view suggests—contrary to the implications of the redistributivist approach—that political transitions are primarily a function of intraelite conflict rather than a function of a small but monolithic elite’s fear of the impoverished multitudes” (Ansell & Samuels, 2010, p. 1544).

Predatory State

Normative assumptions

The myth of the foundation of the state as a voluntary agreement is criticized or disregarded as a source of legitimacy in the formation and consolidation of state as the main form of political organization in the modern world. Indeed, Hume (1742) argued that such consensus did not exist, but

“Almost all the governments, which exist at present, or of which there remains any record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretense of a fair consent, or voluntary subjection of the people” (Hume, 1742, Part II. Essay XII.9).

Graeber (2011) argues that under the assumptions of voluntary agreement through a social contract and naturalization of market exchange, state and market institutions have shaped the way we perceive and construct the daily life experience,

“[...] institutions today –state and market, our most basic conceptions of the nature of freedom, morality, sociality- all of which have been shaped by a story of war, conquest, and slavery in ways we’re no longer capable of even perceiving because we can no longer imagine things any other way.” (Graeber, 2011, p. 14).

These institutions and their violent connotations underlie the normative assumptions of the predatory state perspective. Graeber’s (2011) argument highlights that markets and states co-constructed daily life-experience through violence and power mechanisms such as money and moral debt. Under this perspective, the assumption is that the tension between individual freedom and equality is not the core conceptual construct in the debate of formation of governing institutions, rather is a matter of how these two institutions frame people’s conscience to the point they accept that large external authorities (the market and the state) frame and shape the daily life experience.

In the same regard, Moselle and Polak (2001) argue that the predatory explanation suggests that “the goal of the state’s rulers is only to maximize their own take” (p. 4). Whereas Levi (1989) asserts that rulers are predatory in that they try to extract as much as they can from the population, but this does not imply that they are necessarily exploitative. Meanwhile, Tilly (as cited by Thies, 2005) argues that rulers engage in four activities in the process of building the state: (1) war making; (2) state making; (3) protection of those who support their rule; (4) extraction of resources, and these activities require for the state to be an extractive entrepreneur.

Underpinnings of political order

Although coercion appears to be the normative foundation of the social contract, classic contractarian views suggest the benefits of fear in the process of rationalization of political authority. On the contrary, predatory state perspectives suggest that the existence

of the state does not come from a voluntary agreement between parts, but from the monopoly of coercion by state which provides the state with an additional power: taxation. Under this perspective, the state can be considered an effective extractive mechanism. Levi argues that state revenue production is the key function of the state, noting that “the power of the rulers rests on coercion, but most operate within the rules of the political constitution” (Levi, 1989, p. 2). Two assumptions underlie the idea of state revenue production function: First, political actors are rational and self-interested with fixed preferences. Secondly, actors forming the state have interests on their own, derived from and supported by institutional power (Levi, 1989).

Political power

The existence of the hierarchical structure of power established as an extractive enterprise sustains the development of the political institutions that frame the distribution of authority among elites and the territories they control. Taxation is central to understanding the systemic interactions within the political system. More than a form of repression, taxation is viewed by many predatory scholars as a normatively good institutional outcome. According to Levi, the predatory maximization of revenue collection must be viewed in a more nuanced way than being merely exploitative:

“I distinguish predatory and exploitative behavior. Predatory action connotes a choice of policy based on a calculation of its pros and cons for maximizing revenue. By one definition of exploitation refers to the extraction of surplus labor.” (Levi, 1989, p. 3)

Even if the agreement is not voluntary, because of rationality and self-interested features of political actors, the extractive enterprise is functionally important to the

satisfaction of preferences of political actors. Therefore, it is by means of the state and its revenues that rulers achieve their personal and social ends.

Consequences

Moselle and Polak (2001) express a more negative perspective about the outcomes of the predatory state compared to anarchy and organized banditry. Assuming the ruler's intention is to maximize its preferences, Mosselle and Polak argue that as a consequence the output under a 'primitive state' might be lower than stateless societies or organized banditry. The basis for their argument is that no historical evidence suggests that stateless societies are worse off than state societies – works challenging this assumption suggest the contrary (Ostrom, 2000, 2011; Scott, 2009). Using a game theoretic approach Mosselle and Polak conclude that

“[...] unbridled predatory state can result in lower output and lower welfare levels than would occur under either organized banditry or even anarchy. The short intuition is that, since it is easier for the state to extort income from peasants (who are tied to their farms) than it is from bandits (who can retreat to the forest), the state disproportionately taxes productive activity and thus tends to push people towards banditry. [...] While the provision of such public goods increases total production, however, it can reduce the welfare of the populace. The short intuition is that by making life harsher for bandits, the state can now extort more from peasants without the peasants electing to become bandits” (Moselle & Polak, 2001, p. 28-29).

New Institutional perspectives

Normative assumptions

The basic normative assumption is that institutional arrangements produce different forms of political order (Milgrom et al., 1990; North, 1990; North & Weingast, 1989). North & Weingast (1989) inquire whether institutional changes followed the

Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England. The unwillingness of the Crown to pay its debts in addition to the royal prerogatives revealed how concentrated was the power of the Crown and how this situation negatively affected collective security and prosperity. Thus it was necessary to divide political power among actors, to develop political arrangements that led to mutual interest across centers of authority and tools to preserve individual liberties, rights and wealth. The most important institutional changes that followed the revolution were: (1) the beginning of the era of parliamentary supremacy, although the Parliament did not assume the sole position of power in the government; (2) royal prerogative powers were substantially curtailed and subordinated to common law, and the prerogative courts were abolished; (3) the independence of the judiciary from the Crown was assured; (4) the prerogative of political rights; and (5) control of public finance (North & Weingast, 1989). From this perspective, we can conclude the strong connection between modern states and capitalism.

Underpinnings of political order

The institutional argument has become a common place way to analyze and explain the emergence and maintenance of states. It has been argued that institutions reduce transaction costs (Coase, 1937, 1960; North, 1990) and create credible commitments (Myerson, 2008; Olson, 1993). Some institutional designs are more prone to produce economic development leading to durable and stable democracy (Fearon, 2011). Regardless of the importance of stability, these perspectives neglects the idea of an original consensus as the source of legitimacy of the state. Instead, they assume that the foundation of legitimacy is a moral-hazard problem.

As mentioned in the discussion about the contractarian approach, Hume (1742) suggests that consensus in the social contract does not exist. Myerson (2008) aims to analyze and explain the foundation of constitutional state, suggesting that it can be seen as a game-theoretic model to limit the moral-hazard problem in politics, or alternatively to address the risks associated with actors not complying with political commitments. By focusing on these ‘constitutions of commitment, Myerson presents an institutional explanation about the formation of constitutional states based on the idea of reputational equilibria. This perspective attempts to move from the narrative of spontaneous and consensual emergence of political orders to an analysis of the strategic interactions that anticipate the emergence of political order and an explanation of why strategic interaction leads to specific political outcomes. The argument underlying the analytical model is that personal constitutions of an autocrat is the foundation of all other constitutions in society because “the essential social contract is not between a leader and the general population, but is between the active supporters who help him to defeat his rivals for power” (Myerson, 2008, p. 125). A constitution here is understood as a political outcome that is the result of agents’ interactions, or institutional equilibria as a product of equilibrium institutions. Under this perspective institutions are solutions for dynamic moral-hazard problems.

Considering the game as an analytical instrument, the emergent elements for the foundations of constitutions are: communication, credible commitments and threats, external constraints to individual preferences, and multiple equilibria. Considering these elements, what drives the institutionalization of social norms? This is the starting point of the explanation about the formation and stabilization of political orders, from the

perspective of the focal points developed by Thomas Schelling (1960). What turns out to be very important and interesting too, is that it is not a spontaneous emergence of order (as in the contractarian approach), but a dynamic flux of interactions between individuals that reach stable outcomes. However we might want to be cautious to observe that these stable outcomes do not necessarily achieve the precise form of modern democratic regimes, but instead note that stable outcomes can be completely different from democratic rules (as in Acemoglu et al, 2013). This is a problem that is not addressed by Myerson because the rational component of his argument leads us to consider that the most rational form for the leader is democracy. However this might be completely different when considering focal points as part of the analysis. Therefore the concept of rationality becomes a normative argument and not only an analytical tool within the perspective expressed by Myerson.

Political power

The game-theoretic model takes place in an imaginary island in which leaders are fighting to control political power given the possible outcomes: income as a flow of taxes and rents per time unit. There is a sovereign who needs to cultivate the support of elites who, individually, cannot challenge the sovereign but who, collectively, could usurp sovereign authority. Myerson (2008) refers to these elites as ‘courtiers,’ in reference to the model of court life that structured political power in systems of monarchy. Four kinds of structures emerge governing the relationship between the leader and his active supporters: (i) absolute monarchy; (ii) monarchy with a weak court; (iii) monarchy with a strong court; and (iv) oligarchy. These structures will contribute to understanding the emergence and stabilization of political orders from an analytical standpoint. Before

presenting each type of interaction we want to make clear that for Myerson, it seems that these are distinct types of structures and not stages in an institutionalization process. This will have specific consequences in terms of categories of political regimes (we will not debate that here), and consequently although the model leads to the consideration of democracy as the most rational form of government from the leader's view (given his preferences and payoffs within the game structure), it does not mean that all institutional equilibria will lead to this type of institution.

In type (i) interaction, characterized by absolute leaders who are not subject to third party judgment, we see a credibility problem given the lack of communication among the courtiers. Communication problems might be costly to the leader, and then he might want to open communications channels, moving from bilateral to multilateral model of communication. This leads to the type (2) interaction; in a monarchy with a weak court the capacity for communication among supporters in the leader's court is introduced to the game. However, it can create equilibria based on distrust among courtiers illustrating that communication is a necessary but not sufficient condition to create commitment among the courtiers. Under the type (3) interaction, a monarchy with a strong court can exercise strong checks and is more favorable for the leader because it introduces credible threats and constraints in the relationship between the courtiers and the leader. The coordination problem identified in the monarchy with a strong court leads to the type (4) of interaction; in an oligarchy the equilibrium requires an optimal level of supporters to fight (when needed) the rivals to sovereign power, but this poses the question: what can prevent the courtiers from renegeing from the agreement with the leader? Here, the game has multiple Nash equilibria, but which one is the best? Myerson

argues that to solve the game at this stage, the best equilibria will be decided not by the rationality of the agents but by the culture of the court. Here we move from the analytical to the explanatory aspect of this perspective.

Consequences

The notion of constitutions is not a starting point but rather a product of institutional equilibrium--a public good that cannot be treated as a consensual outcome resulting from the interaction among equals but more as a result of inequalities among individual's costs and benefits. On the other hand, we can understand the legitimacy problem within political order formation using the concept of rationality offered by the game theory perspective as long as we acknowledge the importance of structural conditions that shape how rational individuals respond to institutional incentives. Finally, the use of the institutional argument that recognizes the role of inequalities among individuals and power structures can help to understand political processes in non-yet stabilized democracies. Put another way, this approach is useful for understanding participation as both a means and an end of political development and policy production.

Governing without the control of violence: challenging the classical definition of State Normative assumptions

It is usually taken for granted that developing countries have installed political and economic institutions that are legal but also able to maintain the status quo. Indeed, the case of Latin-American countries suggests that as an outcome of this paradox, the region has experienced rising economic growth along with increasing inequality (Altimir, 2013; Jimenez, 2015). Using Colombia as a case study, Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos

(2013) inquire “[w]hy do some states fail to establish the monopoly of violence and still preserve its governance capacity?” suggesting that one explanation is due to a symbiotic relationship between non-state forces and the executive. As non-state forces can influence elections in which they will support politicians (local and national) that have similar policy preferences, this creates equilibrium of forces within the state. In this scenario it is not worth it for the government to fight non-state forces since they legitimize their political power (Acemoglu, Robinson, & Santos, 2013). The normative assumption seems to be practical rather than moral; governance is an outcome of stabilization of forces in the territory. This argument reinforces the traditional understanding of state building. Non-state forces achieve electoral outcomes for the central government maintaining the symbiotic relationship between the center and periphery. The findings of this study suggest the existence of important differences between rural and urban areas given the ability of non-state forces (in rural areas) and citizens (in urban areas) to influence elections.

Underpinnings of political order

Political and economic institutions support the structure of political order that will establish different levels of democratization and system consolidation. The role of institutions is to achieve and maintain stability and durability of order through the allocation of political power (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009). Acemoglu et al. (2013) observe that countries in Latin-America, Africa, and Asia have the capacity to govern effectively even without the monopoly of violence, as required by Weber’s definition of the state. The existence of a state does not hold exclusively to the monopoly of violence but, perhaps more appropriately, to the

stabilization of forces within the territory. In this regard, institutions play a central role in the modernization process:

“[...] emphasizing the idea that aspects of state weakness, particularly the lack of monopoly of violence in peripheral areas, can be an equilibrium outcome which “modernization” need not to automatically change.” (Acemoglu et al., 2013, p. 5)

Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) develop a theoretical framework that explains the correlations between political and economic institutions and how they produce specific outcomes. As a consequence political and economic institutions produce different paths of political development. These paths support the consolidation of political orders differently.

- a. Consolidated democracy: non-democracy to democracy (linear path) Great Britain
- b. Unconsolidated democracy: democracy to democratic collapse (cyclical path) Argentina
- c. Persistent non-democracy: democracy is never created because of non-democratic political status quo that is stable. Singapore
- d. Persistent non-democracy: status quo makes democracy so threatening to political elites. South Africa (apartheid) (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006)

Political power

The political economy perspective as described by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) suggest that the distribution of land and wealth is an equilibrium of political and economic forces that lead to political stability. Specifically, Acemoglu et al (2013) aim address the question: “which incentives do central states have to eliminate non-state armed actors in a democracy?” Using game theory, they develop a model formed by: (1) two rational agents: central states and non-state armed actors; (2) a strategic situation: the

central government has the choice of maintaining or eliminate non-state armed actors, and the non-state armed forces have the choice of supporting the government or not by influencing electoral outcomes; (3) expectations of obtaining a sustainable outcome: in a setting defined by the authors as “democratic politics,” the players expect to achieve an equilibrium of forces that allow them to maintain/accomplish their policy preferences. The model assumes that “parties can make commitments to their policies, but their ideological stance is fixed” (Acemoglu et al., 2013, p. 12).

The model aims to compare electoral outcomes in a two-party competition (A and B) at times=0 and 1, in areas influenced and non-influenced by paramilitaries. According to the authors, the mathematical formalization has these implications: (1) Areas non-influenced by paramilitaries cast their votes based on their ideological preferences. (2) In paramilitary-controlled areas, electoral outcomes depend on their influence, thus citizens cannot cast their votes to reward or punish government; as consequence in these areas there is a reduction in the provision of public goods and other amenities and increasing inequality. (3) Paramilitary influence on electoral outcomes reduces the willingness of central government to eliminate them from their controlled areas, due to shared policy preferences, non-state forces will promote votes for their candidates, whereas central and local governments will prefer not to eliminate them.

Consequences

Considering Acemoglu’s et al (2013) model and empirical predictions for Colombia, what are the consequences for state building in similar contexts allegedly characterized for symbiotic relationships between non-state actors and central

governments that support the expansion of the monopoly of violence in non-urban areas?

The authors suggest,

“[...] the central state can develop (even “modernize”) without establishing such a monopoly of violence because there may be a symbiotic relationship between the parties controlling the central states and non-state actors exercising power in the peripheries of the country. [...] Politicians elected with the implicit support of these non-state actors will then have less incentive to eliminate them, leading to an equilibrium without a full monopoly of violence of the central state.”
(Acemoglu et al., 2013, p. 40-41)

How do the conclusions of this study compare with the Weberian concept of state? I argue that this perspective provides evidence in favor of the Weberian argument about state capacity. The formal model and the empirical findings suggest that the control of violence is a necessary condition for successful state governance. Based upon this perspective, if central governments and non-state armed actors have the same policy preferences, and they coalesce to win elections, then the outcome is an ‘illegal’ form of controlling violence in peripheral areas. Thus, are non-state armed actors acting as governmental agents despite of their ‘illegality’? Or are they acting as ‘legitimate’ agents of the government? Not considering the ideological preferences of actors could lead to a mistaken understanding of state building in developing democracies. Moreover, and as will be discussed in the empirical sections of this dissertation, the authors neglect the fact that Colombian paramilitary forces were perceived as legitimate actors among many rural and urban political elites who share the ideological perspectives of paramilitaries and see them as instrumentally useful (Bolívar, 2005; Cruz Rodríguez, 2009).

The distribution of power in a territory is an important consideration for the definition of national food security considering its connections with agricultural policies.

The “symbiotic relationship between the parties controlling the central states and non-state actors exercising power in the peripheries of the country” (Acemoglu et al., 2013) is not an explanation of stabilization of forces in the state, but a consequence of the arrangement of power within the state. This sort of equilibrium is the outcome of the role of urbanized rural elites that interact in the production of national policies that are articulated with multinational or international powers. The symbiotic relationship (both legal and illegal) between central states and non-state actors could have been the motor of development of modern states in western hemisphere but do not explain state building in postcolonial world. I will argue that this is not a structural condition for securing food, but is instead unintended consequences of the structure of international markets for food security.

A parallel story of state consolidation... or why these perspectives are necessary but not sufficient explanations of state-building

Following WWII the emergence of new states into the community of nations from the post-colonial world presented a challenge, and also a significant question for scholars interested in understanding why state building differs among societies. What helps to explain why some states are ‘weak’ and others are ‘strong?’ During the sixties the answer was quasi-evident: emergent states were weak because their previous colonial experience limited their ability to achieve political and economic progress. However, this explanation fails to account for many Latin American societies where the process of independence began in the nineteenth century yet state-consolidation has been, at best, spotty. Some authors argue that this is related to the structure of the international system (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Prebisch, 1959) that has tolerated foreign interventions into

Latin American politics in the name of great power competition. This perspective validates the argument that foreign influence has an impact on internal political development.

That said, what would account for the internal and/or intrinsic reasons for cross-country variation on the formation governing institutions? Some states, most notably Chile, have proven remarkably capable of moving from instability to overall stability while others, such as Bolivia, have proven unable to reconcile mass politics and comprehensive governance. In the previous section I addressed the issue from the perspective of different theories of the state, however all these perspectives consider the state as a unit of political power. As the context has changed I suggest that the state in the 21st century is more akin to a collection of pieces (i.e. actors, interests, and existential needs) interacting harmoniously or dissonantly with the ultimate goal of stabilizing urban centers of political authority through consensus or conflict. In the context of a globalized search for food security, a fragmented post-colonial state aims to secure modern legitimacy in urban areas, and seeks to maintain traditional legitimacy in rural areas by incorporating modern mechanisms.

Seemingly, given the current trends in food production, central governments do not take food from peripheries exclusively but also rely on food imports, reinforcing the idea that due to government failures in the allocation of public goods private entrepreneurship and free trade can solve allocation problems. In this regard, national food security policies as they relate to establishing state legitimacy has shifted considerably as countries increasingly seek the right balance between expansion of formal institutional power and maintaining de-facto control. Since controlling rural areas

is costly for central governments, despite a need to preserve the juridical components of the state under a centralized authority, the emergent strategy used by developing world governments is to share control over rural areas with private (national and international) agents who can supplement the cost of control as well as address information asymmetries that make local de-facto control difficult for urban elites. Through the expansion of public-private networks to implement large-scale agriculture, these entities can manage the cost of ruling rural areas. Even if this model increases food production it may not necessarily improve national food security. Instead, the key product of public-private cooperation is the retention of some degree of rural governance, even in the face of harmful consequences for local communities.

Governing rural areas: Modern inventions for traditional areas that cannot longer be ruled in the same way

I argue that the underpinnings of rural governance in modern states are agriculture, the myth of the nation, and bureaucratization. Agriculture is one of the mechanisms central states have utilized to modernize rural areas and this has led to an image of the state as satisfying an existential need by sustaining population feeding needs and controlling rural zones. The need for local food sources implied the presence of relatively dense rural populations located close enough to centers of authority to provide agricultural resources. As explained in the previous section, this model has changed due to the recent trends in population, industrialization of agriculture, and international trade. Urban areas do not rely upon adjacent rural areas to obtain food, instead employing global networks formed by national and multinational corporations' (MNCs) who actively participate in the consolidation of governance in rural areas. The need to secure

access to reliable food resources forced rulers to try and establish political order over outlying areas. Moreover, the amount of territory that the ruler needed to secure would need to be large enough to guarantee sufficient foodstuffs, but also small enough to reliably control with limited resources. A right balance between expansion and control has been considered the fundamental piece for state success. Agricultural policies became a mechanism to encourage political participation and integration of rural elites into the nation-state, and to sustain the balance between expansion and control. This is no longer true.

A second important mechanism that central governments found to modernize rural areas was the expansion of the myth of the nation across rural areas a mechanism to gather legitimacy from all areas of the state. Countries and regions were relatively small compared to modern countries and the need to ‘convince’ locals to obey (either through religious practices, force, or through any form of hegemony) forced the development of state consolidation, or at least gave a survival of the fittest incentive to try and render some sort of order on rural areas. Based on Foucault’s arguments of pastoral power (2007, cited by Stanisevski and Shoup, 2014), Stanisevski and Shoup (2014) suggest that the modern nation needed to incorporate rural populations into the nationalist myth and, to that end, integration of pre-modern rural beliefs were considered as necessary to consolidate governance in rural areas. Their work asserts that:

“[...] the missing element is “pastoral power,” which in the modern nation-state adjoins the previously separated feudal attachment to the land and the ecclesiastic “government of the soul,” pastoralism institutionalized through the Church, into the modern processes of regulation of the personal conduct through the institutions of political government (Foucault, 2003a, 2007, pp. 115-191). Hence, the nation-state as a socio-political instrument of governmentality, which has both territorial and population dimensions (the nation has its land and its people),

bridges the historical fissure in-between the feudal focus on the territory and the modern focus on population (Foucault, 2007, p. 108)” (Stanisevski & Shoup, 2014, p. 5).

A third important strategy to modernize rural and urban areas evenly was the bureaucratization of society. An ideal type of modern bureaucracy can be traced through the sociological studies of Max Weber in late 1800s and early 1900s. Weber suggested that bureaucracy is a formal, impersonal, hierarchical, functional, rule-based, form of governance (Weber, 1922, 1946). This ideal-type of political authority met the ideological needs of an emergent modern society that relied on rational-based legitimacy to govern society. Similarly, the rational basis of bureaucratic authority served the purpose of governing the territory of the state as a machine purposefully structured to control people in the territory (Weber, 1919). The statement “states make war, war makes states” (Tilly, 1992) becomes meaningful due to the internal need to control people and land. The writings of Weber are essential to understand the emergence and role of bureaucracy in modern societies. Regardless of moral interpretations, these ideal-typical aspects became the parameter used to evaluate what bureaucracy is or what is not--the “ideal” became the “idealistic” way to see the bureaucracy. Neutrality was guaranteed by standardized methods of personnel selection, salary, promotion, and hierarchical structure (Weber, 1946), controlled discretion by the division of powers, and warranted efficiency by the “appropriate division of labor” and scientific management (Wilson, 1887).

Historically, it was the Napoleonic code (1804) that set the basis for structuring a modern rational public administration aiming to stabilize civil political power. Under a combination of a dictatorial power and aims of spreading the ideals of the French Revolution (i.e. liberty, equality, and fraternity), the French Civil Code of 1804 reformed

feudal laws to introduce a new “Code” containing laws to establish equality before the law for all citizens (i.e. males), generalized law, and support of political stability. According to Daniel W. Martin (1987) the history of French Public Administration can be traced in three basic textbooks that developed the contents of the Napoleonic administrative reform in the period between 1812-1859: 1) *Principes d’Administration Publique* (1812) by Jean-Charles Bonnin, a proposed administrative code describing the main principles of this new public administration; 2) “*Des Tribunaux Administratifs*” (1828) and “*Éléments de Jurisprudence Administrative*” (1837) by Louis Antoine Macarel, whom though “*Droit Administratif*” seeking to explain the law through administrative principles; and 3) “*Études Administratives*” (1845, 3rd edition 1859) by Alexandre Françoise Auguste Vivien (Martin, 1987, p. 297). Given the impact of Napoleonic wars in Latin America, which led to early movements for independence, the French Civil Code was used as a model to design constitutions and legal systems in emergent Latin American countries after independence from Spain and Portugal (Mirow, 2005).

In the United States modern public administration emerged as an attempt to eliminate the vices of tradition in public businesses. The Jacksonian era (Van Riper, 1983) and the change from an agrarian, traditional society to an urbanized and modern one, can be identified as the critical moment for the advent of a new movement in the theory and practice of government in America. Non-conformity with the spoils system of the Jacksonian led to the creation of the Pendleton Act (1883) that initiated the merit system for the distribution of public offices in the United States. In the theoretical realm Wilson (1887) wrote the iconic article “*The Study of Administration*”, in which he

presents the core ideas that frame the politics – administration dichotomy. Taking ideas from parliamentary system in England and administrative theories in France and Germany, Wilson aimed to explain the need for a separation of the realm of politics (partisan) from administration, given the need to maintain the democratic principles established in the Constitution of the United States. Three central ideas emerge from Wilson’s work: separation of politics (partisan) from administration or the ideology of Politics Administration dichotomy (Waldo, 1952); administration can be studied as scientific field, therefore principles of administration can be inferred from its study (i.e. methodology); government should run like a business in order to achieve efficiency (i.e. practice).

Willoughby (1914, 1918) and Goodnow (1900) emphasized Wilson’s ideas by discussing the Constitutional division of powers and its effects on government, arguing that the function of government should be separated into the expression of the will of the state (politics) and the execution of the will (administration). This ideal-typical separation of politics and administration leads to a concentration on the administrative side of the formula in the study of public administration. For White (1955 (1926) administration should be understood as a unit that needs to be studied, its principles can be discovered and implemented in the government, and is characterized as an art becoming a science. The thoughts of the orthodox or classic movements in PA can be summarized as: (1) strict separation of politics from administration; (2) politics-administration dichotomy enhances democratic principles of the American Constitution; (3) government should be run like a private business because of the need for efficiency; (4) hierarchical

accountability; and (5) a need for discovering and studying the principles of administration.

Following the mainstream literature of state building, consolidation of modern states occurred with the rationalization of power by establishing enduring political institutions aiming to maintain the division of power, rule of law, and well-defined individual rights (Weingast, 1997); all these implemented by a well-formed and autonomous bureaucracy (Weber, 1968). As an ideal-type model of rationalization of political power, public administration intends to implement policies formed by the government evenly across the territory. Nevertheless, the praxis of implementing policies becomes challenging given that the bureau is an adequate figure of governance for areas with high population densities, but it is not necessarily appropriate when population is disperse as in rural areas. Consolidation of modern states occurred in urban areas, whereas rural zones remained 'traditional'. It indicates that the cost of implementing policies and controlling rural territory aiming to preserve legitimacy is high for central governments, compared to the benefits they can obtain from these areas. Assuming that population control is one of the main functions of the state, as population density lowers, the capacity of central states to govern rural areas is reduced for at least two reasons. First, the ratio of state agents needed to monitor people should decrease as population density increases, making population control less costly in urban areas; and second, central states do not have the ability to modernize rural areas the same way they do with urban areas. Therefore, central governments of modern states had two choices regarding governing of rural areas: (1) to abandon them expecting other states to invade; or (2) to implement an alternative model of legitimacy and governance rather than the rational

ideal. Nowadays, in the context of a globalized economy for food production, states have opted for the second option aiming to reduce the cost of ruling peripheral abandoned areas. Therefore, one can argue that rational public administration is a modern invention for a traditional space that no longer suffices as a strategy for rural governance. Instead, central governments have encouraged public-private alliances to govern rural areas.

Theoretical underpinnings of new governance in rural areas under the current narrative of food security

As a main source of rational legitimacy and hierarchical governance, bureaucracy does not meet the requirements of rural governance. A spread out and lower populated territory that sometimes cannot be easily accessed cannot be controlled under the same rationale used in an urban area. I argue that is because of challenging physical characteristics, the fact that peasants and rural elites respond differently to the incentives offered by central states (Barkey, 1994; Bates, 1997; Scott, 1976), and the changing nature in the structure of food production and distribution. While urban areas in non-developed countries have moved at a different pace towards the path of modernization, rural areas remain non-modern. This indicates an intractable distance between urban and rural areas in the process of state consolidation. Regardless, the state still has to govern rural areas, as a means to include these into the state and to reduce the cost of ruling them. The state has either to take advantage of productive lands through agricultural policies or has purposefully abandoned unproductive lands. Currently, given demographic shifts (urbanization), industrialization in agriculture, and increasing international trade of food production, the strategy of central governments to rule abandoned rural areas has shifted towards strengthening state-corporate alliances as

governing mechanisms to achieve and/or maintain legitimacy (negative and/or positive) in the countryside. This indicates that the strategies to obtain legitimacy are different in rural and urban areas.

Nowadays, under the umbrella of food security, large-scale agriculture in developing countries serves to the purpose of obtaining legitimacy and governing rural areas. As the number of people needed to produce food has decreased, mechanisms of control over rural areas in order to obtain legitimacy have changed as well. Because of globalized food markets we observe the production of 'ready-made' foodstuffs (i.e. people everywhere can buy bags of processed food and drinks that are possibly foreign made and easily transported around the world), the growth of 'corporate agriculture', and the fact that people don't need to live close to where their food comes from. People in urban areas need access to nutrition and affordable food, regardless of the source, whereas in the past it meant that rural areas should produce to feed the country's population. This, I argue, reflects the changing nature of political power within post-colonial states, giving the current narrative of food security. Global networks formed by national and multinational corporations' (MNCs) elites actively participate in the consolidation of the state in rural areas promoting a different model of governance. This produced important (and potentially under analyzed) incentives that are central to the theories of modern state building. Seemly, it is not a cohesive set of governing institutions aiming to enhance people's life through the production of public goods (as modern state is normatively understood the governing function), but to develop strategies to achieve legitimacy and governing rural areas.

At root, 'new' countries do not 'need' their outlying/rural areas in the same way that 'old' countries needed their outlying/rural areas. Contestation over rural areas in the developing world tends to happen in resource rich places (oilfields, mines, etc.) and not in places traditionally dedicated to agricultural production. Hence, the change in the definition of food security may be an explanation for the changes in the normative concept of sovereignty in many parts of the world. First, states are both weak and strong. Many states have firm control over key urban areas but lack control over rural areas. This is because economic assets to be taxed were seen as being in cities only. 50 years' worth of development advice taught leaders of the post-colonial world to focus on controlling cities and not on cultivating strong agricultural development. Nowadays, international organizations push for liberalization of agricultural policies (Anderson & Martin, 2006). Moreover, the overwhelming success of industrialization of agriculture made it possible for one farmer to feed thousands of people, whereas in the past it would take dozens of farmers to feed just a few hundred in the cities (Davis, 1955). This meant that rural areas became more and more depopulated further raising the costs of monitoring rural areas. Hence we see asymmetric state strength across the territory (i.e. few countries are total failures) and state failure is typically concentrated in parts of countries where 'the costs of insurgency are low' (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

Additionally, it may be that there is a politically costly externality created by technological improvements in agricultural output. Specifically, developing states no longer have incentives to fully control their rural areas because their physical survival (not political survival) depends on it. The ability to secure adequate food resources from global markets makes rural control less existential. Instead, central governments are

willing to share territorial control with national or international corporations by requiring that they are collaborating with the production of public goods. However this does not occur in a vacuum but in a context of conflict of interest for gathering resources, expanding economic power, and controlling insurgency. In practice, given the shift in the notion of food security, public-private networks have succeeded in the stabilization of the governing functions in rural areas through the implementation of large-scale agricultural projects. The land matrix project indicates that since 2000 world-wide there are about 40 million hectares of agricultural land acquisitions and, of those, only 13% is dedicated to food.

This new model can be considered a new governing structure different from markets or hierarchies. Rhodes (1996) argues that governance is a “structure for authoritatively allocating resources and exerting control and coordination” (p. 653). And he insists that self-organizing networks are a new form of governance defined by inter-organizational ties, “these networks are made up of organizations which need to exchange resources [...] to achieve their objectives” (Rhodes, 1996, p. 658). In and of itself, networks are not good or bad but its specific goals will determine negative or positive outcomes by sector. Sørensen and Torfing (2005) categorized theories of governance into four groups: interdependency theory “defines governance networks as an interorganizational medium for interest mediation between interdependent, but conflicting actors each of whom has a resource base of their own.” Governability theory suggests that governance networks are “horizontal coordination between autonomous actors interacting through different negotiation games.” For Integration theory those networks are an “institutionalized field of interaction between relevant actors that are

integrated in a community defined by common norms and perceptions”. Fourth, governmentality theory “defines governance networks as an attempt of an increasingly reflexive and facilitating state to mobilize and shape the free actions of self-governing actors” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005, p. 209). Conceptually, public-private networks negotiating and implementing large-scale agricultural projects as mechanisms of rural governance are closer to the definition suggested by Rhodes (1996) and in general to interdependency theory, but also gather elements from the governmentality approach.

In this dissertation I argue that there is change in the nature of state consolidation and expansion due to the current narrative of food security. Model A (figure 4) suggests an analytical model that illustrates the modern structure of state expansion and territorial control to achieve consolidation. Under this model, power is centralized and spreads across a territory and over a population that sustains the government of the state both materially (existentially) and politically (legitimacy and legal system). A state needs to control its “hinterland” in order to satisfy its existential needs (control territory to secure production). Rural areas are the support system for the existential need of the state. In its pure form, where urban elites define the course of state building and agricultural policies, the adjusted myth of nation and bureaucratization of rural areas are the main strategies to convey political legitimacy and maintain governance beyond the limits of urban areas. This model of concentric power based on a small urban area that symbiotically interacted with its urban periphery was historically the model used by high income nations with the purpose of feeding their own populations and then exporting over production subsidized or supported by the government. However, the situation was different for non-developed countries. Demographic changes, industrialization of agriculture and trade liberalization

pushed non-developed countries to adapt to these new trends that ultimately changed the nature of food security. Given these external conditions plus the asymmetric state strength across the territory, the expansion and control formula shifted and central governments adapted their strategies governing towards rural areas.




Figure 4 Model A. Modern form of state expansion and territorial control

Under model B-1 (figure 5), urban areas have expanded significantly and elites acquired greater political and economic power within the state. In addition these urban elites established global connections that gathered information from the mentioned external trends and transformed the dynamics of state expansion and control. Since a stable balance of external trade guarantees existential needs, connections abroad become more important for state success. Connecting abroad is a means for food security to become a public good in urban areas whereas rural areas meet a different function. They no longer serve the purpose of feeding urban areas internally but a shared form of

governance makes these areas prone to increase agricultural production for exports mostly or for agricultural production that do not necessarily is designated to food-crops.




Figure 5 Model B.1 – Current internal form for state consolidation

In model B.2 (figure 6) I suggest that there is largely connected world in which urban elites assume the role of being the legal and legitimate authority of the state. In order to stabilize political authority, urban elites need to balance internal legitimacy (i.e. gain votes in democratic elections) and at the same time maintain external connections with international organization and private investors. In this regard, public investment in rural areas is contingent upon agricultural productivity and not small-scale farmers' needs. Investments in large-scale agricultural projects come from central government but from private investors too (i.e. irrigation systems, rural infrastructure) At the same time public transferences from central governments for social development (education, clean water and sanitation, health care, and infant mortality) tend to decline, because responsibility is shared with local governments and private investors. In this regard, there

is an increasing inequality in rural areas of non-developed countries. We will start to see more and more urbanization, and more concentration of land and wealth in rural areas.




Figure 6 Model B.2 - Current external form of state expansion and consolidation

The increasing trend of global land acquisitions for agriculture as expressed in model B.2 suggest that an important change is occurring in rural areas of non-developed countries. Land Matrix project, a global land monitoring initiative defines land deals as “intended, concluded or failed attempt to acquire land through purchase, lease or concession” that meets these criteria:

- “Entail a transfer of rights to use, control or ownership of land through sale, lease or concession;
- Have been initiated since the year 2000;
- Cover an area of 200 hectares or more;
- Imply the potential conversion of land from smallholder production, local community use or important ecosystem service provision to commercial use.”
(Land Matrix, 2015)

Recently, the expansion of agriculture has occurred in areas that have been traditionally considered “wasted” (Grajales, 2013). In the past twenty years, Brazil has expanded its agricultural production to the tropical savanna ecoregion. Due to technological developments (i.e reducing acidity and adding nutrients to the soil), what was considered a worthless land for agriculture, turned into a productive land for soybean production, maize and rice. Despite of increasing agricultural productivity, agriculture has have devastated effects on natural resource in this rainforest (Brannstrom et al., 2008). We see that the case of Brazil is replicating rapidly in Central and Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia. The phenomenon known as land grabbing is explored by a group of scholars focusing on exploring the drivers of global land acquisitions (De Schutter, 2011; Keene et al., 2015; Land Matrix, 2015; Zoomers, 2010). Keene et al (2015) argue that the rush for land promoted by the call for increasing food production has triggered the desire of private investors in acquire land for agriculture. We used to think that corporate investment was a north-south (dependency theory) endeavor but recently there is an expansion of south – south investment. For instance, Malaysia, India and Brazil are among the top investors in agricultural land (Land Matrix, 2015).

CHAPTER IV

METHODS: CASE STUDY OF COLOMBIA

A Theory of Definitional Change in Food Security and its implications for State Consolidation

This dissertation has suggested a multilevel theory that establishes and explains the triggers of the definitional change of food security: demographic shift, liberalization of trade and technology in agriculture. This model has produced a new narrative of food security that heavily focuses on food production through large-scale agriculture: it is making central governments and its urban areas rely on external sources for food acquisition rather than depend on the rural periphery to obtain food (figure 7). Under this model, rural areas are no longer essential for state existence (national food security is not at stake due to the ability to obtain food from foreign sources), instead it has created incentives for central governments to either abandon rural areas or to share the governing costs with private agents. This new form of food security has changed the dynamics of governance in rural areas of non-developed countries that have available land to be adapted for agricultural purposes. As a consequence, we are observing a new strategy from central governments to balance the expansion and control formula between urban areas and the periphery of the state.




Figure 7 State changes in the expansion and control balance

The third level of the theory (figure 8) suggests that the new rural governance paradigm is becoming the new norm for state consolidation. As a product of the current dynamics of food security, new rural governance suggests a different interaction between central governments and private agents in the rural periphery. Under a concentric model (figure 7- A), rural areas meet an existential function for the state because that is the place from which food comes. That is no longer the case exclusively, instead under the multicenter/global model (figure 7- B.1) the expansion of urban power and the increasing costs of controlling rural areas has promoted a model of governance based partly on outsourcing control to private-public partnerships or through the tolerance of low-level insurgency that, while a nuisance, does not constitute a legitimate threat to urban centers, but a lucrative alternative for the central government which can increase the tax-base in areas that have been considered empty and wasted. And can lead to exports for trade balance.




Figure 8 New model of rural governance under the current dynamics of food security

As private actors are searching for profit and government is looking for stability and legitimacy, this model entails that government is voluntarily giving up the monopoly of coercion in the peripheral territory and private agents are willing to cooperate in the production of public goods and stabilization of these areas. Central government operates under a model of dual legitimacy, in urban areas government focuses on maintaining legitimacy by winning elections in democratic competition based on providing bundles of public goods and policies. In rural areas, government operates under a negative legitimacy where, instead of relying on democratic means to balance stability and control of the territory, rural populations rely on traditional means to convey collective action; central governments cooperate with private agents aiming to maintain low levels or eliminate insurgency, guaranteeing profit for private agents and traditional acceptance from rural populations.

The use of Colombia as critical case study

Colombia is chosen as the empirical case used to test the propositions outlined in this proposal for two main reasons. First, Colombia has recently become a frequently used case to study the evolution of political institutions by scholars of political development and rural administration (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos, 2013; Nielson and Shugart, 1999; Thomson, 2011). Like them, I choose to use Colombia as a means of assessing the theory because it constitutes a type of ‘natural experiment’ to test the veracity of how changes in food security policy impact state administrative capacity since Colombia’s history is characterized by periods of long-standing peace and attempts to implement comprehensive public administration across its territory as well as periods of instability where the rule of law is uneven. The use of such case-within-case research designs has been applied by social scientists using post-modern accounts of policy formation (Brass, 2000), modern structural accounts of development and violence (Chandra, 2004; Kalyvas, 2000), and institutional choice theories focusing on the micro-foundations of policy behavior (Cammett, 2014). Following these approaches, I suggest that a critical case study approach allows for the most effective way to flesh out the broader implications of the theory as well as to point to particular punctuations where shifts in food security regimes have produced meaningful impacts on the administrative capacity of national governments.

Second, Colombia represents a particularly ‘hard’ test for my theory since, unlike many countries in the post-colonial world, it achieved independence prior to the traditionally accepted era of the erosion of empirical statehood in the post-WWII period. Colombia, in contrast to the states of post-colonial Africa, gained independence in 1819

in an era when internationally recognized norms of juridical statehood could scarcely provide breathing room to nascent state builders. Indeed, Colombia as we know it today is less a product of the process of willful decolonization and is more a product of internal and external conflicts in the 19th century that ultimately led to the establishment of the Republic of Colombia in 1886. In other words, Colombia has been forced to at least try to accommodate its urban and rural populations, however sporadic and uneven that policy accommodation may have been, under the aegis of a common national identity in an era where the shield of international law could hardly protect its political integrity. Consequently, if changes in food security definitions and policy do have an appreciable and independent impact on how national governments work to provide universal administrative capacity over the whole of their territory Colombia is an excellent place to see it.

Research Strategy

Colombia has been long regarded as among the most stable democracies in Latin America, characterized by consistent economic growth, a robust civil society, and generally good fiscal behavior when compared to its neighbors. These conditions have led to economic and social policies that have reduced poverty, increased GDP and GNI per capita, and increased human development as measured by the Human Development Index. In contrast, Colombia also has the world's oldest guerrilla organization and a degree of rural instability that has maintained an armed conflict for more than sixty years. Moreover, despite attempts to strengthen courts, the judicial system is weak and is marked by high levels of corruption, property rights are not consistently enforced and

despite high levels of reported economic growth there are persistent problems of land and income inequality, particularly in rural areas.

Considering these paradoxes, this dissertation explores the definitional change in food security and its implications for state consolidation through the analysis of the Colombian case, where the contrast between political and economic stabilization in urban areas and armed conflict and poverty of rural areas, illustrate the normalization of dual legitimacy as a new path for state consolidation. In this dissertation I argue that these apparent contradictions, far from being a seemingly rare paradox, are predictable outcomes of the rural – urban divide that has promoted the coexistence of positive (modern) and negative (traditional) forms of legitimacy. This dual form of legitimacy has been utilized as a mechanism to balance out the expansion and control formula for state-building aiming to obtain a monopoly of violence. Although this type of dual legitimacy has been successful at managing violence in rural areas by making insurgency sporadic and localized, the case of Colombia indicates that a fully modern state has not been consolidated. At root, Colombia has chosen stabilization over universal modernization (i.e.; the government is content to modernize the urban population and indifferent towards extending public goods and infrastructure to the rural population), a dynamic that arguably is present in many developing countries. Nowadays, a country such as Colombia is receiving external pressures for expanding its available land to increase agricultural production; and internally as rural populations have decreased and the cost of ruling the countryside has increased, the state has opted for public-private alliances to stabilize the governing function in the periphery.

Therefore, this dissertation asks *why do some developing states have continued poor rural governance while socio-economic indicators on the whole improve?*

New governance for rural areas, associated with the rise in negative legitimacy, has analytical and practical implications. Analytically, there is a shift in the norms associated with the state consolidation process – moving from a concentric to a multicenter/global model. Additionally, we shall see that the state has, at least, informally acquiesced to share its governing function with private (national and foreign) entities.

Methodologically, this dissertation uses the critical case study approach (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009). Through the analysis of the Colombian case this dissertation illustrates the development of new forms of governance for rural areas of non-developed countries. In order to carry out this endeavor this research traced the trajectory of four variables in the Colombian case before and after 1990's (Mahoney, 2008). The studied variables are: 1) the value of rural areas for state existence; 2) the structure of agriculture in the case of rice, corn and oil palm; 3) the changing concept of rural citizen; and 4) the interaction between rural and urban areas related to food security (figure 9). The process traced here is the result of a systematic review and analysis of these sources: previous empirical studies, statistics (economics, agriculture, population and armed conflict data), policy documents (laws, decrees and planning documents) and news. Two types of data were collected: economic and political information.

T1	1990s	T2
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>The new meaning of rural areas for state existence</i> A concentric model for state consolidation ○ <i>The new structure of food systems</i> The case of rice, corn and oil palm ○ <i>The changing notion of rural citizen</i> The role of “campesino” (peasant) in the food production process ○ <i>The interaction between rural and urban areas</i> A symbiotic interaction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trade liberalization War against drugs Internal conflict Migration and displacement to urban areas Policies for technological shift 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>The new meaning of rural areas for state existence</i> The “new” city-state as the new norm in the process of state consolidation ○ <i>The new structure of food systems</i> The case of rice, corn and oil palm ○ <i>The changing notion of rural citizen</i> Businessman securing food for the people in urban areas ○ <i>The interaction between rural and urban areas in a changing environment</i> The interaction between rural and urban areas under the current dynamics of food security

Figure 9 Definitional Change of Food Security: The Colombian Case

Economic components

- Agricultural production (Ministry of Agriculture and SAC)
- Imports and Exports (Ministry of Agriculture and SAC)
- Cultivated areas and regions (Ministry of Agriculture). Geographic composition
- Land Deals (Land Matrix)
- Public-Private alliances (National Planning Department)
- Rural Poverty Data (National Planning Department)
- Municipal Land Gini

Political components

- Laws and regulations pertaining to each sector - Subsidies and incentives
- Sector reports
- Sectorial organizational structure (Fedearroz, Fenalce and Fedepalma)
- Military presence and non-legal armed presence (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica)
- News pertaining agricultural sector. Using the digital news archive from the newspaper El Tiempo, 976 news were collected and analyzed between 2000 and 2014 (El Tiempo, 2016). The keywords used for the news selection are: agricultura (agriculture), arroz (rice), maíz (corn/maize), palma (oil palm) and seguridad alimentaria (food security).

News and National Development Plans were coded using the software QDA Miner Lite Free Version (QDA Miner Lite – Free qualitative data analysis software, n.d.), using the codes in table 4. As a result a time line that allows identification of the critical moments in the second period of the study was created which illustrates the shifts in the aforementioned variables (table 15).

Table 4 Codes and categories for qualitative news analysis

CATEGORIES		
Food Security	Agriculture	Rurality
CODES		
Access	Agricultural production / Costs	Agrarian Reform / Rural Reform
Availability	Competitiveness /Strategic Sectors	Armed Conflict
Food Production	Free Trade / Globalization	Centralization / Decentralization
Foods / Consumption	Market	Displacement
National interest	Private Action	Empty lands
Nutrition	Productivity	Farmer
Phytosanitary	Public Action / Public Goods	Land Conflict
Prices	Rural Development	Land Use / Land Use Planning
Quality	Sectorization	Natural Resources / Sustainability Agrarian Reform / Rural Reform
Self-sufficiency	Stagnation or expansion of agricultural sector	Peace
Social Policies	Tecnology / Factors of Production	Peasant
Agricultural production / Costs		Poverty / Inequality
Competitiveness /Strategic Sectors		Property Rights

A systemic approach to the analysis was developed. In order to conduct this type of study the data analysis will identify patterns of behavior in different rural areas (variation across cases of negative legitimacy). By having the ability to compare cases that have high agricultural presence in a relatively new-space and relatively low state presence, I will be able to gain in-depth knowledge of the suggested new form of governance pushed by the current dynamics of food security. In order to conduct a proper data analysis I will follow the data analysis procedures suggested by Creswell (2007) (table 5). This allows for a detailed description of the case and its setting. Similarly, by

conducting the analysis in three different sectors the aim is to produce evidence which triangulates for the purpose of substantiating the information into a solid piece that will contribute to theory development.

Table 5 Data Analysis and Representation, Creswell (2007)

Data Analysis & Representation	Data analysis procedures
Data managing	Create and organize data files for data
Reading, memoing	Read through text, make margin notes, form initial codes
Describing	Describe the text and its context
Classifying	Use categorical aggregation to establish themes or patterns
Interpreting	Use direct interpretation Develop naturalistic interpretations
Representing, visualizing	Present in-depth picture of the case using narrative, tables and figures

Source: Creswell, 2007, p. 74

By tracing the trajectory of rural areas for state formation, agricultural policies, the concept of rural citizen and the interaction between rural and urban areas, this dissertation expresses in-depth knowledge of the analytical and policy implications of the change in how a state manages food security. In order to present the empirical findings this dissertation offers two evidential chapters referencing the policy frameworks before and after the events in the 1990's that triggered a shift in food security and therefore a change in models of governance and the interactions of rural and urban areas for state legitimacy purposes. An important punctuation occurred during 1900s in Colombia; during that decade we observe the consolidation of international trade liberalization, population changes and a technological shift regarding agricultural production.

The suggested theoretical model to illustrate rural governance under the current dynamics of food security is formed by *actors, interests of actors and actions toward*

other actors within the model. I suggest that in the proposed model of rural governance there are three actors: central government, private agents and people interacting in rural areas: they all aim to achieve their interest by directing actions toward the other actors. It is important to consider that the category *people* is formed by two sub-categories, urban and rural people. It is not a unity of people or citizenry grouped under the nation, as modern theory of state building would suggest but a clear differentiation between these two exist. Table 6 presents the details of the model.

Table 6 Matrix of actors and actions in an interactive model of rural governance

Actor	Interests	Form of action I	Form of action II
Government (G)	<p><i>Internal positive legitimacy:</i> gain acceptance through democratic elections in urban areas.</p> <p><i>Internal negative legitimacy:</i> achieve and maintain a balance between stability and territorial control in peripheral areas.</p> <p><i>External legitimacy:</i> Comply with demands from international organizations and create an adequate context for foreign investment.</p>	<p><i>G to P:</i></p> <p><i>Urban Population:</i> Redistributive Policies: Social Policies – health access, food stamps, food imports.</p> <p><i>Rural Population (Peasants):</i> Low-levels of official control (bureaucratic and military), transfers (budget).</p>	<p><i>G to PA: (plays differently depending on the agricultural sector)</i></p> <p>Distributive Policies: Price control, subsidies.</p> <p>Regulatory Policies: Taxation, production control.</p> <p>Large-scale public investment for agriculture: research, irrigation, rural roads.</p> <p>Open opportunities to create means of self-security (non-state armed forces).</p>

Table 6 (continued)

Actor	Interests	Form of action I	Form of action II
Private Agents (PA)	Profit	<i>PA to G:</i> Foreign direct investment (FDI) Collaboration for the production of public goods.	<i>PA to P:</i> <i>Urban:</i> Low-price processed food. The food can be produced internally or internationally. <i>Rural:</i> Contract farming: “agreement between a buyer and farmers, which establishes conditions for the production and marketing of a farm product or products” (FAO, 2016). Mostly with rural population at a small-scale farming.
People (P)	Nutrition and health-related needs. Subsistence	<i>P to G:</i> <i>Urban:</i> Acceptance through voting <i>Rural:</i> Stability through low-levels or non-existence of insurgency	<i>P to PA:</i> <i>Urban:</i> Market for selling agricultural production in the form of processed food, and/or bio-fuels. These areas can be located within the country or abroad. <i>Rural:</i> Work-force and Stability through low-levels or non-existence of insurgency.

Based on these interactions this dissertation aims to find evidence to these hypotheses, in the study of the case of Colombia:

H1. Government is passing the governance function to other actors in rural areas.

If central governments accept sharing governing function in peripheral areas, then we should observe decreasing political development (negative legitimacy) but increasing economic returns from rural areas.

H2. Central government is diversifying foods sources to satisfy urban population needs.

In the face of changes in eating habits, we should observe increasing imports of food staples, reduction of government protection to non-competitive sectors and increasing of agro-industrial production for export rather than internal consumption.

H3. Wide scale replacement of government in rural areas by low level insurgency and corruption in rural areas.

In the face of external investment by large agriculture we will observe increasing governmental efforts to secure property rights and increase security, accepting illegal but semi-legitimate mechanisms enforce security.

A Decade of Changes: 1990s Policy Shifts and its Effects on Systems for Food Production

The decade of 1990s marked the beginning of major changes in the structure of the food system in Colombia. This section will describe these changes and how they articulate to produce a definitional change in food security with implications for the normative aspects of state consolidation. The end of the Cold War, a new economic model (neoliberalism, multilateralism and free trade), globalization and the centrality of western political values became an opportunity for the United States to maintain and consolidate its leadership in Latin America. For Colombia, the new structure of power in the international system entailed trade liberalization and strengthening of political linkages with the government of the United States. Colombia timidly introduced trade liberalization policies in late 1980s but it was under the presidency of Cesar Gaviria in early 1990s that policies towards liberalization of trade consolidated, such policies were known as “*apertura económica*” (economic opening). The model followed policy recommendations established in the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2004) that

regarding free trade consisted of tariff reduction, liberalization of imports, financial deregulation, and in general a tendency towards the elimination of barriers to international free trade and were based upon the idea of comparative advantages.

Under the assumption that liberalization occurred in free market conditions, government and farmers failed to foresee that advanced economies strongly protect their agricultural sectors; therefore competition under these conditions did not produce the expected economic outcomes. An initial boom in early 1990s was followed by a stagnation of industrial sector and agriculture around 1995, this trend ended up in an economic recession at the end of the decade (figure 10). In rural areas, unemployment increased and social conditions did not evolve at the same speed as they did in urban areas. A generalized sense of disenfranchisement produced by the economic conditions and armed conflict pushed thousands of peasants out of their land into poor areas of urban areas. This not only transformed the population dynamics but also affected the economic and political structure in rural areas.




Figure 10 Colombia, GDP Growth Annual Percentage 1961-2014

Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015). GDP growth (annual %) [Data file]. Retrieved from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

Along with trade liberalization, drug production is another important element to consider when analyzing shifts in governance in rural areas in Colombia. During 1990s, the war on drugs acquired a central role in Colombian national politics given its relevance in the global agenda led by the United States. The Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), signed under President George H. W. Bush's administration, eliminated a series of tariffs on products from Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) to incentivize legal industries as alternative to drug production and trafficking. The connection between economics and politics was part of the strategy to fight drug cartels under the assumption and economic and political development will serve as a strategy to reduce drug trafficking. The strength of the relationship between Colombian and American governments was evident, during the 1990's Colombia became the most important recipient of military and police aid grants from the United States (figure 11).




Figure 11 U.S. military and police aid grants by country or region (total aid since 1996)

Source: Project of the Latin America Working Group Education Fund in cooperation with the Center for International Policy and the Washington Office on Latin America. Information Retrieved from: <http://justf.org/Aid>

There is an undoubtedly connection between drug production and armed conflict in Colombia. Not only drug lords organized under cartels but also left-wing guerrillas became part of the drug trafficking. Territorial disputes between guerrillas and drug cartels (and its armies, later right-wing paramilitaries) increased during 1990s. The expansion of armed actors in rural areas accelerated peasant migration to cities and deceleration of agricultural activities and cattle rising - given guerrilla threats to ranchers and farmers. By the end of the decade FARC accounted for up to 20,000 militants (“¿Cuántos Hombres y Armas,” 2014) and AUC had around 16,000 militants (“Miembros de las AUC,” 2011). Due to the intensification of armed conflict, during this decade government also increased defense expenditures.

Armed conflict, drug trafficking and crisis in the agricultural sector augmented rural poverty and unemployment, accelerating migratory process to urban areas. Bogota, the capital city, shifted from 4.2 million inhabitants in 1985 to 5.7 in 1995 (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), 2011), this is a significant change considering that the city did not reach a million inhabitants in 1950s. This represented a less costly governing function because he more concentrated the population, the le lower the cost per citizen. In theory, the more resources the government has available the more resources it can devote to the provision of public goods. Therefore, this push for urbanization concurred with a generalized improvement in the social and economic conditions of urban populations. Between the 1980s and 1990s in urban areas there was an increase of life expectancy, decrease in child mortality, increased access to clean water and sanitation services, reduction of illiteracy rates; social indicators that among others suggest an important shift in the living conditions in cities (Palacios, 2006, p. 220). However, the situation in rural areas remained critical during the 1990's. Stagnation of growth rates and living conditions among peasants became the norm, along with exacerbation of armed conflict and confrontation for protecting the drug crops. Due to these trends differences between urban and rural areas increased. Cities grew in size and population and they developed faster, while rural areas lagged behind becoming more costly for the central government to maintain and control. Indeed, Junguito, Parfetti and Becerra (2014) suggest that one of the main challenges that rural development faces in Colombia is that economic and social policies have focused on urban development at the expense of the development of agriculture and rural territories.

Although between 1970 and 1996 agriculture represented around 23% of GDP versus 20% of industry (Garay, 1998), government policies in Colombia have traditionally favored the latter over the former (Bejarano, 2011). The model for industrialization between 1950s and 1990s was dominated by import substitution, a model of economic development designed by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (Prebisch, 1959) aiming to strengthen domestic industrialization as means to increase economic growth, it was implemented throughout the region in the aftermath of WWII until trade liberalization in late 1980s introduced a shift in the economic model. The preference of industrialization over agriculture is also connected with the process of labor specialization and urbanization. As competition in international markets became important for agricultural sector, public investment for technology in agriculture slightly increased during 1990s. Before 1990s agricultural sector was featured by low-intensive use of technology, dedication to the domestic market mostly (except for coffee), strong protections by government and small-scale intensive farming for food production.

Among other technological shifts, government participation in the construction and management of irrigation systems changed during 1990s. The situation of irrigation systems in Colombia indicated low levels of public or private investment in this type of technology, due to a poor system of incentives and armed conflict. In 1991 the total irrigated area was 681,000 hectares out of 7.6 million of potentially irrigated land (Dinar & Keck, 1997, based on National Department of Planning data). Dinar and Keck (1997) suggest that in early 1990s Colombian government found out about the inefficiencies in water management for agriculture which lead to introduce institutional changes to

incentivize “private investments in water-supply and irrigation sectors” (p. 1). Law 41 of 1193 re-organized the land development institutions to promote greater involvement of private sector in the development of irrigation systems through mechanisms such as participation of users and making irrigation investments more attractive to private agents (Dinar & Keck, 1997). The push for the institutional change came from international organizations such as the World Bank that by assessing the internal conditions realized of the lack of technological developments in agriculture, implementation of institutional change was subject to loan approvals from the Bank.

Profound changes occurred during 1990s, economic opening towards internationalization of agriculture, increasing number of people living in cities augmenting the role of specialization of urban areas, increasing gap between rural and urban areas and a shift in public investment for technology in agriculture produced a shift in the public understanding of food systems as public goods. As the rural periphery is no longer the only place to obtain food, policies from central governments shifted towards the countryside. Peasants and farmers are not the priority of central government, they are not needed to win the elections or stabilize political power in the territory. Considering the 1990s as a decade that shifted the notion of food systems as public goods the next two chapters of this dissertation will explore the conditions before and after the 1990s concerning the structure of food system in Colombia.

CHAPTER V
PREVIOUS CONDITIONS FOR STATE CONSOLIDATION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR FOOD SYSTEMS

The meaning of rural areas for state existence: A concentric model for state consolidation

Modern political philosophy arguably begins with the idea of the social contract. The expansion of social interaction beyond the family and village level increases the complexity of the ties between the members of the broader community and among different communities due to the need to preserve individual and collective safety. Thus, as communities evolved and increased in size, fear became the political foundation of the state. Hobbes (1651) suggests that the foundation of the state is a contract among frightened individuals and the Leviathan emerges as an entity that is more powerful than the sum of all individual's powers. This contract aims to protect individual lives and property at the expense of some individual freedom (rules and taxation).

The complexity of political organization pushed for a specialization of territory. As population grew and economic specialization became the norm, urban areas became the place for commerce and labor specialization whereas rural areas maintained its role as the place where food came from. Central governments located in the cities ruled and protected the hinterland as a means to guarantee food stuffs. Consolidation of rural areas was existentially important. At the same time, this put rural elites and peasants in a position of power which defined the structure of the political system of emergent modern

states (Moore, 1966). As urban and rural areas acquired different roles, the symbiosis between these two turned out to be the essential formula for expansion and control of territory for modern state consolidation. Under this model, capturing the interest of landed elites became vital for central governments to continue the path towards stabilization. However, it did not mean homogeneity of policy interest; instead, capturing the interest of rural elites became a strategy to legitimize the governmental function of a state across the territory.

Nevertheless, the case of non-modern nations challenges this prototype of state consolidation. As the case of Colombia indicates, the path toward stabilization is challenging under a model of political centralism and strong regional division. As the central government never fully captured the interest of landed elites and peasants we observed a situation where landed elites assumed the role of security separately from the state and peasants organized guerrilla groups to challenge the political status quo that produced poverty and continued political exclusion. At the same time, the central government acknowledged the substantial role of rural areas for state consolidation, thus the efforts for territorial control are meaningful to the extent that rural areas provide food to urban areas. However, this fight for land control under the modern model of state consolidation failed due to, among other things, the inability to accommodate the interests of rural elites into a national project (Patiño V., 2010), the elimination of the peasantry as meaningful class within the state (Bejarano, 2011; Melo, 1992), and the inability of the central government to implement a strong system of taxation and property rights that would allow the consolidation of state legitimacy across the territory (Kalmanovitz, 2000, 2003). This section aims to illustrate the conditions in Colombia that

attempted to develop a concentric model for state consolidation and the significance of rural areas for central government under this model.

Attempts of state consolidation in Colombia: Centralism v Regionalism

Colombian politics has been featured as a mix of modern and traditional values (Leal B., 1984; Melo, 1990, 1992). The liberal political and economic institutions brought by creoles² from Europe were implemented in a traditional society dominated by loyalties and solidarities within local communities. This merge of modern and traditional values produced a specific set of political institutions that vary across the territory (i.e. urban and rural areas reflect this institutional variation). Although Colombian government has been able to establish a status quo that resembles some sort of political stability (i.e. stable elections in the past decades), it has done so without full political consolidation (i.e. the longest armed conflict in the modern world). This dissertation suggests that this has occurred under the establishment of a model of *dual legitimacy*. This system, characterized by a fairly liberal urban policy with comprehensive public administration and an authoritarian rural order administered by a collection of semi-legitimate but illegal armed forces, is the ultimate manifestation of the system of dual legitimacy that has sought to retain the functional trappings of modernity while placating populist demands for traditional types of authority.

First, considering the case of Colombia, the model of dual legitimacy consists of the institutionalization of a modern liberal-democratic system in the *legal sphere* that coexists with a shared set of traditional values that vary regionally and did not converge

² “A descendant of Spanish or other European settlers in the Caribbean or Central or South America” (Oxford dictionary)

into a national project. Second, empirically, the dualism of legitimacy can be more clearly observed in the urban-rural divide. As politicians aim to stay in power by democratic means (Fearon, 2011), governmental efforts are devoted to urban areas mostly; that is because they are more densely populated which makes taxation and rule enforcement relatively easier, it also reduces the cost of governing (i.e. social policies are less costly), and since political culture has shifted towards a democratic culture, politicians are more accountable to the citizens. On the other hand, rural areas are costly to maintain but still necessary for securing food stuffs for urban population. But only rural areas that produce agricultural goods or are owned by land elites are worth securing, the rest has been juridically incorporated but neglected by the central government due to the lack of real benefits that these areas can produce to politicians in the central government (no votes and no taxes). Thereby as urban areas expand and grow toward modernism, rural areas have remained traditional and loyal to kinship relationships rather than committed to a national project. Nevertheless, under the normative version of a modern state, the central government aimed to control rural areas using the same strategies than were used in cities; that is, the rule of law, bureaucracy, armed forces and police.

In Colombia, in the wake of independence in 1819 the ideology of popular sovereignty, representative democracy and division of powers were included in the institutional design of the new Colombian political order. However, attempts to achieve modernization have always faced a traditional culture of localized and personal loyalties, closeness between church and politics, the centrality of family as the basic structure of society, and remoteness from the political and ideological preferences of elites in Bogota.

This section aims to explain why tradition and regionalism collided with the national project, despite of the need for rural areas to secure food stuffs for cities in a modernized but non-modern state (Melo, 1990).

The history of political institutions in the twentieth century

After independence from Spain in the 1810 decade, fights for the political and economic model were constant in Colombia. Constant fights between federalists versus centralist triggered the separation of Ecuador and Venezuela from the Great Colombia (Gran Colombia) in 1830. Several attempts of separation were followed by other states, this pushed for the implementation of federal and decentralized systems of government. Indeed, Safford and Palacios (2002) state that “[i]n the nineteenth century the three major regions (*East, West and the Caribbean, off the text*) became politically antagonistic, with the West and the Caribbean region often joined by their common antipathy to the capital city in the East” (p. 8). The antipathy against the center of political power, located in Bogotá, remained in the followed the independence.

During the nineteenth century several battles, both political and armed, were fought to establish a constitutional order for the postcolonial nation but those attempts failed to stabilize the emergent nation. But it was not until 1886 that a Liberal and Conservative moderate coalition ended the liberal hegemony and installed a Constitutional Assembly formed by 18 members (2 representatives per state) that declared the Constitution of 1886. The new Constitution declared the *Republic of Colombia* as a unitary Republic, strongly centralized with a powerful President (elected by Congress). Although the Constitution of 1886 lasted until 1991, it did not bring the desired stability to achieve economic and political progress as modern nations did.

The political confrontation between Liberals and Conservatives remained for the most part of the twentieth century, and in the mid-century it triggered the civil conflict known as La Violencia (Levine & Wilde, 1977; Palacios, 2006; Sánchez & Meertens, 1983). In the aftermath of 1886 Constitution, Colombia has followed a path of elitist cycles that used elections to legitimize the social, economic, and political order. Under the allegedly dual legitimacy framework, political history evolves in cycles that consist of: 1) *a moment of political reform*, with no changes in the political structure, 2) *social disorder* that demands state intervention, and 3) *the use of the violence and authoritarian means* to return to a situation of order. The forceful institution of order, however, failed to address the underlying tensions between an urban order legitimized by a liberal social contract supported by bureaucracy and a rural order legitimized by closely knit identity groups. The difficulty of real change triggers a political reform that is when the cycle ends a new political reform is needed and the cycle starts over. Between 1886 and 1991, three political cycles can be identified in Colombia:

- 1886-1930--This cycle begins with the approval of 1886 Constitution under a Conservative government. However the War of 1,000 days (1899-1902), a partisan conflict, interrupted the order. Conservatives defeated Liberals and its resolution continued the Conservative hegemony that concluded with the government of Miguel Abadía Méndez. (Arango, 1981; De la Pedraja, 2006; Gaitán, 1928).
- 1934-1957--Attempts of a comprehensive modernization occurred during the 1930's under President Alfonso López Pumarejo who implementing the policies called the *Marching Revolution* and 1936 Constitutional reform. The Liberal

policies were condemned by the most radical conservative sectors of the society, the Conservative party and Catholic Church. This started the period of civil war known by as *La Violencia* (Jaramillo, 1978; Levine & Wilde, 1977; Melo, 1992; Sánchez, 1985).

- 1958-1982--In order to end the partisan violence of *La Violencia* Conservative and Liberal leaders signed a political agreement in 1958 known as *National Front* (*Frente Nacional*). Despite the agreement, political conflict in rural areas never truly ended and insurgent groups claiming political inclusion and redistribution of wealth and land became actors in the political system. In addition, the growing salience of the drug issue (crops and trafficking) emerged as another problem in the political system. Both guerrillas and drug cartels became the big challengers of the political order. The Liberal president Julio César Turbay declared the *Security Statute* (*Estatuto de Seguridad*), a series of actions to respond the increase of insurgency, which gave special powers to military forces to reestablish to a situation of order (Leal B., 1984; Leal B. & Dávila, 1994; Sánchez, 1985; Sánchez & Meertens, 1983).

In these four cycles it is possible to identify four traditional charismatic presidents, that were democratically elected but also embodied the authority of the state: Miguel Abadía Méndez (1926-1930), Laureano Gómez (1950-1951) and Julio César Turbay (1978-1982).

The first of these leaders is the Conservative Miguel Abadía Méndez, whose government was the last of the *Conservative Hegemony* (1886-1930). In 1928, President Abadía Méndez, as chief of the Colombian Armed Forces, issued the order to shoot

against hundreds of striking workers. The peaceful protest against unfair working conditions under the American United Fruit Company, occurred in the municipality of Ciénaga, Magdalena in northern Colombia (Arango, 1981; De la Pedraja, 2006; Gaitán, 1928). Hundreds of workers were murdered under the cover of the government in which has been called Banana Masacre (Masacre de las Bananeras)³. In the context of peasant struggles and riots, the government was unable to control them through negotiation. In addition to the violent means to maintain the *status quo*, Abadía Méndez⁴ political strategies included rhetorical use of language to promote a conservative ideology. According to Córdoba R. (n.d), Abadía Méndez belonged to the generation of politicians called *grammarians*, who administered the country based on the power of rhetoric and language proficiency.

Decades later, President Laureano Gómez (1950-1951) embodied the most radical conservative thoughts in modern Colombian history. He posed himself as a defender of order, the nation and the authority of the state, in opposition to the liberal reforms characterized by the Marching Revolution (la Revolución en Marcha)⁵, implemented by President Alfonso López Pumarejo. His ideas about the corporatist state were based on conservative thoughts about tradition, order and authority, as well as ideas about the community as an organic body that framed his policy decisions. The power of his speech was significant in the way he encouraged armed conservatives (Los Pájaros – The birds) to eliminate liberal fellows. His presidency was the opening of *La Violencia*. In addition,

³ The area where the massacre happened is an area of banana production.

⁴ In 1919 he was initiated as a member of the Colombian Academy of Language. See, Miguel Abadía Méndez Discourse on his initiation as a member of the Colombian Academy of Language on August 6th, 1919 (Abadía M., 1919).

⁵ Liberal President Alfonso López Pumarejo attempted to implement social and liberal reforms in 1936 known as the Marching Revolution (Revolución en Marcha). It was inspired in the ideas of welfare state, the New Deal of President Roosevelt, and Keynesian notions on the role of the state in economy.

he got the support of the Catholic Church to promulgate negative ideas about liberals.

According to Levine & Wilde (1977):

“Although political conflict was much more complex than a simple church vs. state metaphor would suggest, nevertheless through Liberal anticlericalism the church came to be identified overwhelmingly with the Conservative party and its defense of ecclesiastical interests. Conservatives and the church won a significant victory with the Constitution of 1886 and the concordat of the following year, which gave the church an exalted, protected status in Colombian society—a status it continues in large measure to enjoy today. [...] The Colombian church has long been an important factor in this continuing partisan conflict, both as an actor in its own right and as the embodiment of symbols and ideas motivating impassioned defense or determined attack.” (Levine & Wilde, 1977, p. 228)

The role of Catholic Church in the middle-twentieth century violence was essential in delineating ideological concerns about the *enemy*, as well as the characterization of “liberals as atheists and Communists”. Such rhetorical characterizations justified the concentration of wealth and land and prevented further redistributive policies that strongly rejected a potential land reform. From the pulpit, and through their management of education and social welfare, the Catholic Church was able to shape the culture and social perceptions about the good and the evil in the political sphere and social life. Religion delimited the ways of social interaction, the culture, and perception of politics and economics.

The formal *end* of *La Violencia* came with the sign of the National Front agreements⁶ which declared the alternation in the presidency between Conservatives and Liberals and parity in the distribution of public offices. This model reinforced clientelism

⁶ Frente Nacional (National Front) is a sixteen year (1958-1974) period in Colombian history in which the Liberal and Conservative parties applied the criteria of “alternation” in the presidency and “parity” in the number of appointees, to deal with the problems of bi-partisan violence.

and patronage in the political system as a means of maintaining the party balance. Indeed, scholars such as Leal B. argues that Colombia is the archetypal example of clientelism (Leal B., 1984; Leal B. & Dávila, 1994). The National Front not only reinforced a culture of political patronage but also updated the roots of violent conflict, thus a new version of the armed conflict emerged with organized groups of peasants in the 1960s and urban guerrillas in the 1970s. Due to these conditions and emergent insurgent groups, late 1970's and early 1980's was an important moment of political turmoil. Therefore, using his presidential prerogative, in 1978 President Julio Cesar Turbay implemented the *Security Statute* that conferred special powers to the national armed forces to manage national security problems and political instability embodied by insurgent groups⁷. By means of state-sponsored violence he sought, unsuccessfully, to eliminate the enemies of the new formal order. During the 1980's, challenges to formal political authority worsened as drug cartels launched their own war against the state due to persecution and aims of the national government to sign an extradition agreement with the United States. This conflict further exacerbated traditional conflicts over land tenure and property rights in outlying areas as drug lords sought to secure territory for the cultivation of coca leaf. A state that could not secure the monopoly of violence across rural areas experienced the expansion of coca crops after the 1970's and insurgency groups after 1980's.

Drug trafficking not only change the political and economic dynamics of rural areas in Colombia, drug trafficking in Colombia affected the broader political culture by imposing a new norm in some poor urban areas such as Medellín. Attracted to the

⁷ The most prominent guerrilla movements at that moment were the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo, FARC—EP), National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación, EPL), and the 19th of April Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril) or M-19.

seeming glamor and wealth of the drug gangs, many of whose members were removed from urban poverty and marginalization, many younger Colombians desired to be part of the *drug business* or to be close to the *don* or gang leader. The rise of drug gangs produced a number of unanticipated consequences including a declining perception of the importance of education among young people, a generalized acceptance of violence⁸, and acceptance of drug lords leadership in local government and even at national level leadership positions (e.g. in 1982 Pablo Escobar was elected as alternative representative to the House of Representatives). Owing to these governance challenges, the 1991 Constitution sought to address the dynamics of drug trafficking, violence, corruption, political exclusion and religious intervention of the Catholic Church in politics. As a result, the new political mandate created a multiparty system that initially led to the emergence of hundreds of small parties with no discernible ideology, but rather a collection of candidates merely looking for seats in Congress and local municipal positions.

The political history of twentieth century represents a uninterrupted conflict to force upon the model of order that comes from the ideology of Liberalism (capitalism, federalism/decentralization and political freedom) or Conservatism (corporatism, centralism and authoritarian power). This battle for imposing one model over the other led to workers assassinations by the state, a civil war, elite party agreements and a long-term conflict. Two outcomes of this ideological dispute are relevant for the purpose of

⁸ i.e. Pablo Escobar, the most important drug lord, paid 2,000,000 Colombian pesos (\$1,000 dollars) per assassinated regular police official, and 5,000,000 per high ranked police official. Under his model of violence, the Patriotic Union- UP, political wing of FARC, was eliminated. Four more candidates were assassinated during this time: Luis Carlos Galán (presidential candidate for the New Liberalism for 1990 poll), Carlos Pizarro Leongómez (AD M-19 political leader and presidential candidate for 1990 poll), Jaime Pardo Leal (Presidential candidate in 1986 for the Patriotic Union Party), and Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa (President of the Patriotic Union Party), among others.

this dissertation. First, the antagonist forms of political order produced an unusual form of political equilibrium without the monopoly of violence (Acemoglu et al., 2013). The suggested political cycles showed that political reform and authoritarianism are antagonist versions of political order under the umbrella of a legal-traditional system. The fluctuations between these two have achieved an unsteady status quo where political elites have managed to maintain power without a stable and enduring democracy (not only an electoral democracy). In addition, government elites had incorporated the political preferences of rural elites regarding land reform, but without full control of the territory.

A second relevant outcome of this model is that it has neglected the search for a national project and instead conflicting interest have been incorporated into policies that are somewhat incoherent with the national interest but please regional interests and groups. The ideological antagonisms are the result of a regional divide that preserved the micro-nations formed in the pre-Columbian era that only formally responded to a central authority (figure 12). The next section will describe how the ideological disputes had consequences on the territory and the lack of control over rural areas.




Figure 12 Colombian Political Cycles 1886-1991

Notes:

- (1) Red and blue colors represent the colors of Liberal and Conservative Parties respectively. Red shapes with blue border represent bipartisan coalitions
- (2) The green arrow represents the status quo achieved by political forces
- (3) Dashed line represents the movement of the system towards authoritarian or political reforms

The failure of national government to control the rural periphery

The past section briefly traced the history of Colombia's political development during twentieth century aiming to explain the historical conditions that resulted in a form *dual legitimacy* with specific outcomes for the political system. This section will present the conditions underlying the expansion and control in the territory itself, the role of *land* determining state (lack of) consolidation is an important factor to understand the model of dual legitimacy with important implications for the structure of food systems. In Colombia, land property rights have not been enforced equally to all segments of the population, instead the structure of property rights in rural areas is similar to a semi-feudal model of land tenure (Kalmanovitz, 2000; Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006) and exploitation of peasantry (Bejarano, 2011) became the norm.

Seemingly, the integration of the national market has been extremely difficult due to the geographic conditions that are dominated by both mountains in the south and flat lands in the north and lack of a strong transportation system to facilitate communication between them. Indeed, Safford and Palacios (2002) argue that land fragmentation is the cause of a divided society because the regional divide that produced different identities, models of economic production, and political interests. The authors suggest:

“Colombia's topography divided its population, from the pre-Columbian era onward, into three major regions: the East, the West, and the Caribbean coast. This topographic division of the more populated parts of the country into three major regions distinguishes Colombia from a number of other Spanish American countries. [...]. Colombia, by contrast, has had not naturally centralizing topographic feature. Historically, Santafé de Bogotá has been dominant, but not unchallenged politically, and it has had to share economic power with important rivals in other regions” (Safford & Palacios, 2002, p. 7).

Population in mountain lands mostly organized under a model of smallholding or mini-fundia for growing subsistence crops (corn, cassava, plantain); this model of colonization of land led to the expansion of coffee farms (fincas cafeteras) after 1930's (Palacios, 1979), a crop that became the most prominent agricultural export after 1920's. In the early decades of the twentieth century flat inter-mountainous regions like Cauca Valley (Southwest) and the Caribbean Coast featured by producing sugar cane, industrialization of sugar production in Cauca Valley region monopolized industrial sugar production around 1950's (Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006). Flat areas of the southeast were featured by low population densities and large farms dedicated to cattle rising mostly. The predominant geography the south east *plains* (llanos orientales) (i.e. tropical savanna and wetlands) and the rainforest in the Amazon region, combined with low population densities led to an abandonment of those lands by the state and a further expansion of coca crops in those abandoned lands (Holmes, Piñeres, & Curtin, 2006). As a matter of fact the consolidation of a structured national food system never occurred, instead the geographical conditions and limitations in transportation led to regional food production and consumption (Safford & Palacios, 2002), with food collection and distribution centers located in regional capitals and intermediate cities.

Even though the modern normative tradition for state consolidation suggested the need to obtain the monopoly of violence in the territory, the government of Colombia did not have the ability to control unproductive and alien lands, mostly located in the eastern plains and the Amazon. Instead the model that prevailed was the disjunction of juridical and empirical components of statehood (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982), focusing more on the consolidation of urban areas and the abandonment of rural periphery (Grajales, 2013;

Kalmanovitz, 2003). Repetitive failed attempts of agrarian reform in 1936, 1961 and 1994 resulted in the emergence of guerrillas in the 1960's. Albertus and Kaplan (2013) suggest that attempts of political redistribution of land in Colombia had been used as a counterinsurgency strategy and not a real governmental effort to transform the structure of land distribution.

Considering the American ideology of government formation, large scale land owners have worked to find ways to prevent mobilization against tenure laws that encourage land redistribution (Madison, 1788a). Although, formal institutions have supported the existing land tenure structure, they have not been able to avoid factions' activity; instead groups of *bandits* (FARC and ELN guerrillas) have historically attacked the land owners via cattle theft, kidnapping and land grabbing. Due to the actions of insurgent guerrillas against land lords in the 1980's, the later introduced informal mechanisms to secure property rights in the absence of state presence. Private security forces (later known as paramilitaries) became the main mechanism to avoid continuous theft from *roving bandits* (Myerson, 2008).

Disputes for land have been a constant feature in Colombia after independence from Spain, and it can be argued that internal political violence has been motivated not only by ideological reasons (as showed in the last section) but also by problems related to inequality in land and income distribution. Left-wing insurgents have claimed that concentration of wealth and land is the main driver for rural poverty and therefore it became the rationale underlying armed confrontation against the government. Attempts

of land reform started in 1936 through the Marching Revolution⁹; in that moment rural reform introduced new rules on land use, protections for the rights of tenants and settlers on the lands, and the establishment of optimal working conditions for laborers. However such reform did not gain the required political support. Instead, political reform was not welcomed by certain sectors, mainly land owners in society whom promoted violence as a means to avoid changes in land structure. The period known as *La Violencia* (1948–58) was a civil war in which supporters of Conservative and Liberal parties fought mostly in rural areas for control of agricultural land (Bailey, 1967; Sánchez & Meertens, 1983; Tirado M., 1995). Liberals became a public enemy of Conservatives due to their attempts to alter the structure of private property rights (García, 2003).

The National Front aimed to solve the political violence of the 1940s and 1950s. That said, it did not produce the expected political reforms and accentuated political exclusion while it maintained intact the land tenure model (Buitrago & Archila, 1995; Melo, 1992). In fact, it is during the sixties that an organized peasantry emerged to form a guerrilla movement aimed at fighting the government, eschewing democratic contestation as a means of achieving their goals. As *latifundia* model remained the most common form of land tenure in rural areas, guerrillas claimed that they fought for better distribution of land and wealth.

As history progressed another factor delayed attempts of land reform. Since the late 1970s drug trafficking set up the rules for an updated *land counter-reform* because it permitted the expansion of illegal property rights among right-wing armed bandits

⁹ Liberal President Alfonso López Pumarejo attempted to implement social and liberal reforms in 1936 known as the Marching Revolution (*Revolución en Marcha*). It was inspired in the ideas of welfare state, the New Deal of President Roosevelt, and Keynesian notions on the role of the state in economy.

(Holmes et al., 2006; S. Kalmanovitz, 2003). Colombia has ideal physical conditions for growing coca and marihuana, making the country one of the world larger producer and exporter of illegal drugs since the 1980s when big drug cartels (Medellín and Cali cartels) and drug lords (the most notable being Pablo Escobar) started important disputes for territorial control of crops and routes. The need for self-security forces was critical in this case due to the need to secure property rights within the framework of an illegal economy. This became the cause of further expansion of paramilitary forces in rural areas as a way of securing a viable counter-insurgency strategy (Avilés, 2006; Cruz Rodríguez, 2009).

This system of dual legitimacy that has been featured by a fairly liberal urban policy with comprehensive public administration and an authoritarian rural order administered by a collection of non-state armed forces preventing central government to obtain the monopoly of violence has described the Colombian political system in the twentieth century. Scholarship suggests that this situation is the result of modernization without modern values in society (González Rojas, 2007; Jaramillo V., 1994; Melo, 1990) while others critique the “overlapping of formally democratic institutions and high intensity violence” (Grajales, 2013, p. 213). The path towards modernization in Colombian case is a mixed bag of modern and traditional values that in the end limited the capacity of government to fully become a modern state. Given the described conditions, the changes occurred during the 1990’s altered the Colombia’s political economy of governance, yet the expansion of the agricultural frontier over rural areas that are characterized as “wasted lands” (Grajales, 2013) and persistent, yet manageable, low-intensity conflict (this will be explored in the next chapter of this dissertation). This

dissertation argues that given the definitional change in food security given the conditions of the global economy, has redefined the path towards modernization of post-colonial states. This new path has imposed a new form of rural governance that in the context of expansion of large-scale agriculture to promote global food security, is sharing the governance function with non-state actors.

The structure of food systems: the case of rice, maize and oil palm

This chapter is describing and analyzing the previous conditions to the allegedly definitional change in food security. The previous section analyzed the structure of political power founded in a system of dual legitimacy. Here I will discuss the dynamics of the food system in Colombia previous to the definitional shift. I will do so, by exploring the conditions of three agricultural sectors: rice, corn and oil palm. The institutional analysis of these products will allow this study to track the performance of agricultural policies regarding government priorities and agricultural outcomes concerning food security. In that way, this research will be able to track the evolution of the food system by observing the performance of seasonal (corn and rice) and permanent (palm) crops and their role meeting food security demands.

As it was discussed previously, food systems are vital for political organizations because they supply physiological needs, becoming the starting point of political organizations and delineating the path for consolidation of political power (Bates, 2010; Wittfogel, 1957). Previous research suggest that access to food in Colombia rely mostly on local production until 1990 (Bejarano, 2011; Junguito, Perfetti, & Becerra, 2014; Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006). In fact the system for food production, distribution and access was localized regionally due to the topographical conditions and transportation

difficulties. Three (Safford & Palacios, 2002) or perhaps four micro-nations can be identified as food sub-systems for production and distribution of food until the 1990s.

According to Palacios (2006):

“In 1950 a World Bank team headed by the economist Laughlin Currie concluded that Colombia still did not have a viable internal market. The country was divided into “four economic and commercial entities, clearly distinguished and separate from each other”: the Caribbean coast, Antioquia, the Southwest, and the center-east. Each of these four regions, whose distinctiveness reached back to the eighteenth century, had agricultural resources for self-sufficiency and raw materials to develop some industrial and energy-producing capacity. Interregional commerce involved only products able to withstand high transportation costs, such as salt, sugar, and petroleum and its derivatives” (Palacios, 2006, p. 226)

In fact, at the beginning of twentieth century self-sufficiency dominated the structure of food systems (Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006). This coupled with low-intensive use of technology in agriculture, except for isolated efforts in sugar cane production in Cauca Valley and the Caribbean Coast. Kalmanovitz and López E. (2006) suggest that in general, agricultural production was done in a rudimentary fashion:

“Machete was the most widespread tool, slashing and burning replaced chemical pesticides and usage of agricultural machinery was rare. It was also rare the utilization of fertilizers due to the model of extensive economy that allowed for resting periods for agricultural land. Enhanced seeds were almost unknown, as well as herbicides and pesticides” (Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006, p. 109. *Original text in Spanish language, translated by author*).

The low-intensive use of industrial technology in agriculture did not favor productivity, this model in most of the twentieth century led to a low export orientation except for products like coffee, bananas and tobacco; the rest of agricultural production was dedicated to internal consumption. As agricultural producers organized, they

increased their ability push for policy changes that favor specific sectors at expense of implementation of technology, prices for consumers and productivity. Market advocates suggest that strong protectionism under the framework of a corporatist conservative state diminished the ability for agriculture to provide access to food more efficiently, instead consumers were affected by the ability of agricultural unions to manage prices and production based upon group-interest as opposed to market demands (Anderson & Martin, 2006; Anderson et al., 2013; Junguito et al., 2014; Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006). Government failures were used as a justification for changing the model in the 1990's.

A shift in agriculture occurred with the increase in urban population (table 7), this pushed government and producers to change strategies to increase food supplies for growing cities. In the 1920's the low levels of agricultural production for an increasing urban population led to food scarcity. The Law/Decree 952 of 1927 (Emergency Law) reduced tariffs to promote food imports aiming to decrease prices internally; the continuous increase in food demands and the elimination of this regulation in 1931 incentivized internal food production (Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006). Data presented by Kalmanovitz and López E. (2006) indicate that seasonal crops increased between 1950 and 1980, due to their role in securing food provision and the domestic focus of agriculture (figure 13). Policies such as governmental protection from foreign production, subsidies on prices and cheap credit stimulated this production trends.

Table 7 Colombia: Urban Population, 1938-1993

Year	Population*			% Urban	Population Growth Rate		
	Total	Urban	Rural		Total	Urban	Rural
1938	8,701,816	2,692,117	6,009,699	30.94			
1951	11,548,172	4,468,437	7,079,735	38.69	2.24	4.04	1.29
1964	17,484,508	9,093,094	8,391,414	52.01	3.18	5.51	1.29
1973	22,915,229	13,548,183	9,367,046	59.12	2.95	4.38	1.19
1985	30,062,198	19,628,428	10,433,770	65.29	2.31	3.16	0.91
1993	37,664,711	25,849,387	11,815,324	68.63	2.12	2.7	0.93

Source: Murad Rivera, 2003, p. 18




Figure 13 Permanent and Seasonal Crops in Colombia, 1950-2000

Source: Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006, p. 271

Despite of governmental protection of some sectors, agricultural trade unions and peasants condemned lack of governmental support for agricultural policies and rural development; as the twentieth century advanced an abandonment of the countryside and preference for industrial sector and urban areas became more evident in governmental policy orientation (Bejarano, 2011; Garay, 1998). Others, like Kalmanovitz and López E.

(2006) suggest that agricultural lobbying under a model of import substitution achieved costs reduction for agricultural producers (agricultural supplies, financing, production infrastructure and technology) and to protect internal prices from external fluctuations, which ultimately led to agricultural producers to reduce their efforts to enhance productivity. The model of industrialization by import substitution in the aftermath of WWII, consisting of limiting imports of industrialized goods to promote national industry, deepened the preference for industry over agriculture. Under this models, some scholars suggest that agriculture suffered a productivity and competitiveness lag (Garay, 1998; Machado C., 1991; Machado C. & Torres O., 1991).

Before moving forward in the discussion, it is important to describe the main governmental institutions in agricultural sector and their role in protecting the sector. The main institution is the Ministry of Agriculture, is the representative of national government and head of the agricultural policy. The Agricultural Marketing Institute (Instituto de Mercadeo Agropecuario, IDEMA) regulated the market for agricultural products through the sale, purchase, storage, exports and imports. The Colombian Agricultural Institute (Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario, ICA) was created in 1962 to coordinate and intensify research work, teaching and extension of agricultural sciences, according to its mission it aimed for better and more harmonious development of all activities of the sector and especially to facilitate the agrarian social reform (Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario (ICA), N/A). The Agricultural Bank (Caja de Crédito Agrario Industrial y Minero, Caja Agraria) and the Agricultural Financial Fund were the public entities responsible for supporting credit for rural sector under policies defined by central government. Interest rates and credit policies were fixed by the National Bank (Banco de

la República) an entity that was not independent from national government. Other entities such as the Ministry of Public Health supported agricultural policies by fixing sanitary standards and nutrition parameters, the Ministry of Commerce reinforced commercialization aspects and the Ministry of Finance defined sectorial budgets based on national priorities of investment. This institutional framework served to the purpose of maintaining a strong system of protections of agriculture before 1990 when trade liberalization policies were introduced (Bejarano, 2011; Junguito et al., 2014; Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006; Machado C., 1991).

However, the Colombian case illustrates preference for large farmers, which can be observed through financing policies. First, according to González and García (2002, cited by Kalmanovitz and López E., 2006, p. 156) between 1950 and 1962 one third of the loans from the financial sector focused on agricultural activities. Second, in order to promote agricultural production credit for agriculture was highly subsidized with important differences between interest rates between agriculture and non-agricultural activities (Vogel & Larson, 1984). And third, most of the credit was given to large farmers due to the institutional structure that preventing farmers from receiving credits from *formal financial institutions*, and “a very small group captures a very large share of the total amount of credit disbursed” (Gonzalez-Vega, 1984, p. 120), as a result income distribution in rural areas has suffered due to the advantages taken by large farmers and the lack of formal credit for small farmers.

Therefore, it can be said that even if agricultural policies in Colombia have favored large farmers, it is also true that has been a general abandonment of distant rural lands from urban centers and very little focus on rural development initiatives (public

infrastructure and social policies). From a political standpoint lack of interest in rural areas can be explained by the absence of a strong tax-based that would allow the consolidation of a strong agricultural sector through investments in public goods for rural areas and infrastructure for agricultural production. In modern nations, as long there is a co-dependency relations between rural and urban areas, urban elites that keep the control of central governments, should please the interest of land owners by enacting policies that strongly favor the interest of agricultural elites. The Colombian case differs somehow from the modernization model of agricultural policies. Instead of a comprehensive agricultural policy, central governments have favored land elites by preventing land reform. The description of the rice, corn and palm sectors will reveal the impact of agricultural trade unions on governmental action.

Rice

Rice in one of the staple foods in Colombian's diet; it was brought to Colombia by the Spanish colonizers between the fifteenth and sixteenth century. The first rice farmers were located in the center-west of the country¹⁰ and later expanded to the north and eastern planes (Leurquin, 1967). Initially, rice growing was subordinated to cattle raising and it was mostly a strategy for colonizing and expanding agricultural frontier than actually commercial growing (Balcázar V., Marulanda G., Rojas R., & Roldán L., 1980). Rice crops slowly located in floodable areas next to Magdalena river given its weather conditions and possibilities for irrigation. Commercial crops initiated in early years of twentieth century when it expanded to the eastern planes¹¹ (Federación Nacional

¹⁰ Today Tolima and Huila Departments.

¹¹ Today, Meta Department

de Arroceros (FEDEARROZ), N.A). According to Kalmanovitz and López E. (2006) by 1930 50% of rice production was located in Bolívar (northern Colombia); further, it expanded through the departments of Huila, Tolima (center-west) and Valle del Cauca (south-west). Due to the impulse given by urbanization and the end of the Emergency Law of 1927 (tariff reduction for food imports), rice production peaked after 1945 (figure 3). The department of Tolima became one of the largest producers in the nation where rice growing became more efficient given the ecological conditions, low prices of land, utilization of machinery and irrigation and closeness to consumer areas such as the emerging coffee growing regions (Balcázar V. et al., 1980; S. Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006).




Figure 14 Rice Production, Colombia 1915-1950 (Millions of Kilograms)

Source: Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006, p. 116

The growth of rice crops is important for understanding the expansion of the national agricultural frontier in Colombia. As mentioned, rice grew initially at expense of cattle raising. Cattle ranchers needed to cut down forest to clear new lands for cattle herding, thus they agreed on tenant farming contracts (*colonato*) with poor peasants for them to plant seasonal crops for subsistence (rice among those), this prepared the land for

further herding (Balcázar V. et al., 1980). This model of farming and cattle raising succeeded in the northern coast. Nevertheless, successful yield in Tolima due to the utilization of machines and irrigation led by Spanish people in the region, displaced cattle raising for rice growing, in the 1940's this model led to the region to become the second producer in the nation (Triana, B, 1953, as cited by Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006).

Rice production in Colombia had similar features as the rest of the agrarian structure of property rights and labor structure. According to Balcázar V. et al. (1980) in the nineteenth century rice growing was dominated by *pre-capitalist* forms of exploitation of the working class mainly on large estates, “these forms of exploitation ranging from *conciertos*¹² and *terrajés*¹³ in the south-west to sharecropping and *partijas*¹⁴ who settled in Tolima, Eastern Plains and parts of the north coast” (p. II-13. *Original text in Spanish language, translated by author*). The authors suggest that these forms of labor exploitation aimed the expansion of agricultural frontier, to subject workers to the farm (*hacienda*), and to produce food for self-sufficiency and reproduction of labor force within the *hacienda*. Urbanization and expansion of domestic market introduced important changes into the rice production system, incentivizing capitalist production of profitable crops. The price increase in agricultural goods pushed for an increase in land prices too, especially in areas that surrounded urban areas. This change pushes for an elimination of pre-capitalists forms of exploitation because it was more profitable for

¹² Resident laborers (Andrien, 2002).

¹³ “Terrajero was the one who paid terraje, and terraje was not until about thirty years ago a relationship of feudal and servile character, according to which an indigenous had to pay in free labor on the estate the right to live and exploit a small plot, located in the same lands that were taken from them to indigenous reserves by landowners, a relationship that lasted until it was finally swept away by the indigenous struggle which began to develop after 1970”. (Vasco U., 2008. *Original text in Spanish language, translated by author*).

¹⁴ Partition or distribution, especially an inheritance.

land owners to rent the land to capitalist agricultural entrepreneurs or exploiting the land themselves (Balcázar V. et al., 1980).

It is important to mention that rice growing in Colombia is high-labor intensive and it is produced in small farming operations, most land planted in rice did not exceed 50 hectares in the 1950's (FEDEARROZ cited by Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006, p. 179). The reduced size of rice farming makes it more difficult the development of innovation and implementation of technology (Balcázar V. et al., 1980). This situation led to a strong state involvement in the development and implementation of innovation systems in the sector. In that regard the organization of rice producers played an important role connecting producers needs and policy decisions.

Despite of production increases in the 1940's, productivity was low. Technology development under the framework of green revolution became the answer to productivity problems (Herdt, 2012). The Rice Research Program was a collaborative agreement for research and technology transfer between the Colombian Agricultural Institute (Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario, ICA), the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) and the National Federation of Rice Growers (Federación Nacional de Arroceros, FEDEARROZ), it led to the development of technology like enhanced seeds, construction of irrigation systems, expanded use of fertilizers, and others that are central for productivity increases (Balcázar V. et al., 1980; "Programa del CIAT para la Investigación en Arroz de Secano en América Latina," 1981). Kalmanovitz and López E. (2006) indicate that one outcome of the technological change resulting from the green revolution was yield increase, it went from 1.94 to 4.25 tons per hectare between 1966 and 1975 (p. 177. *Original text in Spanish language, translated by author*). Despite of

this steady growth, after the 1970's Colombia did not exceed the average world yields. Scholarship suggests that the power of the organization of rice producers affected the potential for market-oriented growth in the sector (Garay, 1998; Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006; Machado C., 1991).

Despite of the introduction of technological changes, rice production in Colombia is not fully mechanized but a small share of total production is still manual (upland manual). Additionally mechanic production can be irrigated or rain-fed (upland). Given the introduction of technology, most of the rice produced in Colombia after 1960 is irrigated; during the last two decades of the twentieth century around 75% of total production used this system. Irrigated and upland mechanic rice show important productivity levels (tons per hectare) at the end of the 1980s reaching a peak in early 1990's (figure 15, A and B). Introduction of free trade policies led to an important decline in harvested area during the 1990s in both irrigated and upland mechanic rice, although productivity remained stable. Between 1990 and 1997 the rice sown area dropped 131,000 hectares (Balcázar, Vargas, & Orozco, 1998). However, this shows that the competitiveness capacity is low compared to other economies. Interestingly, the reduction of cultivated areas for mechanic rice coincided with an increase in manual upland rice, but this is just a small share in total rice production and has low-productivity levels. Two conclusions can be drawn from this trends in rice production; first, technological change tend to replace traditional forms of agriculture where small-farming tends to vanish due to low efficiency in the production systems. However low-competitiveness capacity of large farming in Colombia reduced sown areas when trade

liberalization policies were introduced. The role of organization of producers in policy formation can explain these outcomes.




Figure 15 Rice: Harvested area and production, 1987-2000

Source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, Colombia, Agronet (2015). Harvested area (annual hectares) and production (annual tons), 1987-2000 [Image file]. Retrieved from <http://www.agronet.gov.co/estadistica/Paginas/default.aspx>

An important institutional aspect of the rice sector is the negotiation capacity of the organization of producers to define sector policies, which secured important governmental support after 1960's. Rice producers are organized in the National Federation of Rice Growers (FEDEARROZ). FEDEARROZ consolidated as an important player defining agricultural policy assuming two important roles: lobbying and research. The organization was created in 1947 under the name of *Tolima's Rice Growers*

Association (Asociación de Productores de Arroz del Tolima) that brought together rice producers from Tolima and Valle del Cauca departments. According to Balcázar V. et al. (1980) the larger producers were more vulnerable to policies of domestic supply of rice, because of the policy of strict price control (managed by the Colombian Office of Price Control) and liberalization of rice imports due to internal high prices. However, the organization of producers was able to manage canceling import licenses for 50,000 tons; this not only favored the conditions for capitalist enterprises for rice production with price controls (managed by FEDEARROZ) in an environment of high demand for the commodity, but also consolidated the emergent organization as an important player in the policy making in aspects such as prices, marketing and technological development (Balcázar V. et al., 1980; Leurquin, 1967).

The semi-public character of FEDEARROZ, allowed the organization to actively participate in policy decisions concerning rice in an environment of trade balance deficit and average yield levels (Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006). FEDEARROZ main achievements during the 1950's and 1960's can be summarized are follows:

“Time and again it used its power to avoid imports for which there was no significant need; it exercised influence on the government to obtain better prices, to lower import duties on fertilizers and machinery, and to bring about the abolition of import duties on inputs, as with the 25 per cent duty on rice seed in 1952. In addition, the Federation repeatedly sought more favorable credit conditions. It also acted as a cooperative, storing spare parts of agricultural machinery and importing fertilizers. Its cooperative function throughout the years proved to be particularly favorable to enterprises in Tolima near a large number of Federation agencies.” (Leurquin, 1967)

Now, the role played by FEDEARROZ in Colombia is a good example of a public action that concentrates benefits and spreads costs (Anderson et al., 2013; Bates, 1981).

Indeed the organization of producers was able of introduce distortions that affected prices for consumers but at the same time guaranteed rice supply for domestic consumption. Here, there is an underlying discussion on, how does *distortions* affect food security? Market advocates suggest that price subsidies, cheap credit, low taxation and other protection measures for agricultural producers affect price for consumers reducing food security. On the other hand the discussion is about the role of government supporting the emergence and stabilization of food systems. Under this view, food systems become public goods that fulfill the role of enhancing production, access and utilization of food. However, as the case of rice illustrates, a strong organization of producers like FEDEARROZ in the context of a corporative state was able to address policies to favor the sectorial interest at the expense of citizens' ability to access food in adequate conditions.

As FEDEARROZ was able to push policy changes in aspects like production quotas, price subsidies and cheap credit that favor producers, efficiency stagnated and productivity took distance from international patterns of production (Kalmanovitz, 2003; Machado C., 1991). In this regard, Kalmanovitz (2003) suggests that the corporative conservative model in agriculture artificially increases land rent and benefits for producers with a low-tax burden for them. The outcome of this model was an acceleration of commercial agriculture between 1950 and 1970 with steady production for internal consumption and strong state intervention. However, after that boom, rice production stopped enhancing yield given the lack of external competition. The introduction of trade liberalization policies changed dramatically the situation for the production of this seasonal crop. Since the principle of comparative advantage was used

to introduce free trade, rice sector did not have the ability to compete with strong producers like Asian countries or even regional competitors like Ecuador and Venezuela, where smuggling rice came from.

The story of rice illustrates, for the purpose of this dissertation, the ability of organized farmers in a context of a corporatist conservative state, to change policies that although contribute with the *production* aspect of food security, do not fully secure food in terms of access and utilization. Through the time explored in this section, rice production areas directly interacted with emergent urban centers to provide specialized laborers with affordable food. This was encouraged by governmental policies that favored the sector to provide domestic market only. The development of transportation infrastructure served to that purpose, although the fully integration of a domestic market did not occur during this period. Instead micro-nations created their own food systems as opposed to a big integrated national market. On the other side, it is important to recognize the role of seasonal crops in securing food for emerging urban areas. This is going to change with trade liberalization, change of diet in urban areas which created new food demands, this will be explored in the next chapter.

Maize¹⁵

Maize was a staple food for indigenous groups in pre-Columbian era along the Americas. The availability of the cereal and its adaptability to different ecological conditions situated maize as an important staple in the diet of Colombians in the twentieth century. By 1915 maize crops occupied 30.8% of total utilized agricultural land in Colombia, representing the largest share (Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006); in 1974

¹⁵ In this dissertation the terms *maize* and *corn* will be used indistinctively

this surface accounted for 20% to 25% of cropped area, that number was comparable with coffee crops only (20%-30%). By the 1970's corn was the cereal with the largest share of utilized agricultural land in the country, followed by rice that had a cropped area between 6% and 10% (Ruíz de Londoño & Pinstруп-Andersen, 1975).

As shown in the section on rice, the expansion of urban population increased demands for staples. Figure 16 shows an important increase that coincides with the urbanization process. Despite of its importance for supplying feeding needs of a growing urban population, maize yield levels were relatively low compared to other economies and despite of its importance in Colombian agriculture most of maize was grown for subsistence purposes and the portion dedicated to commercialization was devoted to domestic consumption. The lack of internal production to supply human, industry and animal consumption led government to authorize maize imports in the 1973 (Ruíz de Londoño & Pinstруп-Andersen, 1975)




Figure 16 Maize Production, Colombia 1915-1950 (Millions of Kilograms)

Source: Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006, p. 116

Maize production in Colombia relies in two systems: traditional and industrialized. Traditional maize features by low usage of technical inputs, it is intensive

labor oriented (performed by family members or waged employees) and most of the production is for self-consumption. By the 1970's, maize sector farms possessed less than 10 hectares; these farms accounted for 73% of total share of maize producers; those farms encompassed between 40% and 44% of maize cropped areas and accounted for 32 to 35% of total national production (Ruíz de Londoño & Pinstруп-Andersen, 1975). On the other hand, industrialized maize is fully market oriented with better access to technology and credit and better capacity for negotiating input prices. Although it has less cropped area, production share is higher than traditional maize due to better access to inputs and yield. As mentioned, maize production has been dedicated to domestic consumption, and within the domestic market 65% maize production was for human consumption and 35% was dedicated to industry and animal consumption (1974 information) (Ruíz de Londoño & Pinstруп-Andersen, 1975).

Although government intervention played an important role in the development of industrialized agriculture of maize, it did not achieve relevant yield levels. Machado (1991) states that the development of industrialized agriculture in Colombia after 1950 has two main stages: 1) rapid growth and structural transformation from 1945 until 1970; and 2) a slowdown in the structural transformation between 1970 and 1990, which is described as modernization without technical change attributed to the strong role of organization of producers and conflicts among producers and industry. Although the development of maize production falls into these stages, it did not achieve relevant outcome yield levels. Figure 17 shows that despite of production increases, productivity was low; this path responds more to an increase in cropped area and less to the introduction of technological change. The strong focus on research for productivity

enhancement was followed by a slowdown in the production transformation which let corn as one of the main affected after trade liberalization in the 1990s due to the lack of comparative advantages of this product.




Figure 17 Maize. Harvested area and production, 1940-1973

Source: Data retrieved from Ruíz de Londoño & Pinstup-Andersen, 1975, p. 13

In mid-1970's, the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical, CIAT) conducted a study to assess the factors associated with low yield levels in small farms in three Departments of Colombia (Antioquia, Boyacá y Tolima). The study found that the core issue was the use of traditional cropping practices and reluctance to introduce technological change. This factor is central when the study found that the maize production faced three challenges: an unstable rainfall regime that required investment in irrigation systems, soil acidity and deficiency of nutrients such as phosphorus and nitrogen (Ruíz de Londoño & Pinstup-Andersen, 1975). In the next chapter I will illustrate how introduction of technology and foreign investment manage to reduce the environmental problems faced by maize and

develop a new production system that is transforming the dynamics of rurality in Colombia.

The research movement of the green revolution importantly focused on enhancing maize production. The biological diversity of country resulted in a varied collection of maize species, in 1957 a study indicated that Colombia had 1,999 races that flourished in a variety of conditions, from ground level up to altitudes of 3,000 meters (9,842 feet) (Roberts, Grant, Ramírez E., Hatheway, & Smith, 1957). The wide variety of races available in Colombia aroused interest from international research institutions aiming to enhance agricultural production for food security purposes (Herdt, 2012). In 1950, the Rockefeller foundation and Colombian Ministry of Agriculture signed an agreement for the development of a research program for corn improvement (Roberts et al., 1957). The research program started by studying native varieties and further, it led to the development of hybrid corn. However technology had little impact on traditional corn production, having yields of 800 kg/ha while yields of industrialized corn reach 3,000 kg/ha (Ruíz de Londoño & Pinstруп-Andersen, 1975). In 1973, a reduction in cropped area triggered corn imports.

Unlike rice, the organization of producers of corn was not as powerful due to the combination of interest. Maize producers share an organization with other cereal and legume producers. The National Federation of Cereal Producers (Federación Nacional de Cultivadores de Cereales, FENALCE) was created in 1960. It brought together producers of maize, wheat, sorghum, oats, barley, peas, beans, chickpeas, beans, lentils and soybeans. FENALCE meets two functions for cereal and legume producers: lobbying and research through the Center for Research and Technology Transfer of Food Chain

Cereals and Legumes (Centro de Investigación y Transferencia de Tecnología de la Cadena Agroalimentaria de los Cereales y las Leguminosas, Cenicel). Despite of the relatively low influence of FENALCE in the definition of agricultural policies, maize sector received the benefits of the policies of prices, subsidies, cheap credit (for large farmers) and research support. This can be attributed to the importance of corn in Colombian agriculture and the focus of the policies after the 1950's on internal production for supplying the domestic market (as opposed to an external vocation of the economy). In fact, Machado (1991) suggests that despite of the low organizational capacity of maize producers, it was the *favorite* sector for the Ministry of Agriculture in the transition to an industrialized agriculture (p.126).

One the most important policy instruments (that still remains active) is the *Agricultural Promotion Funds* (Fondos de Fomento Agrícola) created in 1966 (Law 51) and updated by law 67 of 1983. For the case of cereals, the marketing activity must pay a share of the selling prices for promotion purposes – this is a 0.75% of the selling price of each kilogram of wheat, barley, oats, white, yellow, corn on the cob and sorghum from domestic production (Federación Nacional de Cultivadores de Cereales (FENALCE), N/A). The fund shall apply to the implementation or funding programs for the development of the sector, although the funds are public funding they are administered by FENALCE aiming to benefit a specific sector. This has been somewhat controversial due to the nature of the funds versus the administrative scheme and to whom they benefit, as a clear policy that spreads costs and concentrates benefits.

As it has been exposed here, several factor affected productivity in the maize sector in Colombia, however the strong protectionism that framed agricultural policies

between 1950 and 1990 resulted in a production crisis for the sector after an abrupt series of trade liberalization policies at the beginning of 1990s. The area in which corn was planted was reduced 263,000 hectares between 1990 and 1997. In 1996 the average yield was 1.7 tons per hectare and 3.3 in industrialized corn. This is very low compared to Argentina with an average yield of 4 ton/ha with no irrigation and low use of fertilizers, Chile with 9 ton/ha with irrigation systems and intensive use of fertilizers, or the United States with an average yield of 7.7 tons/ha. Colombia was ranked 90 in corn yield levels (Balcázar et al., 1998).

Figure 18 shows that industrialized maize had low productivity levels and production increase related to the expansion of cropped area. Although production increased in 1991, it was followed by a relatively small drop, and by the end of the decade we observed a significant yield increase until it reached the highest point in 2000. This can be attributed to the incentives for the expansion of agricultural frontier in Altillanura (eastern planes and Orinoquia rainforest)¹⁶. On the other hand, traditional maize shows an expansion of cropped area in early 1990s followed by an important decrease in the rest of the decade. The new focus of agricultural policies after the implementation of trade liberalization was on productivity based upon the forces of international commodity markets. The case of palm oil will illustrate this issue more clearly.

¹⁶ This phenomenon will be explored more carefully in the next chapter




Figure 18 Industrialized and Traditional Maize. Harvested area and production, 1987-2000

Source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, Colombia, Agronet (2015). Industrialized and Traditional Maize. Harvested area (annual hectares) and production (annual tons), 1987-2000 [Image file]. Retrieved from <http://www.agronet.gov.co/estadistica/Paginas/default.aspx>

Oil Palm

It is thought that African oil palm was brought to the Americas through the slave trade that arrived to Brazil; it made its way to Colombia in the 1930's but production for commercialization purposes only started in the early 1960's (Loma-Ossorio F., 2000).

The history of oil palm in Colombia can be divided into two stages. In the first stage government strongly supported palm sector aiming to reduce substitution of vegetable oil imports. Despite of governmental efforts, the sector had very low competitiveness

capacity. In the second stage, palm producers aim to respond to the dynamics of international market of commodities where palm oil became a highly demanded good due to its importance in the food industry as cooking oil and frying fat for processed food and in the non-food industry for the production of soaps, detergents, and cosmetics and more recently for the production of biodiesel (table 8). In both stages, palm sector has been widely supported by government through policies like tax-relief (law 9 of 1983) and credit for the sector promotion through entities like Caja Agraria and the Agricultural Financial Fund (Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006; Machado C., 1991).

Table 8 Stages and products in the production chain that is derived from Palm Oil

Agroindustry		Fats and Oils Industry	
Agricultural Stage		Primary Industrial Stage	
Crop	Process	Primary industrial transformation	Advanced Industrial Stage
			More complex industrial transformation
Fruit	Crude oil	Palm oil refined, bleached and deodorized (RBD). In bulk Palm olein Palm stearin Fatty acids	Edible oils Alcohols Concentrated animal food Fuels Emulsifiers Fats for snack and fast food industry Frying fats Ice-cream fats Baking fats Soaps Margarines Vanaspati
	Palm kernel	Palm kernel cake Palm kernel oil Palm kernel olein Palm kernel stearin	

Source: Loma-Ossorio F., 2000, p. 12

Oil palm acquired relevance in the domestic market (and further in the international commodity market) due to transformations in food industry where oil palm derivatives have become widely important in the industrial production of processed

foods. As diets changed, the demand for palm oil increased. Given the nature of this crop - perennial and late yield crop, different stages in the industrial process are required to bring a transformed product to the final consumer. In this process, vertical integration is necessary in the course of transforming the fruit and crude oil. This was one of the main obstacles that oil palm producers faced in the first stage of commercialization, the lack of processing plants that were integrated with crops prevented the sector from expanding. Thus, under the leadership of the National Federation of Oil Palm Growers (Federación Nacional de Cultivadores de Palma de Aceite, FEDEPALMA), the sector integrated business that performed the processes of the *primary industrial stage* (Mesa Dishington, 2002). This important institutional transformation changed the role of oil palm and permanent crops in Colombian agriculture. As a result, in the period 1987-2000 the oil palm saw rapid growth of harvested area and production (figure 19).




Figure 19 African Oil Palm. Harvested area and production, 1987-2000

Source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, Colombia, Agronet (2015). Oil Palm. Harvested area (annual hectares) and production (annual tons), 1987-2000 [Image file]. Retrieved from <http://www.agronet.gov.co/estadistica/Paginas/default.aspx>

Under the military and dictatorship-style government of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, there was an important push for the agricultural promotion of oil palm aiming to reduce imports of vegetable oils. Through the Decree 290 of 1957, the Institute of Cotton Promotion (Instituto de Fomento Algodonero, IFA) was in charge of leading the promotion of oil palm by implementing a research program to genetically adapt the plant to the Colombian ecological conditions, manage the human resource to provide technical support for the crop development and to assist the emergence of an organization of producers. In addition, the policy strategies contemplated tariff protection and government intervention to acquire domestic production (Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006; Loma-Ossorio F., 2000; Machado C., 1991). Under this framework of government intervention emerged a production model based upon an association scheme that included producers and industry; it established crops of 500 hectares in suitable areas of different regions of the country, in order to promote domestic production of oil and replace imports of oils and fats. As a result of this policy change the cropped area shifted from 250 hectares in 1957 to 5,000 in 1962 and a decade later after the first intervention, cropped area reached 19,000 hectares (Loma-Ossorio F., 2000; Mesa Dishington, 2002).

Due to the strength of this organization, strong governmental involvement has featured the path of this sector since 1950's. FEDEPALMA was born in 1962 to join not only oil palm growers but also representatives of the oils and fats national industry. According to Machado (1991), FEDEPALMA was able to create a solid organization entity with strong impact on governmental policies due to its ability to bring together interest of all size of producers and to include the industry in the organization. Meanwhile, Loma-Osorio (2000) attributes the success of FEDEPALMA to its

organizational structure, a horizontal arrangement where the information flux is dynamic and open with a strong focus on the sectorial interests rather than regional concerns, plus an associate but independent research institution – the Research Center for Oil Palm (Centro de Investigación en Palma de Aceite, CENIPALMA). Regarding the development of a research program in oil palm, instead of government and international research institutions agreements to enhance agricultural productivity, the core mechanism for advancing research was a strong private involvement in the development of new technologies to adapt the plant to the Colombian ecological conditions and prevent diseases that seriously affect the crops. Consolidation of this research program occurred in the end of 1980's, resulting in the creation of CENIPALMA in 1991. And it was only until 1994 (Law 138, 1994) that the government created the Share for the Promotion of Oil Palm Agribusiness and the Oil Palm fund, aiming to implement or fund programs for the development of the sector, research included.

Another important feature of oil palm is the structure of production units and employment structure. Table 9 indicates that production units larger than 1,000 hectares occupy 55% of cropped area with only 3% of the share of production units, indicative of large concentrations of land ownership. On the other side, the larger the unit size the less employment they create per hectare. This is due to the fact that the more land utilized has an inverse effect on employment. Due to the implementation of technology in large scale units, the need for labor decreases. Perhaps, it could also be due to something like economies of scale within the specialization of the labor force on the farm. Another important conclusion that can be drawn from table 9 is that there is an important number of small production units (80% are smaller than 50 hectares), which implies that there is

an expectation of long term benefits in the long run but under conditions of contract farming with larger agribusiness that can support the primary industrial transformation of the fruit. Vertical integration makes the oil palm sector different from other agricultural commodities.

Table 9 African Oil Palm. Distribution of production units and employment by size range, 1996

Production Units Size range (ha)	Production Units		Net Area		Employment	Area/ Employment
	Amount	Share (%)	Hectares	Share (%)		
Less than 5	916	44.6	1,311	0.9	2,669	0.50
Between 5 and less than 20	543	26.4	2,776	2.0	1,815	1.50
Between 20 and less than 50	184	9.0	2,414	1.7	812	3.00
Between 50 and less than 200	180	8.8	9,992	7.2	1,467	6.80
Between 200 and less than 500	102	5.0	19,907	14.3	2,534	7.90
Between 500 and less than 1,000	69	3.4	26,483	19.0	3,248	8.10
Between 1,000 and less than 2,000	30	1.5	18,983	13.6	2,164	8.80
More than 2,000	30	1.5	57,444	41.2	8,735	6.60
Totals	2,054	100.0	139,310	100.0	23,444	5.94

Source: Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006, p. 261 (based on information provided by FEDEPALMA)

Unlike rice and maize, oil palm did not suffer the negative impacts of the policies of free trade in the 1990's. One of the potential explanations for the path of oil palm compared to rice and corn, is the underlying criteria of comparative advantages in international trade. As oil palm demands increased and it is produced in tropical regions, the new structure of international trade made those *comparatively* more competitive. In a scenario of free trade of agricultural commodities based upon comparative advantages, economies like the Colombian, become a strong competitor in the international market of

commodities. However, this does not come without consequences both at policy and population outcome level. In the policy realm government shifted sector preferences to sectors that will potentially create economic growth. On the other side, as demographic shift occurred, population in urban areas changed their eating preferences pushing the demand for processed food up, but simultaneously this change further will create public health problems related to processed food and life-style changes (Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF), 2006, 2011).

Lessons from agricultural policies before the 1990's

Since this dissertation is concerned with the problem of food security, how do the paths of rice, maize and oil palm affect food security? As the cases of rice and maize illustrated, the organizations of producers (FEDEARROZ mostly) were capable of addressing policy decisions that affected agriculture, determining the path for consolidation of industrial agriculture, it further stagnated due to the strong government protection policies (Machado C., 1991). The upcoming of free trade in the aftermath of two comparatively weak sectors led to the crisis of rice and maize in the 1990's. Market approaches consider that agricultural protection generate perverse incentives for producers and create an indirect tax-burden on consumers (Anderson & Martin, 2006; Anderson et al., 2013; Bates, 1981; Garay, 1998; Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006). Government-like scholarship would suggest that these set of agricultural policies respond to the need to create a reliable system of food production, aiming to meet the functions of state as provider of public goods (Bejarano, 2011; Pingali, 2012; Suárez M., 2007).

However, the analysis of the Colombian case does not restrict the discussion to market versus state only. Not only the economic conditions but the political scenario

determined the path of agricultural policies. That is, due to the political and physical distance of Bogotá from some of the locations of food production, the centralized authority did not have a different alternative that accommodated the interests of powerful landowners. This scheme not only allowed the provision of food to the emergent urban centers (from their own hinterland) in a model of strong regional power with autonomous food systems, but also allowed politicians to maintain their connection with regional political chiefs-gamonales (Sánchez & Meertens, 1983) to obtain votes in a system of electoral democracy.

Finally, an important conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of oil palm sector in Colombia is the connections between urbanization, expansion of food industry and the emergent export market of agricultural commodities. The migration of people to cities and the expansion of urban areas had an impact on people's eating habits. Despite of the importance of staples like rice and corn, processed food (where oil palm is important), gets incorporated into people's diets, increasing the demands for these type of agricultural goods. Meanwhile, the availability of food staples apparently expanded through trade liberalization (not necessarily true in the 2008 food price increase crisis). Government start to rely on international production to obtain these goods rather than support national production exclusively, that structure is not only less expensive to feed urban population, but also please the demands of international donors and financial institutions. In the end, this updated structure of food systems also affected population health outcomes. Due to the incorporation of processed foods, we will further observe the increase of issues like obesity and other food-related health outcomes due to the change in nutrition patterns and life-styles that became part of the public health problems in

urban areas. Interestingly, this contrasts with issues like undernourishment in rural areas due to armed conflict, physical and cultural isolation and weak strategies for peasant population (Caballero, 2005; United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2011).

The changing notion of rural citizen: The role of “el campesino” (peasant) in the food production process

The policy shift from an economic model that focused on the domestic market mostly (except for coffee and banana exports) to a model of free trade had important implications for the definitional change in food security. In the policy realm, government faced the need to satisfy population feeding needs and simultaneously satisfy the agricultural producer’s interest. In this scenario, crops like rice and maize had two alternatives: competition or elimination. In the case of rice, during the 1990’s Colombian government maintained agricultural protection without impacts on productivity, and since national production did not meet the internal demand it led to increase of rice imports. Meanwhile, maize further suffered a structural transformation due to the government intentions of expanding the agricultural border in the eastern planes and Orinoquia regions supported by important private investments in research development.

Now, considering agricultural policies for food security purposes, it is important to mention that even if rice and corn are important food staples, they are not exclusive sources of foods and a lot of the food in Colombia before the 1990’s was produced at small farming operations (Barrientos-Fuentes & Torrico-Albino, 2014). But, despite of its importance the focus of rural policies before the 1990s was on large farmers and land owners rather than peasants and small-farming. This had important consequences for the structure of food systems because this model led to land and wealth concentration and it

hold the social and economic conditions of poverty among peasants that were relegated from the main economic processes -unless they participated as tenants or labor. Vargas (1987) conceptualizes the peasant economy (economía campesina) in Colombia before 1990's as a form of production that is inserted in a set of capitalist's relations.

Vargas suggests that peasant economy did not aim for the accumulation of capital but that agricultural production was for individual and family reproduction. Another feature of this model according to the author are: producers have direct control over means of production (even if they do not have property rights but just tenure) and the product of their labor; members of the family directly participate in the production process, constituting the most of the workforce, wage labor is occasional; there is not a clear division of labor as in modern productive units and land rent does not exist at this scale; both production and reproduction occur in the same space, which includes the housing and the production site. This form of production is labor intensive with little technological change and intensive use of land (Ruíz de Londoño & Pinstруп-Andersen, 1975).

Given the rural-urban distribution of the population in the 1940's the focus of agricultural policies was on one side to stabilize food access for urban populations while also pleasing rural elites that never legitimated the political power of Bogota. In this scenario, the aims of industrialization of agriculture focused on large farmers and not on medium and small farming and peasants. Instead, small farming depended upon informal credit for subsistence (more expensive and less reliable) (Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006; Vargas V., 1987; Vogel & Larson, 1984). Concentration of credit on large farming maintained the structure of land concentration and increased the income gap between

peasants and farmers. Indeed, data from the National Planning Department (Safford & Palacios, 2002) shows that the population share living under poverty line has been traditionally higher in rural rather than urban areas. Between 1978 and 1995 the share of rural population under the poverty line was an average of 75% compared to a 46% average among urban population (Safford & Palacios, 2002, p. 307).

An additional factor of rural poverty is related to the concentration of land (table 10). The liberal versus conservative approaches to land reform are at the heart of the long-term civil conflict in Colombia. Left-wing armed groups in the 1960's argued that concentration of wealth and land was the main driver of rural poverty and it became the rationale underlying armed confrontation against the government. On their side, conservatives have been reluctant to introduce changes in the structure of land tenure due to the structure of property that benefits land owners. In this context, attempts of agrarian reform have failed due to the ideological and political differences between land owners and peasants. Machado C. (1999) and Machado C. and Torres O. (1991) suggest that several attempts of agrarian reform failed because they focused on land tenure issues rather than the development of comprehensive policies of rural development. Attempts of liberal land reforms (1930's and 1970's) aimed to promote modernization by adjusting the property rights structure to promote land ownership among small and mid-size farmers (Kalmanovitz, 2000) and integration between agriculture and industry (Machado C., 1991). These initiatives aimed to introduce the transition from a traditional to a modern society not only by the expansion of urban areas but through the modernization of the rural and accessible periphery. However, rural elites have rejected all type of initiatives of agrarian reform and it has created a status quo that prevails over attempts of

reform. Indeed, Albertus and Kaplan (2013) suggest “it may be politically difficult to implement at a sufficient scale because it threatens the status quo” (p. 198). The land structure problem is at the heart of the dual legitimacy problem suggested in this dissertation, although modernization started in the stage before 1990s through the emergence of urban areas, rural areas remain traditional despite of the governmental efforts to industrialized agriculture and convey regional interest into a national interest.

Table 10 Structure of land tenure, 1960 and 1988

Size	Percentage of Owners		Percentage of Area		Mean size in Hectares	
	1960	1988	1960	1988	1960	1988
Les than 1 hectare	24.6	28.3	0.5	0.6	0.44	0.28
1-5 hectares	37.9	34.0	4.0	4.6	2.41	1.87
5-50 hectares	30.6	29.9	19.7	25.9	14.52	12.16
50-200 hectares	5.2	6.1	20.9	28.9	91.10	66.53
More than 200 hectares	1.7	1.7	54.9	40.0	730.59	214.90

Source: Safford & Palacios, 2002, p. 309

One of the political outcomes of wealth inequality in rural areas was the emergence of National Association of Peasant Users (Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos, ANUC). It was created in 1967 under the presidency of Carlos Lleras Restrepo (Liberal Party). ANUC is a peasant organization that includes low and medium income peasants and rural laborers aiming to introduce a comprehensive and democratic agrarian reform in Colombian institutional framework and enhance the quality of life of peasants. Due to the context of emergence, this group clearly exposes a Socialist ideology, concerning issues like property rights, role of the state and political organization of peasants (Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos, 1971).

However, the organization has constantly stated that they did not have connections with left-wing armed groups. ANUC has been relegated from the core structure of political power but in 1971, a large peasant mobilization headed by ANUC allowed peasants to recover 1250 *haciendas* and unproductive latifundia (Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos, n.d.-a)

Thus, the economic and political structure of rural areas determined differentiated types of policies for large and small farming. On one side, the analysis about rice, corn and oil palm showed a concentration of governmental efforts on large farmers, this was mediated by organization of producers who mediated the relationship between the government and producers. On the other side, medium and small farming received a smaller share of the government benefits in addition to lower efforts for the production of public goods in rural areas. This contrasts with the expansion of the bureaucratic state in urban areas. In fact, due to the conditions of social inequality in rural areas, the Currie Mission in 1949 (a World Bank initiative for institutional transformation) encouraged migration to cities in order to promote economic growth through modernization of industry (Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006). Under this context, in the 1970's Colombia started social policies aiming to attend low-income populations in urban areas starting an important transformation and increasing the urban rural divide.

The interaction between rural and urban areas: A symbiotic interaction

There is a clear divide in governance and legitimacy between urban and rural areas. The development path taken by Colombia before the 1990s created a dual path that strongly divided urban and rural areas. Under this model, urban areas are more likely to be industrialized and more prone to democratic civic engagement whereas the rural

periphery remain traditional and created the conditions for the extension of armed conflict. This is the result of a model of dual legitimacy that has preserved the stability of countries such as Colombia at the expense of comprehensive modernization. What we observed is that different forms of clientelism and patronage are more prevalent in rural areas. The form rural democracy was based upon regional loyalties (*gamonales*) and traditional legitimacy. Under this model, land owners managed to obtain votes from poor peasants by having the land ownership and maintaining a semi-feudal system of loyalties.

The history of twentieth century in Colombia is the story of *de iure* state consolidation. This implied the emergence of large urban areas, the expansion of the bureaucratic state and the formation of a structure for policy-decision making supported by model of conservative corporate state. However, as I illustrated in the first section of this chapter, central state could not achieve full political legitimacy across all the territory. Whereas urban areas started to consolidate as democracies (at least electorally), the story in the countryside was different. In order to balance the control and expansion formula, the central government opted for purchasing the loyalty of rural elites through the expansion of agricultural policies that favored large farming and land owners at the expense of peasants. This model also helped the central government to consolidate legitimacy in urban areas by having some control over food production internally. However, the existence of multiple micro-nations with autonomous food systems became an obstacle in the consolidation of strong modern nation-state.

Although there have been several attempts of obtaining territorial control over rural areas, government has always found limitations to perform the security function in the periphery. Theoretical approaches to state consolidation in Western hemisphere have

addressed ways that sovereigns sought to control territory owing to a need to internally exist as well as to prevent invasion from foreign powers (Tilly, 1992). Considering the history of state, control of rural areas through systems like feudalism and vassalage (Barkey, 1994), as well as through the modern processes of nationalization (Caramani, 2004) were seen as critical functions of emergent political institutions. This dissertation suggests that Colombia has been mixed these two systems. Under an ideal type of state consolidation, it was not sufficient to control a town or urban area since these places, while important centers of economic and political activity, were dependent upon local sources of agricultural goods. However, the formation of micro-nations with autonomous food systems illustrates one of the limitations for the consolidation of the state. While urban areas in the twentieth century in Colombia have moved at a different pace towards the path of modernization, rural areas remain traditional. The next chapter will illustrate how the changes occurred in the 1990s may have affected that pattern of state consolidation.

CHAPTER VI

WHAT HAS CHANGED? NEW GOVERNANCE FOR RURAL AREAS UNDER THE DYNAMICS OF FOOD SECURITY

The new meaning of rural areas for state existence

In the proposed theoretical model I suggested that food security is different now. Most people are urbanizing, changing eating habits, food types and food sources; this has modified the relationship between urban areas and rural peripheries. Indeed, because of international trade networks and the principle of comparative advantages directing the international market of commodities, many countries have increased agricultural production for exports, rather than for local consumption. Additionally, low competitiveness of domestic production in developing countries (compared to highly-protected agricultural sectors in developed countries) led to increasing food imports. These dynamics have changed how national governments understand and formulate food security policies. The symbiotic relationship between urban areas and the rural periphery to obtain foodstuffs has changed and allegedly altered the structure of legitimacy for central governments because nowadays urban areas need less and less of its rural periphery to obtain food. I am illustrating this shift in the case of Colombia and this chapter is going to tell the story of the allegedly definitional change.

In the last chapter I illustrated the political and economic dynamics of rural areas and agriculture in the twentieth century, and the urban-rural interactions as the

foundational aspects of state-building in Colombia. For this particular case, the regional divide (for political and topographical reasons) that characterized the twentieth century, and the interactions between urban and rural elites have limited the ability of the central government to consolidate the state across its juridical territory.

Similarly, this case has illustrated the role of regions in the consolidation of autonomous food systems in the context of a conservative corporatist state (political) and a model of industrialization by import substitution (economic). As a result, strong agricultural protection for the production of commodities like rice and corn contrasted with insignificant policies for rural development. Even though, production of commodities was important for securing food for emerging urban areas, the small-farming system was very important for self-sufficiency of rural populations and also the small surplus was critical for sustaining local markets without full integration to a national market. This model maintained the autonomy of regional food system but still the central government needed its rural areas to support (among others), population feeding needs. In this context, the prevalence of a semi-feudal system of land-tenure and policies from central government favoring large-farming, preserved poverty among peasants and ended up promoting rebellion in the 1960's. And, despite of the presence of bureaucratic state in rural areas, the political and administrative control remained in the hands of *gamonales* whom formed and maintained powerful armed groups that meet the security function that state did not perform. This section will illustrate the cycle where right-wing forces actively participate in the regressive re-structure of agricultural sector, increasing the urban-rural divide.

The underperformed function of state in rural areas

As explained in the last chapter, political system in Colombia is featured by a form of dual legitimacy. This system, characterized by a fairly liberal urban policy with comprehensive public administration and an authoritarian rural order administered by *gamonales* supported by a collection of semi-legitimate but illegal armed forces. This is the ultimate manifestation of the system of dual legitimacy that has sought to retain the functional trappings of modernity while placating populist demands for traditional types of authority. Under this framework, I have argued that political history evolves in cycles that consist of: 1) *a moment of political reform*, without structural changes in the political system of power, 2) *social disorder* that demands state intervention, and 3) *the use of the violence and authoritarian means* to return to a situation of order. Three cycles were identified in the twentieth century-described in the previous chapter. Next, I will describe a fourth cycle: 1991-2014.

The 1991 Constitution was a political agreement among different sectors of society that aimed to open the system to different political forces in addition to the Conservative and Liberal parties. It was also a mechanism to confront the problems of drug production and trafficking, and rural insurgency. Despite of the goals of this political agreement, the main challenge for the state thus far, was the control of the territory and the enforcement of property rights. As means to respond to this impediment, land lords and drug cartels among them, supported the expansion of private security forces to protect the *de facto* structure of property rights that was challenged by the expansion of guerrillas. An insecure rural periphery, low levels of rural employment, the increasing number of guerrilla members, and the situation of political and economic

instability during the 1990's triggered the advent of an independent and populist candidate to the presidency in 2002, Álvaro Uribe Vélez who won the presidency and ruled the country for eight years (López, 2007; López & Sevillano, 2008).

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, President Alvaro Uribe received the mandate from the people to eliminate the internal enemy: FARC guerrillas (in rural areas) and corruption (in urban areas). Elected as an independent¹⁷ candidate, Uribe represented strength and authority, conditions needed to reestablish order. His campaign slogan “firm hand, big heart” (mano firme, corazón grande) and the concept *Communitarian State* symbolized proximity ties to people and the mobilization of collective authority against a nebulous enemy that had imposed disorder and chaos. The power of his speech to call people against the *enemy* was an important aspect of his mandate and reenacted the ethos of a *nation* that although blurry, was required to move forward in the process of consolidating a semi-authoritarian political power.

Due to the nature of President Uribe's mandate, his government shared *ideological preferences* with the right-wing illegal paramilitary group United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Ducas, 2003). In fact, the history of the group dates back to the creation of CONVIVIR groups in 1994 (special vigilance and private security services) as a response to guerrilla attacks, an initiative that was strongly supported by the former governor of Antioquia, and further President Álvaro Uribe Vélez. AUC was a professedly independent armed organization committed to the cause of Colombian nationalism and the protection of property rights of the land owners and/or large and mid-size farmers.

¹⁷ Although he run as an independent candidate in 2002, Uribe's political career evolved under the Liberal Party.

The rationale of AUC underlying the fight against left-wing armed groups was to protect the social order and the economic and political interests of rural elites and business owners (mostly) that had been threaten by the deployment of guerrilla forces across the territory in the 1980's and 1990's. There is evidence of the increasing presence of paramilitary groups during the presidency of Uribe (figure 21). This group was responsible for carrying out assassinations of peasants suspects of being guerrilla collaborators, armed combats with guerrillas and the national army, violent displacement to recover or expand territorial control over rural areas likely to be used for agricultural purposes, drug-trafficking and extortion (Cruz Rodríguez, 2009; Franco A., 2007; López, 2007; N. A. López, 2007).




Figure 20 Violent events in Colombia. Guerrilla vs. Paramilitary groups 1988 - 2009

Source: Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos, CERAC (2015). BDCAC - Base de datos sobre conflicto armado colombiano, 1988-2009 (*) [Data file]. Retrieved from <http://www.cerac.org.co/en/resources/conflict-data.html>

(*) Note from the database author: This is not census information and it is subject to revisions and updates.

One relevant outcome of the *boom* of paramilitary phenomenon in the 2000's is that their practices embedded as *legitimate* in the political culture of rural populations - large and mid-size farmers, rural business owners and large-scale agricultural corporations. Although they were illegal forces, the justification for its expansion was the lack of governmental presence in rural areas to stop the expansion of guerrillas. However, this is an iteration of right-wing armed forces to maintain the *status quo* that have had presence in Colombian history for decades. What is different in this new cycle was their ability to obtain legitimacy across economic and political sectors, despite of their illegal character. This can be attributed to the nature of the presidential mandate, the character of the President (rising from a land elite and populist), the political culture in rural areas and the tacit acceptance among traditional parts of society of violent practices as mechanisms of social and political control and economic growth. In fact, AUC acted sometimes with the sponsorship of local bureaucracies and alliances with police and the military (Álvaro Rodríguez, 2008; Kalmanovitz, 2011; Romero, 2007, 2011). This scheme of armed power reinforced the ethical standards of large and mid-size farmer and business owners whom relied on violence as a mechanism for social control and economic growth. Indeed, during this period we observed that illegal practices strongly governed collective life. These practices that infiltrated the everyday life led to the normalization of violence to obtain political and economic outcomes (Wilches Tinjacá, 2011).

The relationship between national and local government and paramilitary forces is important to understand the dynamic of governance in rural areas during this period. In 2003, the government of President Uribe and AUC headed by Carlos Castaño, initiated peace talks, under amnesty conditions and declaration of paramilitary crimes. Peace talks

took place in Santafé de Ralito, department of Córdoba, an area dominated by paramilitaries. Under serious controversies, a peace agreement was signed and over 30,000 members¹⁸ of AUC demobilized under a controversial *Peace and Justice Law* that did not promote reconciliation and restitution for victims. Figure 22 shows the number of armed encounters between 1988 and 2009, it is divided into three categories: state armed forces vs. guerrillas; state armed forces vs. paramilitaries; and guerrillas vs. paramilitaries. Although important expansion of paramilitary presence occurred in the late 1990's and 2000's, armed confrontations between the state armed forces and paramilitaries is not comparable to the amount of battles fought between guerrillas and state armed forces. Although the number of militants under FARC and AUC by 2000 was comparable (20,000 and 17,000 respectively), it can be argued that the decision to fight one group over the other was not deliberate and responded to the national interest of eliminating the enemy (FARC) and not necessarily fight paramilitaries. In fact, the participation of paramilitaries in peace talks with government was the result of the government acknowledgement of their political status versus the pointing of FARC as a terrorist group and thus neglects any potential negotiation with that group (Pizarro L., 2005; Restrepo, 2005).

¹⁸ Originally this group did not have more than 17,000 but suddenly more militants appeared to receive the benefits of demobilization. An issue that was under juridicial investigation ("Miembros de las AUC sumaban 15.000 o 16.000, al final se desmobilizaron 31.000": 'El Alemán,'" 2011).




Figure 21 Combats according to groups in confrontation, 1988 - 2009

Source: Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos, CERAC (2015). BDCAC - Base de datos sobre conflicto armado colombiano, 1988-2009 (*) [Data file]. Retrieved from <http://www.cerac.org.co/en/resources/conflict-data.html>

As AUC performed the security function replacing and/or complementing the government in rural territory, they also developed their own political preferences that spread out across the political system through the electoral process (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Avilés, 2006). Unsurprisingly, paramilitary-backed parties and candidates have consistently supported tenure policies that advance the interests of rural elites, large-scale farming and the urban-based large landholders at the expense of a generally disenfranchised and poor rural population. As a result the concentration of land ownership remains very high in rural areas. The most recent measurement of land distribution in rural areas reports that the Gini coefficient reaches 85% (table 11), indicating a highly concentrated model of land tenure in the periphery (Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi & Universidad de los Andes, 2012).

Table 11 National Rural Land Gini, 2000-2009

Year	Land Gini (GINI tierras)	Property Value Gini (GINI avaluo)
2000	0,854	0,806
2001	0,856	0,806
2002	0,855	0,807
2003	0,855	0,811
2004	0,856	0,809
2005	0,855	0,809
2006	0,855	0,814
2007	0,856	0,817
2008	0,860	0,820
2009	0,859	0,845

Source: Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi & Universidad de los Andes, 2012

Additionally, there is juridical evidence of the paramilitary support in congressional and local elections¹⁹ (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Álvaro Rodríguez, 2008; Avilés, 2006b; Cruz Rodríguez, 2009). The public exposure of these agreements occurred in January of 2007 when a secret agreement to re-found the state was released. The know *Ralito Agreement* (Pacto de Ralito) was signed by paramilitaries and politicians (Congressmen and other elected officials) that were part of the Uribe's government coalition, in a meeting hold in 2001 in Santafe de Ralito (department of Córdoba, area of paramilitary influence), in the midst of FARC and government peace talks. This agreement occurred under the *Birmania Plan*, a paramilitary strategy to consolidate its armed power supported by drug-trafficking money (and sponsored by few members of

¹⁹ It is important to mention that guerrillas also influence elections in their own areas of influence, as much as are originators of violence, but not buttressed by the State.

legal forces) and further take over the government (“Los secretos de Carlos Castaño,” 2008; Puente B., 2008). The introduction of the Ralito Agreement states:

“Fellow citizens as our preamble states²⁰, "the people of Colombia, invoking the protection of God, and in order to strengthen the unity of the nation and ensure its members life, coexistence, work, justice, equality, knowledge, freedom and peace", today gives us the indispensable task of *re-founding our country*, signing a *new social contract*.

Everyone here today assume the commitment to guarantee the state's objectives: "To defend national independence, maintain territorial integrity and ensure peaceful coexistence and a just order" (“Texto del ‘acuerdo de Ralito’,” 2007).

Revelations of Ralito Agreement initiated juridical investigations against politicians involved with paramilitaries; nevertheless political clans maintained control of congressional sits, limiting the likelihood of political change in the next election cycle. The local support to authoritarian practices (that encouraged the use of illegal violence on the periphery with alleged ideological and political purposes but especially with an important economic component and social control) had effects on electoral outcomes such as paramilitary sponsorship of local and national elected officials (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Álvaro Rodríguez, 2008).

An important conclusion can be drawn from the expansion of paramilitary phenomenon. Although this is a cycle within the proposed model of dual legitimacy, it introduced an important change in the political system: it removed the exclusive control of the executive/centralized power from urban elites. The election of a non-partisan President that represented the interest of the rural elite reinforced the ethos of a semi-feudal system of local loyalties in rural areas and the use of violence as mechanism of

²⁰ Constitution of 1991

political and social control. Given the power vested by the executive power in a strongly presidential system, the values of tradition and authority imposed over the values of democracy. As a result of this process rural areas re-acquired value, not as food baskets for urban areas or wasted lands, but scenarios of economic growth in a context of increasing demands (and prices) of agricultural commodities like oil palm. The recovery of rural areas for medium and large farmers and land-owners became a strategy for national economic development that no longer attempted to industrialized urban areas exclusively but now to strongly industrialized agriculture under the updated narrative of food security. However, the high-costs associated with control of rural areas demanded a more active participation of private agents and their security forces. The role of preserving stability in the periphery to increase large-scale agricultural production was not solely of the state but it was shared with private entities. The next section is going to show the path of agricultural policies between 2000 and 2014, which was mostly governed by a rural elite leading the executive.

The new structure of food systems: the stories of oil palm, maize and rice

The large amount of agricultural protection after the 1950's under a model of import substitution did not favor competitiveness in international markets despite the introduction of technological change in some sectors. The upcoming policy change in the 1990's that favored international trade put agricultural producers in a critical situation because they started to face increasing food imports with lower prices while government started to dismantle price subsidies and production quotas and began an institutional change of the agricultural sector. Economically speaking, these changes aimed to shift from state-supported agriculture to market-based solutions. Given this new conditions,

rural areas suffered a critical situation in the 1990's that resulted in earnings decline for farmers (rice and corn has been described in this dissertation), lower rural employment and persistent peasant poverty. This conditions added to the critical situation of armed conflict in the countryside, where not only guerrilla forces deployed, but drug lords expanded, increasing agricultural land for coca crops (figure 23). Due to the conditions of agricultural sector and the situation of armed conflict and drug production, public policies in the 2000's emphasized in agricultural sector recovery and strategies for pacification of the countryside funded by the United States through funding from Plan Colombia, a strategy that led the war on drugs in the country.




Figure 22 Map of the evolution of Coca crops in Colombia, 1994 and 2001 (by municipality)
 Source: Díaz & Sánchez, 2004, p. 9. Authors based on the IGAC (National Institute of Geography) municipal map

In this context, at the end of the twentieth century the country went through one of the deepest economic crisis in its recent history, with a negative GDP in 1999 (-4%), government sought to manage the crisis by identifying and promoting the sectors that were likely to increase economic growth. Agricultural sector was one of those with growing potential given the increasing demands for commodities. In the time of a closed economy, exports were limited to products like coffee, tobacco and banana; and internally, industrialized agricultural production of food staples concentrated on rice and corn mostly. However, as urbanization shifted eating habits, industrialized foods became core in the diets of city inhabitants; this pushed the demand for goods like oil palm - important in the production of processed foods. Colombia met the requirements for the expansion of production of this commodity: located in a tropical region, some of the country's land is appropriate for the expansion of this crop. International investors (Malaysian mostly) put an eye on the expansion of oil palm in Colombia ("El cultivo de Palma," 1997). Under the new dynamics of globalization, rice and corn (seasonal crops) are no longer exclusively produced internally, whereas oil palm (permanent crop) had the potential for expansion and economic growth. This situation adjusted the structure of agricultural production in Colombia, importantly, since the 1990's we saw a shift in the distribution of agricultural land, where permanent surpassed seasonal crops (figure 24).




Figure 23 Permanent and Seasonal Crops in Colombia, 1990-2013 (cropped hectares)

Source: Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Colombia, Estadísticas Sector Agropecuario (2015). Cultivated area (hectares, national totals) [Data file]. Retrieved from <https://www.dnp.gov.co/programas/agricultura/estadisticas-del-sector-agropecuario/Paginas/informacion-agricola.aspx>

President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) had to deal with economic crisis, failed attempts of peace talks with FARC and extreme poverty in rural areas. As a result, his National Development Plan²¹, “Change to Build Peace” (Cambio Para Construir la Paz) includes among others the strategy, *Development and peace: instruments and priorities for peace-building*. Policies for the development of agriculture belong to this strategy, and they include: (1) production chains; (2) rural development; and (3) institutional change (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 1999). In fact, the news analysis suggest that during the presidency of Pastrana, there was an important push for the recovery of agricultural sector, specifically the analysis suggest that there are four important policy areas: increase of funding for agricultural loans, modernization of agriculture including

²¹ The National Development Plan is the basis of government policies of the presidents of Colombia in their four-year term. It is a planning instrument that links the President’s proposals and implementation through specific programs, projects and estimated budget. It is further used for evaluation purposes. It is formulated every four years considering the winning candidate proposals and the interests of various sectors of civil society.

promotion of agribusiness, increasing foreign direct investment for agriculture, and for the first time, expansion of agricultural frontier in the eastern plains or Altillanura. This area that has been considered by the central government as wasted lands due to the limitations for agricultural production (Grajales, 2013). Research innovations regarding soil adaptability started to shift the concept about these lands, and will potentially become the new hot spot for agriculture. The renewed importance of agriculture pushed private investors to acquire cheap land in areas like Cesar, Córdoba, Norte de Santander, Sur de Bolívar y Orinoquía²².

Candidate Álvaro Uribe is elected in the middle of the economic and political crisis. The National Development Plan named “Towards a Communitarian State” (Hacia un Estado Comunitario), democratic security, sustainable economic growth and creation of jobs, social equity, increase transparency and governmental efficiency. After the congressional approval of presidential re-election, Álvaro Uribe won the election in 2006 and ruled for four more years. The National Development Plan is an updated version of the communitarian state.

An important governance shift occurred after Uribe. Despite of his attempts to promote indefinite reelection, Uribe opted to support his previous minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos. Santos comes from the urban elite that owned one of the most influential national newspapers, El Tiempo. Despite of Uribe’s support to his presidential campaign, Santos’ policies de-linked from the focus that Uribe gave to his government. One of the main differences was the willingness to negotiate with FARC and the introduction of a victim’s law with a strong focus on restitution of land for the victims

²² These departments will further become areas for of control by paramilitaries or under dispute between paramilitaries and guerrillas.

(table 12). The rationale underlying that set of policies was the need to settled property rights to promote land transactions under the new dynamics of international agricultural trade.

Table 12 Legal changes for Agricultural Sector and Rural Development during Juan M. Santos presidency, Presidential Decrees 2015

Decree Number	Content
2363	Creates the National Land Agency (Agencia Nacional de Tierras, ANT)
2364	Create Rural Development Agency (Agencia de Desarrollo Rural, ADR)
2365	Winds up the Colombian Institute for Rural Development (Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural, Incoder)
2366	Creates the Territory Renewal Agency (Agencia de Renovación del Territorio)
2367	Create the Superior Council of Administration of Rural Land Use Planning (Consejo Superior de la Administración de Ordenamiento del Suelo Rural)
2368	Creates the Superior Council of Administration for Land Restitution (Consejo Superior de la Administración para la Restitución de Tierras)
2369	Changes the organizational structure of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural)
2370	Increases funding sources for the Rural Microfinance Fund
2371	Changes the organizational structure of the National Commission of Agricultural Credit and the Fund for Financing the Agricultural Sector (Fondo para el Financiamiento del Sector Agropecuario, FINAGRO)

Source: Salinas A., 2015, p. 1

The next section will show three stories about agriculture in Colombia after 2000. Their interconnections tell the new story of agriculture in Colombia, and how these changes correlate with the substantial changes in food security. As food security no longer means national security exclusively, agriculture is no longer a public good but an asset for economic growth. The ability of markets to provide food has increased not only food exchanges but also re-defined food security.

Oil Palm

The story of palm is about the potential economic growth in rural areas that were previously considered wasted and unproductive; this shift occurred under the principle of comparative advantages in international trade and the increasing demand for oil palm for the food industry in developed countries. However, this story of *progress* in Colombia correlates with events of violence and terror used as mechanisms to obtain land for agricultural expansion. The demand for oil palm increased substantially due to the industrialization of food production, and other industrial uses like cosmetics, cleaning products and bio-fuels. The factors that have pushed the rush for land for oil palm are the high efficiency compared to other oilseeds (yield and competitive price), increasing consumption in developed and developing countries -China is ranked first followed by the European Union, India and the United States (Sime Darby Plantation, n.d.), and although Indonesia and Malaysia harvest more than 80% of world production, Colombia has increased its participation and is currently among the 10 largest producers worldwide (Indexmundi, 2016).

Oil Palm is a permanent and long-term yield crop and this condition structured the business model. Initially this was considered a limitation for small-farmers with low levels of disposable income. However, the business model adapted and introduced *vertical integration* in the process of obtaining palm oil. The organization of producers, FEDEPALMA greatly contributed to the development of this business model integrating industrial capacity with producers in order to carry out the primary industrial stage to obtain palm oil (Loma-Ossorio F., 2000; Mesa Dishington, 2002). Small farms vertically integrated into this business model as producers under contract farming or cooperative

agreements (Loma-Ossorio F., 2000; "Proyectos empresariales en palma," 2002); however poor peasants did not integrate successfully into this model and instead were evicted from their land to satisfy the interests of the agribusiness of oil palm.

Thus, increasing international demands, ecological conditions on some regions in Colombia (located warm tropical rainforest where oil palm grows successfully), the strong influence of the organization of producers and the systemic conditions of political power in the late 1990 s and 2000's set the conditions for the expansion of palm growing. This resulted in a strong governmental support for this sector. Upon the arrival of Uribe to the presidency, agricultural policies provided support to large scale agricultural projects like oil palm via subsidies, cheap credit for large farmers, tax-burden relief and public promotion for the expansion of this crop. And despite the attractive conditions, security was still an issue for potential national and foreign investors looking for opportunities in Colombia (Domínguez, 2002, June 1; "El cultivo de Palma," 1997). Therefore, one of the pillars of the national development plan of President Uribe was the known *democratic security*; this was a scheme that consisted in a communitarian form of provision of security, where private cooperatives performed the security function as a supplementary to the government performance. This model had great support among farmers of different sizes and given the nature of power relations in rural areas, this model of communitarian ended up encouraging paramilitary forces as mechanisms to provide security and fight guerrillas to rebuild order in peripheral regions with potential for agricultural expansion.

The whole idea of productivity of the palm agribusiness spread out and paramilitary leaders (that were former agro-businesspeople) understood the potential for

economic growth. They encouraged a rush for land in areas like Urabá (Lower Atrato), Mid-Magdalena, the eastern plains and the southwest. This was a shared valued with the president Uribe and his coalition of government. So, as Acemoglu et al. (2013) argue, paramilitary forces and politicians shared set of policy preferences that it was a form of institutional incentive for both agents to collaborate in order to expand the oil palm agribusiness. However, the shared preferences of the rural elite, regional and national politicians and businesspeople led to increasing internal displacement due to the need of more land to grow palm. Indeed, Ibañez and Querubin (2004) suggest that there is a strong link between forced displacement and land concentration. Previous academic work and advocacy groups have also found the link between the expansion of oil palm agribusinesses and violence and displacement (Álvarez Jiménez, 2013; García Reyes, 2011; Grajales, 2013; Mingorance, Minelli, & Le Du, 2004).

The geographic analysis by department illustrates that the growth in oil palm crops coincides with internal displacement (figure 25). In the spatial analysis, there is evidence that departments with increasing oil palm had larger displacement levels. In this regard, two regions deserve particular attention, Mid-Magdalena (Magdalena Medio – red circle) and Urabá (green circle). Magdalena medio²³ is an extensive Andean valley located in the central part of Colombia formed by the Magdalena River, with abundance of natural resources for agriculture, mining and cattle ranching. During the 1980's and 1990's this area turned into the focus of paramilitary and guerrilla disputes and in the end of the 1990's and early 2000's it became one of the centers of paramilitary power

²³ Magdalena Medio is an extensive Andean valley in the central part of Colombia formed by the Magdalena River, is divided between the departments of Antioquia, Bolivar, Boyacá, Cesar and Santander, and to a lesser extent between Caldas, Cundinamarca and Tolima.

(Romero, 2007, 2011). The ecological conditions were adequate for the development of oil palm, but lack of territorial control from government prevented palm entrepreneurs from launching their business strategies. Thus, pacification came from paramilitary forces that were able to rule the area and led the expansion of agribusiness. The combination of mining, oil palm and cattle rising become important conditions for the expansion of paramilitaries in the region.




Figure 24 Colombia Displacement and Palm Increase (Ha), 1999-2012

Displacement data: Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento, CODHES, (2012). Número de personas desplazadas por municipio y año de llegada, 1999-2012 [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.codhes.org/index.php?option=com_si&type=1

Oil Palm Data: Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, Colombia, Agronet (2015). Oil Palm. Harvested area (hectares), 2000-2012 [Data file]. Retrieved from <http://www.agronet.gov.co/estadistica/Paginas/default.aspx>

A case of forced displacement took place in Las Pavas hacienda (2,800 hectares) located in southern Bolívar. A group of peasants (further grouped under Asociación de Campesinos de Buenos Aires, Asocab) arrived to this site in 1997 due to the abandonment of the land from its original owner. This group of peasants farmed the land for subsistence mostly until paramilitary groups forced them to leave the property, where later industrial agriculture for oil palm developed. The group of peasants returned in 2006 aiming to recover the land and obtain the legal titles because they were previous tenants but those lands were purchased by a large agribusiness company. They were evicted in 2009 by a judicial order, but the Constitutional Court declared the unconstitutionality of their eviction and they returned in 2011. Since then the land has been under dispute between peasants and agro-industrial companies (Aportes San Isidro S. A. S.) with large extensions of oil palm. While the case was under dispute, security forces that presumably act in the name of Aportes San Isidro S. A. S., threaten to kill peasant leaders, poison the cattle owned by the peasants, damage the subsistence crops and in general use intimidation and direct threats to force the peasant to leave this land (“Body Shop drops,” 2010; Franco A., 2007; “Lucha por la tierra,” 2014).

Another region that deserves special attention is the Urabá region, specifically the lower Atrato region that suffered an intensive expansion of paramilitary and oil palm crops starting in the late 1997’s. A peasant massacre carried out by paramilitary groups occurred in 1997 backed by the national army. This case known as Génesis Operation was ruled by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights against the government of Colombia for violation of human rights (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos

(CIDH), 2013), was the moment that opened the door for the expansion of paramilitaries in the Urabá region in the departments of Chocó and Antioquia.

This region became one of the more important centers of oil palm production in the country. Later, in 2014, a judge from Medellín (capital city of Antioquia department) sentenced 16 businesspeople after verifying alliances with paramilitaries to develop an agro-industrial oil palm project in the Lower Atrato. In the sentence, Judge Rendón Henao sent to prison businesspeople due to their participation in illegal acquisition of land, forced displacement and invasion of areas of special ecological importance. The victims in this case were mostly African descendant communities that had shared property rights. The compilation of victims' statements throughout the judicial process suggest that businesspeople arranged with the paramilitaries to prevent the return of displaced communities to their territories through strategies ranging from violent bullying, intimidation and direct threats, and also to push the sale of plots at bargain prices. Thus, people like Sor Teresa Gomez and Manuel Alvarez Remberto (two of the condemned people) who acted as intermediaries between the displaced and businesses for buying and selling businesses ("A la cárcel 16," 2014; Rendón Henao, 2014):

"Only a year and a half later, when the presence of paramilitaries in the region was consolidated, Vicente Castaño²⁴ invited palm entrepreneurs to invest in the region of Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó. That was how they arrived at Chocoan land companies like Urapalma S.A, Pamadó Ltda, Agropalma & Cia Ltda, Bajirá Palmas, among others, which ended up occupying the abandoned territories." ("A la cárcel 16," 2014).

By comparing data from massacres by type of armed actor (figure 26) and oil palm growth (figure 27), we observe that the period of increasing of number of massacres carried out by paramilitaries (1997-2003) coincides with the most important expansion of

²⁴ AUC bloc commander and leader.

oil palm crops, which consolidated a model of expansion. Despite of the structure of the business model, poor peasants were not able to integrate into this business structure and instead lots of them were ejected from their lands, under murder threats or their land was acquired to very low cost with the sponsor of local bureaucracies and intermediaries that worked for paramilitary forces.




Figure 25 Massacres per type of armed actor

Source: Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Colombia (2016). Base de Datos Masacres, 1980-2012 [Data File]. Retrieved from <http://www.centrodehistoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/basesDatos.html>




Figure 26 African Oil Palm. Harvested area and production, 2000-2014

Source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, Colombia, Agronet (2015). Oil Palm. Harvested area (annual hectares) and production (annual tons), 2000-2014 [Image file]. Retrieved from <http://www.agronet.gov.co/estadistica/Paginas/default.aspx>

Maize

The story of maize for the purpose of this dissertation accounts for the structural transformation of agriculture in Colombia under the shifted dynamics of food security. Maize has been a staple in the Americas since the pre-Columbian indigenous era; as a crop it is very adaptable and can grow in very different altitudes (from almost sea level to 3,000 mts). As shown in the previous chapter, traditional corn production was essential for the subsistence of small farmers, whereas industrial production although relevant for domestic consumption was not competitive and maize imports were necessary at certain moments. Although most of agricultural land was dedicated to corn along the twentieth century and it was a highly protected sector by the national government, the policies of free trade put maize in a very complex situation because of the likelihood of rising

imports due to an increasing demand for human consumption and the growing poultry industry versus its low productivity levels (Balcázar et al., 1998; Machado C., 1991).

The economic model of free trade, plus the 1999 economic crisis demanded for new alternatives to economic growth. Industrialized agriculture with a strong focus on capital private investment in previously known as abandoned lands was one of those alternatives. In the corn sector, national policies aimed to promote national and foreign investment in lands with potential for expansion but with high requirements of capital investment for technological change. A newspaper article from 2000 states:

“The savannas of the eastern plains that were previously dedicated to livestock and improved pastures to increase milk production, now have a great opportunity to get involved with various crops such as corn, sorghum and soybeans. Thanks to technological advances and genetic improvement that make these crops today better tolerate the acidic soils of the region.

Such is the case of the new hybrid corn launched by the Colombian Corporation for Agricultural Research, Corpoica, called H-108 which will involve large tracts of land hitherto unproductive and dedicated to herder, with low production costs and a generous return” (“La multiplicación del maíz,” 2000. *Original text in Spanish language, translated by author*).

As it is the central argument of this dissertation, this is not an isolated issue but is part of a larger conceptual shift in food security driven by population change, technological change in agriculture and international free trade. In fact, the punctuated moment that occurred during the 1990’s adjusted this path in the decade of 2000 because it introduces a second wave of free trade, with a stronger focus on sectors that represented comparative advantages. Once the first set of policies were introduced in the early 1900’s, it was proven that the structure of national agriculture was not prepared to support the upcoming of imported goods at lower prices due to better competitiveness

conditions or a strong system of subsidies in other economies. Therefore, the agricultural policies in early 2000s strongly focus on competitiveness. Under the dynamics of international trade, only large-scale agriculture can be competitive because of the ability of large scale producers to reduce cost of production in vertical integration chains. Industrialized maize adapted to this dynamic.

It was in the early 2000's when the eastern plains (Altillanura or Orinoquia region) were seen as the new alternative for the expansion of agricultural frontier; even though this region was traditionally abandoned by the central government and it was for several decades under the control of guerrilla forces and further disputes between guerrilla and paramilitaries, poverty, lack of public infrastructure and low population densities. However, issues like increasing demands for staple foods in the international market of commodities and changes in population diets and lifestyles introduced an important pressure to corn production worldwide. Instead of producing corn for human consumption exclusively, corn production is mostly for industry and animal consumption; this required a very industrialized sector with active private participation that responded these demands. A model like this require: high levels of capital investment, the development of technology and cheap land with potential for agricultural exploitation. Altillanura met this requirements and government promote these conditions among national and foreign investors. Under this model the cropped land in Altillanura shifted from 1,500 hectares in 2001 to 60,000 in 2009 (“Área cultivada en la Altillanura,” 2009, December 4).

In the 2000-2014 period the expansion of industrial agriculture in Meta, Casanare and Vichada departments was very noticeable; permanent and seasonal crops received

important promotion from central government through incentives like tax-reliefs, cheap credit and subsidies (Amaya, 2009; Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social. República de Colombia, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2014; Domínguez, 2010). The expansion of crops like oil palm, rice, corn, sorghum and soy became quintessential in the economic model of that region. However, as described earlier in this dissertation the structure of land tenure in Colombia has tended to concentration of ownership and Altillanura region is featured as one with the highest levels of concentration nationwide. The issue of land ownership is an issue that different governments have tried to bring to a manageable point. As a result several attempts of land reform have been carried out with small achievements, one of those was the Law 160 of 1994²⁵ that creates the National System of Agrarian Reform and Rural Development aiming to manage peasant economy and prevent land concentration, by establishing limits to the amount of land owned by a natural or juridical person in areas that were previously given to low-income peasants -under the model of Family Agricultural Unit (Unidad Agrícola Familiar, UAF). However, the structure of large-scale agriculture requires a different arrangement of land ownership, one that allows concentration rather than land fragmentation and a well-defined structure of property rights in regions with potential for agricultural exploitation with land at a low cost.

In this context, an important situation was described by Oxfam in the report “Divide and Purchase” (2013) where the authors illustrate the process of legal but shady

²⁵ The main purpose of the Law 160 of 1994 is “reforming the agrarian social structure through procedures straightened to eliminate and prevent unequal concentration of land ownership or uneconomical fractionation and give land to rural men and women with limited additional resources of ages older than 16 who do not possess, to small-holders (minifundistas), household rural women, indigenous communities and beneficiaries of special programs established by the National Government”.

process of land acquisition by Cargill through its subsidiary Black River Asset Management, of parcels given to peasants under the legal regime of Law 160 for the production of corn and soy. According to the report, Cargill carried out these purchases through a mechanism named fragmented purchases:

“[...] through 36 shell companies, Cargill acquired 39 properties in the municipalities of Santa Rosalía, Cumaribo, and La Primavera in the Department of Vichada. These properties together have a total expanse of at least 52,575.51 hectares, (equivalent to approximately six times the area of Manhattan). To acquire them, the Cargill business group made an investment of COP 73,000m, equivalent to USD 38.5m.

[...] Certificates for each of these properties show that all of them had been previously awarded to agrarian reform beneficiaries between 1991 and 1998 – that is, they are historically within the category of baldíos²⁶. Ten of them were awarded under Act 160 of 1994 and the rest under previous agrarian reform laws: Act 135 of 1961, Act 4 of 1973, and Act 30 of 1988. Therefore, all the properties are of a size equal to or smaller than the permitted maximum, which is the UAF unit designated for each particular area.

The properties acquired adjoin one another and, according to statements obtained in the field, comprise two large extensions of land.” (Oxfam, 2013, p. 18)

Thus, private entities manage to exceed the legal limits for land ownership in distant areas from urban centers. In these places local bureaucracies respond to regional loyalties rather than the legal authority of the state, making these types of deals relatively easy to accomplish due to the scheme of local power and the lack of accountability. In these areas the structure of property rights and land transactions are dominated by traditional canons rather than the rule of law. Following the mechanism of fragmented land, other corporations like Monica Semillas (Brazilian) carried out practices of fragmented land for the development of agricultural projects of corn and soy (Marín

²⁶ Empty lands owned by the State.

Correa, 2012; Mónica comenzará a sembrar," 2009). Public scrutiny occurs in the cities but the local situation remains the same due to the structure of political power where economic power strongly mandates the rules of political competition and public power. In practice, the local structure of political power and the definitional change in food security, have triggered public-private networks governance that have succeeded in the stabilization of the governing function in the rural periphery through the implementation of large-scale agricultural projects. Private agents acquire land at low prices and in exchange they invest large amounts of capital not only in the agribusiness itself but in the provision of public goods like, schools, roads or clean water systems.

However, an important issue that emerges from the structural transformation of corn is that the expansion of agricultural frontier is promoting land grabbing and the foreignization of national territories, a phenomenon that is occurring not only in Colombia but in different developing countries worldwide (Álvarez Jiménez, 2013; Clements & Fernandes, 2012; De Schutter, 2011; Grajales, 2013; López M., 2012; Zoomers, 2010). Under the current narrative of food security that pushes for augmenting food production due to population increase (especially after the food prices increase in 2008), land deals for large-scale agriculture take place between governments and foreign entities. However, according to Land Matrix project worldwide only 13% of this land is dedicated to food crops; other uses include agricultural land for bio-fuels and forestry. Table 13 presents the list of land deals in Colombia according to the Land Matrix database. Also, the International Food Policy Research Institute warned in 2009 about the risks and opportunities of land grabbing due to the increasing value of land and water:

“Food-importing countries with land and water constraints but rich in capital, such as the Gulf States, are at the forefront of new investments in farmland abroad. In addition, countries with large populations and food security concerns such as China, South Korea, and India are seeking opportunities to produce food overseas. These investments are targeted toward developing countries where production costs are much lower and where land and water are more abundant” (Von Braun & Meinzen-Dick, 2009).

Table 13 Land deals in Colombia by foreign investors, 2000-2012

Location	Investor Name	Investor Country	Intention	crop
Santa Marta, Santa Marta, Magdalena, Colombia	Odin Energy Santa Marta Corporation S.A.	Japan	Biofuels	Oil Palm
Meta, Colombia	Cargill	United States of America	Food crops	Cereals (no specification)
Mapiripán, Meta, Colombia	Poligrow	Spain	Biofuels	Oil Palm
Antioquia, Colombia	Agropecuaria Santa Rita	Chile	For wood and fibre	N/A
Cauca, Colombia, Magdalena, Colombia	Smurfit Kappa	Ireland	N/A	Eucalyptus, Pine
Pivijay, Magdalena, Colombia	Merhav Agro	Israel	Biofuels	Sugar Cane
Antioquia, Colombia	Compañía Agrícola de la Sierra	Chile	Forest unspecified	Pine
Vichada, Colombia	Cargill	United States of America	Food crops	Corn (Maize), Soya Beans
Meta, Colombia	Monica Semillas	Brazil	Food crops	Soya Beans
La Primavera, Vichada, Colombia	La Esperanza Timberland Holding Limited	British Virgin Islands	Food crops	Corn (Maize), Soya Beans
La Primavera, Vichada, Colombia	La Diana Timberland Holdings Limited	British Virgin Islands	Food crops	Corn (Maize), Soya Beans
La Primavera, Vichada, Colombia	Las Ventas Timberland Holdings Limited	British Virgin Islands	Food crops	Corn (Maize), Soya Beans
La Primavera, Vichada, Colombia	Potosí Timberland Holdings Limited	British Virgin Islands	Food crops	Corn (Maize), Soya Beans
La Primavera, Vichada, Colombia	La Libertad Wood Holdings Limited	British Virgin Islands	Food crops	Corn (Maize), Soya Beans
La Primavera, Vichada, Colombia	La Paz Wood Holding Limited	British Virgin Islands	Food crops	Corn (Maize), Soya Beans
La Primavera, Vichada, Colombia	La Esperanza Wood Holding Limited	British Virgin Islands	Food crops	Corn (Maize), Soya Beans
La Primavera, Vichada, Colombia	Canaguay Wood Holding Limited	British Virgin Islands	Food crops	Corn (Maize), Soya Beans
La Primavera, Vichada, Colombia	El Morichal Wood Holding Limited	British Virgin Islands	Food crops	Corn (Maize), Soya Beans
La Primavera, Vichada, Colombia	Paraíso Wood Holding Limited	British Virgin Islands	Food crops	Corn (Maize), Soya Beans
Magdalena, Colombia	Proteak, S.A.P.I.B. de C.V. (BMV: TEAK)	Mexico	For wood and fibre	Teak

Source: Land Matrix, 2015

The model of large-scale agriculture in the Brazilian savanna (Cerrado) featured by an important expansion of their agricultural frontier in a highly environmentally rich savanna (Brannstrom et al., 2008) was brought to the Colombian Altillanura by foreign entrepreneurs and supported by the central government. The development of technology

to reduce soil acidity and increase soil nutrients, paired with the discovery of discovery of the genetic code of maize in 2009 made this model more likely of success. In the context of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States²⁷, the national government of Colombia initiated the program called *Agro-Secured Income* (Agro-Ingreso Seguro, AIS) aiming to provide subsidies to sensitive agricultural sectors like rice and corn after the startup of the trade agreement with the United States (Congreso de la República de Colombia, 2007). “The government's plan, which is implemented through the Ministry of Agriculture will promote crop substitution, financing systems for technical training and support lines for the construction of irrigation systems” (“Gobierno presentó en Tunja,” 2007). However, an important share of these resources was given to large farmers not only because it was the original purpose of government but because wealthy families who owned large amounts of land and foreign investors used mechanisms of land fragmentation to obtain the subsidies from this program²⁸. The Minister of Agriculture under Uribe’s presidency, Andrés Arias was a big supporter of large-scale agriculture versus small farming arguing that privately owned land is more profitable both economically and socially than shared property or small farming (“El caso Carimagua,” 2009; “Tierras destinadas a víctimas,” 2008; Unidad Investigativa de El tiempo, 2008). Thanks to the case of AIS, Arias was judged and condemned to jail for his involvement in this corruption scandal (“87 funcionarios, contratistas,” 2009; “Polémica por evaluación,” 2011).

²⁷ Negotiations for the Free Trade Agreement between Colombia and the United States started in 2004 and concluded in 2006. Colombian government approved the agreement in 2007 it was declared constitutional in 2008. Finally the agreement was approved by the United States Congress in 2011.

²⁸ Land owners divided their property into smaller parcels and temporarily transferred the title to peasants or other members of the family in order to meet the requirements of the program.

Despite of the corruption scandal involved in the AIS program, it was not withdrawn from the set of agricultural policies aiming to promote agriculture. Instead, the updated program called *Rural Development with Equity* (Desarrollo Rural con Equidad, DRE), emphasized on supporting strategic sectors for food security purposes. One of its strategies “aimed at improving the conditions of financing agricultural projects associated with the planting and maintenance of short cycle crops that are part of the basic food basket instrument, they are of export interest or are sensitive to imports” (Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, n.d. *Original text in Spanish language, translated by author*). Although the focus was not on large farming only, the conditions to access the subsidies imply that the recipients have to meet some requirements in terms of secured land tenure, stable income and capital. In this context, the Plan “Maize Country” (*Plan País Maíz*) is part of this large strategy of national food security. It aims to expand areas cropped with corn, increase the national production of industrialized corn and reduce imports (Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, 2011). However, an important share of the national production of corn comes from small and medium size farming units under traditional form of production and due to the low levels of productivity (figure 28), these are not the main focus of agricultural policies currently. As the figure 29 shows, there is a clear regional divide between traditional and industrial maize. Areas with more densely populated, located in the mountains are more likely to grow traditional maize, whereas flat areas in the eastern plains and the inter-mountainous valleys are more likely to focus industrial production.




Figure 27 Industrialized and Traditional Maize. Harvested area and production, 2000-2014

Source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, Colombia, Agronet (2015). Industrialized and Traditional Maize. Harvested area (annual hectares) and production (annual tons), 1987-2000 [Image file]. Retrieved from <http://www.agronet.gov.co/estadistica/Paginas/default.aspx>




Figure 28 Industrial vs. Traditional Maize Harvested Areas, 2012

Data source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, Colombia, Agronet (2015). Traditional and Industrial Maize. Harvested area (hectares), 2012 [Data file]. Retrieved from <http://www.agronet.gov.co/estadistica/Paginas/default.aspx>

An additional factor that pushed the rush for land in Altillanura was the new use of maize for the production of bio-fuels. Although FAO indicated that the production of biofuels does not affect food provision in Colombia due to the low amount of land dedicated to this activity (Castello, 2008), there are negative consequences for small farming and low-income peasants because this model has promoted forced displacement (as seen in the case of oil palm), in addition to the very little set of incentives from government for non- industrial agriculture. Importantly, scholarship suggested that one of the main drivers of 2008 food increase prices was the concentration of production of commodities like corn for the production of biofuels, due to speculation and less availability of food (Suárez M., 2007, 2008).

As it has been argued along this dissertation, this new model has important consequences for state consolidation and rural governance. But the shift from abandoned lands to potentially economic developed areas was pushed by political and economic variables. Economically, Colombia saw an opportunity to expand agriculture thanks to free trade agreements and the development of technology. Politically, central government saw the opportunity to partner with private entities to maintain state presence without the traditionally high costs attached, indeed collaborations between central government and private entities led to the reduction of cost of governance in remote areas with important implications for state consolidation.

Rice

The story of rice accounts for how agricultural policy preferences shifted based on the current narrative of food security, thus the structure of food systems adapt to the new dynamics for food acquisition which ultimate re-frames the process of state

consolidation. For the case of rice, the last chapter showed the importance of the association of producers FEDEARROZ in the definition of agricultural policies. Its role successfully introduced mechanisms of government protection for the sector. However, the upcoming of free trade policies changed the situation for rice producers. Because of the internationalization of agricultural commerce, government does not have to rely solely on internal sources of food production but instead now can obtain food stuffs from foreign sources where the food staples, like rice are cheaper. Instead of incentivizing internal production, after the 1990's government focused its attention on medium and large size farmers that are willing to crop reconversion but also are capable of competing in the international market of commodities. Rice was never one of those commodities.

The discovery of the genetic code of rice in 2002 was an important research finding that changed the dynamics of production of the most important food staple in the world (Goff et al., 2002; Yu et al., 2002). This finding was celebrated as an important alternative to solve the problems of hunger worldwide but also brought about the potential risks of private control of genetic material for the human food security. For Colombian rice producers this finding represented on one side the potential to access to new technologies in a near future to enhance productivity but also the acknowledgement that the sector was not competitive compared to other producers like China, India and Southeast Asian countries. Along the 1990's and the 2000's decades the rice sector suffered the consequences of trade liberalization and reduction of governmental protection. This contrasted with constant increases of rice imports from the Andean region (legally imported and smuggled) and from the United States (Domínguez, 2002; "Importaciones como Arroz," 2001; "Sin arroz para todos," 2008) (figure 30). During the

negotiations for the trade agreement rice and corn producers were highly concerned because of their inability to compete with a highly subsidized sector, as it is the case in the US. In addition to the fear for the trade agreement, rice producers face the highest cost for inputs in the region (Domínguez, 2012), rice smuggling through Ecuador and Venezuela and reduction of government protection the end of the harvest absorption agreement in 2003 (“Fin a Compra Obligada,” 2003).




Figure 29 Imports of Cereals, 2000-2012

Source: Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia, SAC (2015). Imports of Cereals (Thousands of US\$) 2000-2012 [Data file]. Retrieved from <http://www.sac.org.co/es/estudios-economicos/estadisticas.html>

In the context of increasing liberalization of trade and population growth, food prices suffered a significant increase in 2008. It brought back the idea of protectionism to secure access to food. Population growth in developing countries like China and India account for one of the reasons for the food price increase, but also an income change among these populations increased the amount of food per capita (“El arroz, el maíz,”

2008; “La crisis de los alimentos,” 2008; “Los precios de los cereales,” 2006). But that is only one side of the equation, on the production side, the increasing demand for alternative energy sources due to the oil prices generated a shift in cropped land, from agricultural land for food-crops mostly to biofuels. These conditions created a speculation bubble that increased a rush for agricultural land affecting food production worldwide (Domínguez, 2008; Naim, 2008). Under a potential scenario of food scarcity, countries decided to keep their agricultural production triggering speculation in the food and land markets (Von Braun & Meinzen-Dick, 2009). After that crisis Colombian government focus its agricultural policies in sectors that were more likely to prevent insecurity (Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, N/A), whereas institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank opened a credit line to promote agricultural production in places like Colombia with an important potential for expanding its agricultural land (“La crisis de los alimentos,” 2008).

For the case of rice production in Colombia the consequences of the food prices were temporarily. Due to the potential for scarcity, irrigated harvested area grew significantly in 2009 but the trend in the reduction of harvested area came back to its previous path, the same production type had the first relevant productivity improvement in decades in 2014 but still the sector kept relegated from the government priorities (figure 31- A). Regarding upland rice-manual the 2008 price crisis had important effects on the expansion of harvested area and production (figure 31-B), this may indicate that a food scarcity can be managed with alternatives to industrialized agriculture like traditional farming; indeed according to FAO most of the food produced worldwide comes from small-farming units, rice included (Food and Agriculture Organization

(FAO), 2014); whereas, upland rice mechanic suffered market fluctuations (figure 31- C) Similarly, figure 32 illustrates that the areas of larger share of harvested area are located in the Altillanura, in addition to the traditional areas in the inter-mountainous valleys of Tolima, Huila and Valle Departments.




Figure 30 Rice: Harvested area and production, 2000-2014

Source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, Colombia, Agronet (2015). Harvested area (annual hectares) and production (annual tons), 1987-2000 [Image file]. Retrieved from <http://www.agronet.gov.co/estadistica/Paginas/default.aspx>




Figure 31 Irrigated Rice, Harvested Area per Department 2000-2014

Data source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, Colombia, Agronet (2015). Irrigated Rice. Harvested area (hectares), 2012 [Data file]. Retrieved from <http://www.agronet.gov.co/estadistica/Paginas/default.aspx>

The changing notion of rural citizen: Businesspeople securing food for urban areas

As it has been stated in this dissertation liberalization of trade, demographic shift and advancements in technology for agriculture have triggered a substantial change in food security. Under the current dynamics of food security, national governments do not rely on their countryside exclusively to obtain foods, instead international networks that dominate the exchanges of agricultural commodities determine access to food. Additionally, remote areas from urban centers that are highly costly to maintain for central governments play now a role for the state: they became a new source for economic growth due to the increasing rush for land driven by food price increases in 2008 and the new wave of demands for alternative energy sources like ethanol and biofuels. Thus under the current dynamics of food security, low-income rural inhabitants are becoming part of industrialized agriculture as part of the labor, and those that lack of alternatives (or have the option to leave) migrate to cities. In this regard, food production at large scale is assumed by private investments with the sponsorship of the government. However, government is no longer politically responsible for these areas but instead private partners supply the governing function of the state, backed by traditional rural elites that remain in power and which locations are no longer in the rural areas but in large urban areas. In this regard, peasants are no longer the focus of policies for agricultural development but businesspeople responsible for the creation of private wealth in remote areas.

However, the social and economic conditions for rural populations remain difficult. Poverty among rural populations remain considerable higher than in urban areas which disincentives peasantry as a social and economic activity (Machado C. & Botello

M., 2014). Instead, what we observe that the agribusiness man is the new actor responsible for food production, a system that has led to the farmer's detachment from the land. In this chapter I have mentioned the case of Agro-Ingreso Seguro (AIS), which main focus was industrialized farming as opposed to small- farming. The image of peasant is like a poor individual limited to produce wealth, instead business owners recreate the image of the wealth creators and thus they become the representative citizens of rural areas. The true rural citizens do not necessarily live in rural areas and the rural inhabitants do not get the sufficient capital and land to obtain the category of citizens. The Minister of Agriculture under Uribe's presidency, Andrés Arias reinforced the idea of large-scale agriculture as truly profitable while neglecting peasant economy as valid sources for economic and social growth. Paramilitary groups manage to reinforce this stereotype by displacing populations from their lands in order to carry out oil palm and other agribusiness. Under this model peasants are no longer necessary for the stabilization of food production.

Nevertheless, this narrative contrasts with the arguments in favor of peasant economy. In fact, FAO and other scholarship suggest that peasant economy is still responsible for more than half of the food production and employment in rural areas (Barrientos-Fuentes & Torrico-Albino, 2014; Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 2014; Maass Wolfenson, 2013; Machado C. & Botello M., 2014). This is a reality that seems to be neglected for the large-scale farming model and its current dynamic of land grabbing from foreign investors. It seems though, that the attempts of land reform in the context of a peace agreement carried by the government of President Santos aim to legally adjust the property rights structure aiming to legalize land tenure in order to make

it more accessible to private entities to purchase land. Therefore, it seems important the findings of Ibáñez and Querubín (2004) about displaced population in Colombia, the authors found that there is a minimum desire for displaced populations to return to their place of origin due to fear of armed actors or lack of community support to reestablish their way of living before they were displaced.

In this way, the organization of peasant (ANUC) adapted its role to the new conditions and instead of focusing on the goals of socialist ideology for land reform, they aim act now as a business oriented organization:

“The overall objective of the ANUC is "to organize, train and represent farmers in Colombia and act as a valid interlocutor, as an advisory and consultative body to the government and society to manage, defend and vindicate their economic, political, social and cultural respect and ensure full compliance with the guarantees that give the constitution and the law." (Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos, n.d.-b)

Similarly, agricultural policies since the early 2000's have focused on the development of business oriented farming, productivity, competitiveness and export oriented production. This model requires a business-oriented citizen rather than a small-holder which only goal is to produce for family reproduction only (or mostly). This has important implications for the political process in rural areas because peasants are no longer important for the purpose of governing rural areas. They are part of the labor force but had nothing to say in the political decision-making process.

The interaction between rural and urban areas in a changing environment: Two spaces coexisting under one juridical authority

Given the external push to expand large-scale agriculture to enhance food security globally and the internal need to consolidate rural areas, a new form of rural governance

has expanded through the development of public-private alliances for agricultural expansion. This operates both as a mechanism of external legitimacy, and a new governing strategy for rural areas. Instead of the concentric model for state consolidation, we are seeing that the “city-state” has emerged as the new norm in the process of state consolidation. As urban areas have expanded, their relevance for governance purposes have increased. In the meantime, traditionally abandoned rural areas are becoming the center of attention in the context of the rush for land, promoting the foreignization of state land. Thus land reforms carry out by central government’s aim to clarify the structure of property rights in order to be able to promote large-scale capital investments in agriculture. This has important implications for rural populations that had the alternative of stay in the countryside as part of the labor force or migrate to urban areas.

This indicates an intractable distance between urban and rural areas in the process of state consolidation. Regardless, the state still has to govern rural areas, as means to include these into the state and to reduce the cost of ruling them, the state has either take advantage of productive lands through agricultural policies or has purposefully abandoned unproductive lands. Today, given demographic shift (urbanization), industrialization in agriculture, and increasing international trade of food production; the strategy of central governments to rule abandoned rural areas has shifted towards strengthening state-corporate alliances as governing mechanisms to achieve and/or maintain legitimacy (negative and/or positive) in the countryside. Instead of an elusive legitimacy as Palacios (2006) suggested, we are seeing the normalization of the dual form of legitimacy in the new context for state consolidation. This indicates that the strategies to obtain legitimacy are different in rural and urban areas. Land reform is one of them, it

has been used for different purposes: obtain legitimacy, maintain the status quo, promote economic growth (Albertus & Kaplan, 2013; Barlowe, 1953; Besley & Burgess, 2000; Deininger, Jin, & Nagarajan, 2009; Guinnane & Miller, 1997). The recent reforms on land restitution indicate a clear interest in the promotion of economic growth in traditionally abandoned lands, aiming to expand the agricultural frontier in the eastern planes mostly.

The most recent approval of the Law 1776, 2016 - Zones of Interest for Economic and Social Development in Rural Areas - ("Por el cual se crean y desarrollan las Zonas de Interés de Desarrollo Rural, Económico y Social", ZIDRES) - is an example of this phenomenon. ZIDRES are defined by the law as territories with agriculture, livestock and forestry and fisheries aptitude identified by the Rural Agricultural Planning Unit (UPRA). In addition the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development will define the agricultural frontier taking into account the definitions of environmental reserve zones and other restrictions on the use of soil imposed by any governmental authority. The conditions for ZIDRES are:

1. They are isolated from the most significant urban centers
2. They demand high costs of adaptation for productivity due to its agrologic and climatic characteristics
3. Low population densities
4. They have high levels of poverty
5. Or lack of minimum infrastructure for transportation and marketing of products

Now, the expansion of illegal but semi-legitimate forces promoted a *violent pacification* of rural areas for agricultural purposes. This means that coalesce of

government investment in defense to fight terrorist forces (FARC) and confrontations between guerrilla and paramilitary forces achieved the FARC retreat and although they did not surrender, they accept a negotiation with government. The reduction of insurgency in rural areas indicates a shift in the meaning of rural areas for government and insurgency (table 14). Rural periphery no longer represents the place to battle to impose the legal authority of the government and state consolidation, but it is the new place for economic growth in the context determined by an increasing rush for land for large scale agriculture. As the notion of national food security has shifted, rural areas are not existentially important for central government, because they are not the exclusive source of food stuffs for urban population.

Table 14 Number of FARC members 2002-2014

Year	Number of FARC members(*)	Variation %
2002	20,766	-
2003	18,690	-10.00%
2004	14,840	-20.60%
2005	13,970	-5.86%
2006	11,783	-15.65%
2007	10,179	-13.61%
2008	8,777	-13.77%
2009	8,520	-2.93%
2010	8,978	5.38%
2011	9,075	1.08%
2012	7,873	-13.25%
2013	6,938	-11.88%
2014	6,700	-3.43%

(*)Estimates of Colombian Military Intelligence. Reported by: ¿Cuántos Hombres y Armas Tienen las FARC? (2014, August 26). Noticias RCN. Retrieved from <http://www.noticiasrcn.com/especialesrcn/conteo-hombres-farc/>

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

“There is a false concept of food security, the country does not have to produce all what it needs but Colombians should have access to cheaper and more competitive products”

Luis Arango Nieto, Vice-Minister of Agriculture (2001)

("Campesinos en vía," 2001, *originally in Spanish language, translated by author*)

This dissertation develops a theory about the consolidation of state legitimacy in the contemporary world given transformations in food security. Firstly, this research analyzed the theoretical changes in the concept of food security and its policy implications since the 1970's worldwide; this shift consists of moving from the idea of national food security as self-sufficiency to consider food security as the capability of feeding populations despite the agricultural production source. This definitional change was triggered by urbanization, industrialization of agriculture and liberalization of trade under the premise of comparative advantages in international commerce. These dynamics have altered the formula for balance and control of the territory in the process of state consolidation because central governments no longer need to primarily rely on domestic production of agricultural goods to feed their population. Instead, the expansion of industrialized food production has led to an increasing volume of international food exchanges and reliance on transnational networks for food provision. This, I argue, has produced a decoupling of rural and urban areas, yielding a new form of governance in peripheral areas. The theory suggested in this dissertation challenges the conventional

approaches to modern state consolidation in the sense that the monopoly of violence in the territory is no longer the core of state legitimacy, but alternatives to this model make also possible the consolidation of state political power.

Industrialization of food production, especially in the aftermath of the Green Revolution has positively impacted food provision for impoverished populations worldwide. However, this model has implications for the sustainability of modern states and legitimacy. The development of irrigation systems, mechanization, enhanced seeds, fertilizers and pesticides have had important effects on the ability of humans to produce food; technological developments in agriculture have increased crop efficiency, improving access to food and nutrition. Industrial agriculture has enhanced production techniques and reduced the utilization of labor force per hectare; thus, promoting rural displacement to urban areas. More recently, population growth, price increases and alternative uses of agricultural production rather than food (fuels, industrial oils/products), have yielded a rush for land in developing countries to expand large scale agriculture. Therefore, agricultural production is not a humanitarian cause exclusively but it has proven to be a fruitful business especially when it is performed at a large scale, promoting a form of foreignization of land (Von Braun & Meinzen-Dick, 2009). Thus, while collectively we can produce more and cheaper food, it comes at the cost of altering rural administration.

This dissertation suggests that food security policy as it is currently understood has been an important variable that seems to explain the apparent instability in the developing world. The decoupling of rural and urban regions in terms of mutual dependence has essentially established a political order characterized by rapidly

developing an increasingly efficient urban area where citizens are linked through shared civic practices and the rule of law and peripheral areas that are more and more a burden to be borne by an economically advanced metropolis that seeks little value in their rural citizens. Indeed, rural regions and the people that live in them are gradually seen as unequal participants in the modern social contract to the extent that urban regions can rely on multiple sources to satisfy their diverse food requirements. Rural areas become foreign countries, even to citizens who live in the same state.

Methodologically, this dissertation followed the critical case study approach. Given the newness of this theoretical approach, fleshing out the idea of the negative externalities of food security as it pertains to governance in developing countries can benefit greatly from a single case that typifies the expected relationships between variables. While it may sacrifice some external validity in terms of generalizability it maximizes the internal validity of the theory through careful process tracing. Thus, given the conditions of Colombia, this country has become a frequently used case by social scientists to analyze rural insurgency and poor governance.

A key conclusion from the analysis of the Colombian case, is that the *new normal* for developing world countries (and as I will argue also for advanced democracies) is persistent low level insurgency or ‘at best’ a rural periphery that is detached from the rule of law and civic practices that we associate with the modern democratic state. This indicates an intractable distance between urban and rural areas in the process of state consolidation. Although the state still has to govern rural areas, as a means to include these into the state and to reduce the cost of ruling them, under the current dynamics of food security the state can either take advantage of productive lands through agricultural

policies or can purposefully abandon unproductive lands. Today, the strategy of central governments to rule previously abandoned rural areas, such as the case of eastern plains (Altillanura) has shifted towards strengthening state-corporate alliances as governing mechanisms to achieve and/or maintain legitimacy in the countryside. Hence, legitimacy in peripheral areas differs from positive legitimacy experience in the urban centers and in that this dissertation suggests that rural legitimacy has been identified as shifts in negative legitimacy representation as featured by the traditional structure of political power that is dominated by regional landowners and to whom they are accountable. Although the patrons dictate the rule, they manage to coexist with the legal authority of the state by sponsoring patronage practices among local bureaucracies, that ultimately adapt the legal system to particular interest. Nowadays, the need for territorial control to expand agribusiness has been supplied by rural elites through private armed forces that have normalized the use of violence to promote economic growth (Oil palm).

The analysis of the Colombian case suggest four theoretical themes: the role of agricultural policies in the structure of food systems; the new model of governance in rural areas; this model's effects on state consolidation; and finally the notion that food security is not about food production exclusively.

The first empirical chapter illustrated the importance of national organizations of producers in the policy making process in the context of an economic model that was focused on import substitution as a strategy for economic development. This determined the path for consolidation of industrial agriculture that furthered stagnated due to the strong government protection policies (Machado C., 1991). This stagnation was made worse with the liberalization of trade and led to the crisis of rice and maize in the 1990's.

Market approaches consider that agricultural protection generate perverse incentives for producers and create an indirect tax-burden on consumers (Anderson & Martin, 2006; Anderson et al., 2013; Bates, 1981; Garay, 1998; Kalmanovitz & López E., 2006).

Government-like scholarship would suggest that these set of agricultural policies respond to the need to create a reliable system of food production, aiming to meet the functions of state as provider of public goods (Bejarano, 2011; Pingali, 2012; Suárez M., 2007).

However, the analysis of the Colombian case does not restrict the discussion to market versus state only. Not only the economic conditions but the political scenario determined the path of agricultural policies. That is, due to the political and physical distance of Bogotá from some of the locations of food production, the centralized authority did not have an alternative source of food and thus created policies to please the local powers that were associated with land owners. This scheme not only allowed the provision of food to the emergent urban centers (from their own hinterland) in a model of strong regional power with autonomous food systems, but also allowed politicians to maintain their connection with regional political chiefs/*gamonales* (Sánchez & Meertens, 1983) to obtain votes.

This dynamic partially changed in the post-liberalization stage. Internal crisis and the potential for economic growth in the agricultural sector pushed for a new set of agricultural policies, maize suffered an important structural transformation given the potential for expansion in the Altillanura region, whereas rice remain uncompetitive and production fluctuated. Thus, government shifted from protecting these sectors to incentivize shifts to crops with better prospects in the international market of commodities. In addition, as food prices suffered a significant increase in 2008, national

governments relied again on domestic production to feed populations. Simultaneously, other nations with unutilized land started to experience a rush for land purchases from foreign investors to enlarge agricultural production. This moment accelerated the expansion of agricultural frontier in Altillanura. But agriculture is not only the source of food but more recently the source of alternative energy like ethanol and other biofuels. The increasing demand for biofuels produced a shift in cropped land, from agricultural land for food-crops mostly to biofuels. These conditions created a speculation bubble that increased a rush for agricultural land affecting food production worldwide (Domínguez, 2008; Naim, 2008). After the food price crisis, Colombian government focus its agricultural policies in sectors that were more likely to prevent food insecurity (Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, N/A) in the context of no-real food deficits.

On the other hand, the analysis of oil palm sector in Colombia establishes the analytical connections between urbanization, expansion of food industry and the market of agricultural commodities. The migration of people to cities and the expansion of urban areas had an impact on people's eating habits. Despite the importance of staples like rice and corn, processed foods (where oil palm is important) are incorporated into people's diets, increasing the demands for these types of agricultural goods. Although oil palm was not the focus of agricultural policies in the twentieth century, liberalization elevated the status of oil palm in the agricultural sector in Colombia after the 1990's. Thus, the international structure of commerce, the ecological conditions on some regions in Colombia (located warm tropical rainforest where oil palm grows successfully), the raising influence of the organization of producers (FEDEPALMA) and the systemic

conditions of political power in the late 1990 s and 2000's set the conditions for the expansion of oil palm crops. This resulted in a strong governmental support for this sector via subsidies, cheap credit for large farmers, tax-burden relief and public promotion for the expansion of this crop. The problem of security generated by guerrillas was solved through private security forces that later became illegal paramilitary forces. This scheme performed the security function as a supplementary to the government performance. This model had great support among farmers of different sizes given the nature of power relations in rural areas.

The idea of productivity of the palm agribusiness spread out and paramilitary leaders (that were former agro-businesspeople) understood the potential for economic growth. They encouraged a rush for land in areas like Urabá (Lower Atrato), Mid-Magdalena, the eastern planes and the southwest. This was a value shared with the president Uribe and his coalition of government. So, as Acemoglu et al. (2013) argue, paramilitary forces and politicians shared a set of policy preferences that formed institutional incentives for both agents to collaborate in order to expand the oil palm agribusiness. However, the shared preferences of the rural elite, regional and national politicians and businesspeople led to increasing internal displacement due to the need of more land to grow palm. Indeed, Ibañez and Querubin (2004) suggest that there is a strong link between forced displacement and land concentration. Previous academic work and advocacy groups have also found the link between the expansion of oil palm agribusinesses and violence and displacement (Álvarez Jiménez, 2013; García Reyes, 2011; Grajales, 2013; Mingorance, Minelli, & Le Du, 2004). The geographic analysis by department illustrates that the growth in oil palm crops coincides with internal

displacement (figure 25), this dissertation provided evidence that departments with increasing oil palm had larger displacement levels.

Thus, under the current dynamics of food security peasants are no longer responsible for food provision, instead businesspeople are responsible for performing this function. Businesspeople take advantage of the available cheap land (low opportunity cost) to carry out large capital investments. Under this model, farmers that are detached from the land play a central role in defining rules in the periphery sponsored by the central government. Although those private entities contribute to the definition of political order they are a business class rather than peasantry. In this context, an adjustment in the land rights structure was necessary (carried out by President Santos). Under the current land reform, peasants acquire property rights, but they cannot afford capital investment (government do not offer credit alternatives). Businesspeople carry out large capital investments with high profitability and high government benefits. While peasants own the land they either rent it or utilize it under mechanisms such as: strategic alliances, cooperatives, and/or contract farming.

In fact, private entities manage to exceed the legal limits for land ownership in distant areas from urban centers. In these places local bureaucracies respond to regional loyalties rather than the legal authority of the state, making these types of deals relatively easy to accomplish due to the scheme of local power and the lack of accountability. In these areas the structure of property rights and land transactions are dominated by traditional canons rather than the rule of law. In practice, the local structure of political power and the definitional change in food security, have triggered public-private networks of governance that have succeeded in the stabilization of the governing function

in the rural periphery through the implementation of large-scale agricultural projects. Private agents acquire land at low prices and in exchange they invest large amounts of capital not only in the agribusiness itself but in the provision of public goods like, schools, roads or clean water systems.

However, an important issue that emerges from the structural transformation of corn is that the expansion of agricultural frontier is promoting land grabbing and the foreignization of national territories, a phenomenon that is occurring not only in Colombia but in different developing countries worldwide (Clements & Fernandes, 2012; De Schutter, 2011; Grajales, 2013; López M., 2012; Zoomers, 2010). Under the current narrative of food security that pushes for augmenting food production due to population increase (especially after the food prices increase in 2008), land deals for large-scale agriculture take place between governments and foreign entities. However, according to Land Matrix project worldwide only 13% of this land is dedicated to food crops; other uses include agricultural land for bio-fuels and forestry.

Finally, the rush for land for large-scale agriculture to enhance food security globally and the internal need to control rural areas, produced a new form of rural governance through the development of public-private alliances for agricultural expansion. This operates as a governing plan for rural areas. Under these conditions, rural areas remain part of the juridical state as potential zones for economic development but are not politically integrated with urban centers. Thus, this creates a form of dual legitimacy where the rule of law, bureaucratic state and democratic mechanisms beyond the electoral process prevail in urban areas, whereas in peripheral areas there is a prevalence of tradition and kinship in the structure of political power and a public

administration that does not comply with the legal power of the state; this structure has recently merged with the increasing demands of land for large-scale agriculture that has been taking advantage of private armed forces and normalizing violence as means to achieve economic growth.

The expansion of illegal but semi-legitimate forces promoted a *violent pacification* of rural areas for agricultural purposes. This led to a coalescence of government investment in defense to fight terrorist forces (FARC) and confrontations between guerrilla and paramilitary forces achieved the FARC retreat and although they did not surrender, they accept a negotiation with government. The reduction of insurgency in rural areas indicates a shift in the meaning of rural areas for government and insurgency. Rural periphery no longer represents the place to battle and impose the legal authority of the government for state consolidation, but it is the new place for economic growth in the context determined by an increasing rush for land for large scale agriculture. As the notion of national food security has shifted, rural areas are not existentially important for central government, because they are not the exclusive source of food stuffs for urban population.

Instead of the concentric model for state consolidation, we are seeing that the *city-state* has emerged as the new norm in the process of state consolidation. As urban areas have expanded, their relevance for governance purposes has increased. In the meantime, traditionally abandoned rural areas are becoming the center of attention in the context of the rush for land, promoting the foreignization of state land. Thus land reforms carried out by central government's aim to clarify the structure of property rights in order to be able to promote large-scale capital investments in agriculture. This has important

implications for rural populations that had the alternative to stay in the countryside as part of the labor force or migrate to urban areas. In the case of Colombia the land reform started in 2011 with the victims law aiming to maintain the status quo but also to promote economic growth (Albertus & Kaplan, 2013; Barlowe, 1953; Besley & Burgess, 2000; Deininger et al., 2009; Guinnane & Miller, 1997). Instead of an elusive legitimacy as Palacios (2006) suggested, we are seeing the normalization of the dual form of legitimacy in the new context for state consolidation.

To conclude, it is worth saying that rural areas are nowadays valuable for centralized governments if the cost of ruling them is shared with private entities and they are likely to create economic growth. Therefore, pacification is important for economic purposes, not for political reasons (negative legitimacy). Thus, is the Leviathan defeated in the Colombian case? It can be said that it has failed under the modern normative standards of state consolidation but it has succeeded in the stabilization of the governing function. Instead, the case of Colombia serves as the empirical evidence of a theoretical model that illustrates the creation of a new norm for state consolidation in the developing world. In this regard, a theory of legitimacy and therefore Public Administration for the developing world must explain how the mechanisms to administrating are legitimate and relevant or the social contract will collapse. This dissertation examined and diagnosed the theoretical underpinnings in the new model of state consolidation around the issue of food security, policy implications and administrative/government functions and/or actions within this context to regain legitimacy or serve the public will be explored in future work.

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APPENDIX A

TIME LINE OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES, 2000-2014

Table 15 Time line of Agricultural Policies, 2000-2014

2000	2001	2002	2003
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agricultural loans • Agricultural sector recovery • Attempts of modernization • Increase of food imports & lower prices for urban areas • Expansion of agricultural frontier in Altillanura • Expansion of agribusiness • Increasing of Foreign Direct Investment • Effects of international trade: low rural employment and increasing violence in rural areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expansion of agricultural frontier in Altillanura for annual and perennial crops (corn) • Government investment in competitiveness and productivity • Increasing supply of food in Bogota-price reduction • Increase of food imports (hit the rice sector mostly) • Increasing costs of agricultural production • Market v State in agricultural sector • Regions with cheap land: Cesar, Cordoba, Norte de Santander, Sur de Bolivar, Orinoquia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Permanent crops benefiting from international agricultural trade • Increasing agricultural subsidies before starting negotiations for Trade Agreement with Colombia • Reduction in areas sown with rice • Researchers find the genetic map of rice (cheap staples in international markets. This benefits corporations who own the technology) • Malaysian palm investors seek to expand in Latin America (Brazil and Colombia), this requires security • Strategic alliances • Corpoica launches a form of hybrid corn • Altillanura has more potential than Cerrado Brasileiro • Development and Peace Program in Magdalena Medio to grow Palm 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Income tax exemption for perennial farmers dedicated to perennial crops • Technified corn, palm and rice pulled agricultural sector growing • Increasing of oil palm prices in international markets • Increasing oil palm exports and increasing food imports • Policies aiming to increase the amount of irrigation systems available • Harvest absorption agreement ends • Low-cost of land in Piedemonte llanero. It's likely to attract private investment • Expansion of agricultural frontier in Altillanura • Oil palm offers comparative advantages. Cereals are not competitive (i.e. rice) • Need to promote export-oriented agriculture, this increases wealth • Introduction of GMOs

Table 15 (continued)

2004	2005	2006
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • *Paramilitary demobilizations start *Santa Fe de Ralito Peace talks *Millers v rice producers. • *Oil Palm for biofuels • *Negotiations on free trade agreement • *Prices of commodities dropped affecting Oil Palm, Rice and Corn • *Expansion of agricultural frontier in Altillanura requires investment in research, roads, crop rotation • *Concerns for trade negotiations • *Rice market is saturated with imports from the Andean region • *Concerns for trade agreement and GMOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace and Justice law is approved • Orinoquia region represents opportunities in the upcoming trade agreement • Small-scale farmers associations in Altillanura to grow corn • Paramilitaries and illegal acquisition of land for agriculture • Alternative energy sources boom • Government incentivizes Oil Palm Crops • Loan for large business owners, Paramilitaries and loan sharks loan to small-scale farmers. A vicious circle • Expansion of agricultural frontier in Altillanura growing Oil Palm • Annual crops prices dropped except for rice • Tests to grow using GMOs by owned by Monsanto • Increasing rural poverty 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • End of negotiations for the free trade agreement with the US. President Bush is looking for approval in Congress. Sensitive goods: rice and corn, they are not competitive • Poor performance of agricultural sector in 2005 • Draft of Agro Ingreso Seguro (AIS) law to protect sectors affected by the free trade agreement. Aims to sponsor crop conversion, land improvement, water management and infrastructure • Peasant economy, the most affected by the trade agreement *Increase of cereal prices • Increasing food imports worldwide • Paramilitaries promise to return illegally obtained land as form of reparation to victims. Lands that have been use to grow palm are part of these/upcoming conflict • Expansion of agricultural frontier in Altillanura • Increasing number of hectares planted with permanent crops versus decreasing number planted with temporary crops

Table 15 (continued)

2007	2008	2009
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Colombian Congress approves Free Trade Agreement with US (Law 1143, 2007) • Internal displacement caused by expansion of palm crops. Business take advantage of government benefits at expense of peasants • It is expected that AIS resources go to large business. It is an incentive for large-scale agriculture. Difficult to implement in areas dominated by minifundia • Government strategies aiming to improve competitiveness • Illegal transactions with agricultural land • Boom for biofuels keeps growing • The illegal Ralito Pact was disclosed. Aiming to re-found the country. Beginning of paramilitary politics scandal. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constitutional Court declares that Free trade agreement is constitutional • Increasing of food prices worldwide. Hunger is affecting not only rural but urban areas. Return to national protectionism to secure access to food • Agricultural sector grows at slow pace • Inter-american Development Bank: Loans to encourage food production • Carimagua: looking for private investors in land that belongs to people displaced by violence • Biofuels: In Colombia biofuels and food are not competing because there is not land scarcity (Uribe) • The country is shielded against food scarcity. This contrasts with undernourishment among minorities and in rural areas • Increasing of land prices in Altillanura • Vertical integration in food industry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Former Ministry of Agriculture is using AIS to promote his presidential campaign • Cambio Magazine report on irregular granting of AIS subsidies to wealthy families (October). Using the strategy of land fractioning to obtain more subsidies • AIS and government assume that only large scale agriculture can increase wealth and lead to progress. Therefore AIS is not for small-scale farmer and peasants. • Government incentives for permanent crops • Changes in Orinoquia region that is promoting economic growth but is causing environmental damages-affecting water cycles, changing ecosystems • Altillanura shifted from 1500 cultivated hectares in early 2000s to 60000 hectares • Puerto Gaitan became the "capital" of Altillanura • Monica Semillas ended the land development of 3,000 hectares in Altillanura (rice and soy). 19 foreign investors in that region • Researchers find the corn genome (cheap staples in international markets. This benefits corporations who own the technology)

Table 15 (continued)

2010	2011	2012
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AIS trial. It is argued that AIS is not for small-scale farmers and poor peasants but large business • Land grabbing by foreigners. Presence in Altillanura: Monica, Cargill, Maggi (Brazil) • Rough situation for cereal growers under free trade agreement • Interests groups in agriculture demand from government to designate Altillanura as an Special Zone of Agricultural Development to replicate the Cerrado experience • Altillanura is associated with Food Security. But it requires technology in order to increase productivity • Illegal acquisition of land for agriculture. Lands were stripped from peasants by paramilitaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US Congress approves the free trade agreement with Colombia • Forest First notified Colombian government about its interest to develop an agricultural project of 10,000 hectares in Altillanura • National government project to build the road to connect Meta and Vichada. Also to fund the project for the navigability of Meta river. • Rural Development with Equity Program (DRE) replaces AIS • New policy focus: agricultural production aiming to stabilize food security • Expansion of areas cultivated with GMOs • Victims and Land Restitution Law 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Free trade agreement starts • High prices of rice in Colombia compared to regional prices • Importance of corn in the international commodity market • Government efforts to protect rice sector are not enough according to Fedearroz • According to FAO there is no conflict between biofuels and food production in Colombia • Increasing purchase of arable lands by foreign investors. • ENSIN 2010 survey found that there is an increasing number of obese and overweight people • IFPRI suggest about the hazards of foreign land grabbing • Peace talks with FARC start. Fedegan (cattle ranchers federation) neglects to participate in the conversation • Strategic alliances position peasants as workers preventing them from farming • Anti-restitution illegal armies

Table 15 (continued)

2013	2014
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uncertainty for property rights in Altillanura. Acquisition and land tenure problems. Empty lands own by the State • There is a need to clarify property rights to attract foreign investment in agriculture • Empty lands law: Decree 1465-July 10, 2003. Empty lands accumulation cases (El Tiempo, June 13) • Strong focus on the potential for expansion in Altillanura • Draft of Zidres Law to Congress (Special zones of agricultural development) • Infant undernourishment among indigenous communities • Resolution 970 about sees. ICA burnt seeds belonging to farmers. They did not comply with the technical requirements. Ignoring peasant tradition to collect and maintain the best seeds for the next harvest to incorporate laboratory seeds in the farming process • Arable land shifted from annual to perennial crops. The trend is getting stronger 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CONPES Altillanura • Special regime for unproductive areas distant from the center that require high amounts of investment to increase productivity. Willingness of government to share governing function • US Farm Bill. Impacts on Colombian farmers • Small-scale farming is still feeding more people than large-scale agriculture (FAO). It is central for food security • Food insecurity among Wayuu indigenous groups

Time line was created based on the content analysis of news articles from El Tiempo.